

How Do Grice and Strawson End Up in a Rabbit Hole?

Grice ve Strawson Çıkmazı

YUNUS AYDEMİR 

Middle East Technical University

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Abstract: Since Kant's usage of analytic and synthetic to divide propositions into two categories, there have been many different philosophers who have used the same distinction over time. However, this does not necessarily mean that every philosopher who uses this distinction for their philosophical purposes actually favors it. The most important of all is unquestionably Willard Van Orman Quine. He defines the existence of the distinction as an unempirical dogma of empiricists or a metaphysical article of faith. To him such a distinction does not exist. He believes he offers enough proofs for this claim in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Alternatively, Grice and Strawson strongly believe in the distinction. Therefore, they write an article, namely In Defense of a Dogma, to refute Quine's claims. The main objective in this study is to demonstrate that the response by Grice and Strawson does not work at all.

Keywords: Analytic and synthetic distinction, analytic propositions, synthetic propositions, two dogmas of empiricism, in defense of a dogma.



Introduction

It has been approximately seven decades since the world came to know Quine's ideas on analytic and synthetic truths. In his '*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*' (1951) Quine, mainly argues that analytic truths and reductionism *are not* or even *cannot* be what they are meant to be. In doing so, he follows a rather unique and queer method. It is mainly this method and his claims that lead to some kind of uprising, so to speak. One of the most prominent and block-busting replies was raised by H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson in their '*In Defense of a Dogma*' (1956). Their reply was block-busting because it was not only a relief for defending a very long tradition, but it was also a relief for those who could not bear Quine's radical maneuver.

Now, this article does not claim to defend either Quine or Grice and Strawson on their ideas, because as a matter of fact I do not know whether Quine is right or not, even whether the tradition that he criticizes on certain grounds has a say or not, yet. As a fact, studies on Quine's ideas on this matter are generally not in favor of him. For example, Hilary Putnam, a revisionist in the matters related to analytic vs. synthetic distinction, in his '*Two Dogmas Revisited*' (1983) is suggesting that Quine is actually attacking the term '*a priori*', that Quine's first dogma should actually be taken to stress that there is not a distinction between a priori and a posteriori instead of claiming that there is no distinction between analytic vs. synthetic (Putnam, 1983: 87-88). My aim here is not to take a side. Rather, this article mainly claims that the reply that is given by Grice and Strawson does not function at all, let alone having enough and sound tools to do that. While trying to do this I leave aside the polemics on the nature of such an existence in terms of the distinction.

Charles R. Pigden in his '*Two Dogmatists*' (1987) manifests a similar¹ approach, as I do in this article, with differences and some points that might be helpful. For one thing one difference is that he finds it fit to start his critique on the history of the analytic vs. synthetic distinction claiming that the distinction is rather new when compared to the distinctions of

¹ The only similarity in both articles is the main idea that we both have; which is what Grice and Strawson put forward is not good enough to refute Quine's claims. Except this the points that Charles R. Pigden stresses upon are totally different than the points I stress in this article.



‘necessary and contingent’, ‘a priori and a posteriori’, ‘truth of reason and truth of fact’ on which Grice and Strawson so eagerly and hastily develop their philosophy and take them as if they are one and the same thing as analytic vs. synthetic. For instance, Pigden, leaning on this matter, is telling us that “*the necessary / contingent distinction goes back to Aristotle at least, but only coincides with the analytic / synthetic in the writings of empiricists and their followers.*” (Pigden, 178-179). The same thing goes for the binary terms that were just mentioned and he claims that with some research it is clear enough that they do not come to the same meaning with analytic vs. synthetic which indicates to an anachronistic mistake (Pigden, 178-180)².

That said, without making a fuss and complicate things any further, I intend to embark on my mission at once without excluding important parts, though. For this mission, it seems rather crucial to go through and remember, shortly, what Quine is suggesting us in his article and then try to show how Grice and Strawson fail to give a compact answer, if any.

On The Very Existence of Analytic vs. Synthetic Distinction: Quine’s Uprising

In the beginning of his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine claims that the two dogmas of empiricism; namely (i) the distinction between analytic vs. synthetic truths and (ii) reductionism, “*The belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.*” are ill founded. (Quine, 20). Quine bases this bold claim on the definition of analytic which he believes can be restated as: “*A statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.*” (Quine, 21). Apparently, it is the ‘meanings’ part

² Another important point that Pigden stresses upon is logical impossibility (which I will not refer to in this article) thesis put forward by Grice and Strawson. To him this thesis also does not work. For further insights see: Pigden, C. R. (1987). Two Dogmatists. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 173-193. Also, see Francis Eshemomoh who has some kind of critique towards Grice and Strawson in terms of logical, and natural impossibility. Eshemomoh believes that Grice and Strawson are not precise about the endeavour they are in. When this is the case, instead of solving it, he believes, Grice and Strawson moves the problem to an even more vague level. For further information see: Eshemomoh, F. (2021). The Metaphysics of Empiricism: Two Dogmas of Empiricism Reexamined. *IGWEBUIKE: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 7(1). 39-40.



that attracts his attention more, as we see throughout his writing all along. Shortly after that, he gets to the point where analytic statements are grouped into two. The first group consists of those statements called *logically true* in every condition no matter what. As an example, for this first group Quine stresses upon the statement ‘*No unmarried man is married*’. To him as long as ‘*no*, and ‘*un*’ as logical particles stay the same in every possible reinterpretation then this statement is true no matter what. Quine, evidently, does not have a problem with this first group. To him the problem starts with the second group in which a synonym is used for another. ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ is a statement for the second group in which ‘bachelor’ is taken to be synonymous for ‘unmarried man’. To Quine the second statement is turned into the first one by substituting ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’. Behold! We are taking ‘bachelor’ as a synonymy for ‘unmarried man’ in this case by virtue of meaning and Quine asks, ‘How do we know that?’. Quine’s queer method begins here when he resorts to several options to decide on whether two terms we take to be synonymous for granted do really have firm grounds or not. To Quine we are still in need of an explanation for this kind of characterization in these statements because we have resorted to the term ‘synonymy’ to explain analyticity, however the term synonymy itself is as much in need of clarification as the term analyticity itself. The bottom line is we are claiming that we know what analyticity is by using synonymy as a tool to explain it while the tool itself is in need of clarification (Quine, 23).

As I said above I will try to hinge only on important parts that are common to both articles. That is why instead of using every detail in Quine’s article such as Carnap’s *state-description*, I will stress upon the points that attract Strawson and Grice. In this manner the first point is that of ‘*definition*’ that Quine resorts to explain what synonymy is and decide whether it works.

To Quine there are some who thinks definition is the key to turn the second group of analytic statements into the first one and thus explain analyticity in terms of synonymy. Because by definition ‘bachelor’ is taken to be synonymous for ‘unmarried man’. However, Quine asks who defined them as such and when? As this process is done by lexicographers who themselves rely on antecedent facts which are related to general or



preferred usages, then it is clear enough that there is not such a *law* that we lean on to define two terms as synonymous in terms of definition which seems arbitrary rather than relying on an unchangeable or fixed law. For this reason, lexicographers' usage of definition for synonymous cannot be taken as a ground (Quine, 24). Quines' ideas on definition in the following lines range to different areas such as mathematics and logic, but his general claim about the definitions and synonymy is basically as sketched above.

The second option that Quine resorts to is '*interchangeability*', (*salva veritate*) in Leibnizian terms, to explain synonymy and to find out if it works. Interchangeability here basically means the usage of two synonymous terms in the same (all and every) context without any change in their truth values. However, it is clear that two synonyms cannot be used in every possible context without losing their truth values such as in, for the term *bachelor*, 'bachelor of arts'. It cannot be turned into 'unmarried man of arts'. It basically loses its truth value. Again, in the examples of:

i) "Bachelor has less than ten letters."

ii) "Unmarried man has less than ten letters."

'Bachelor and unmarried man' lose their truth values because 'bachelor' has less than ten letters while 'unmarried man' has more than ten letters. Interchangeability, *prima facie*, does not work at all³.

The other option that Quine appeals to is *semantical rules*. Quine tells us that it is often hinted that the real problem with making a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements relies on the nature of ordinary languages which are vague to a certain amount. That is why creating an artificial language which is precise, and which can show us exactly the statements that are analytic would help, then the problem at hand would be solved. Here by referring to Carnap, Quine suggests that let us say we have an artificial language (L_o) as described and the statement S which is accepted as analytic belongs to this language. Then naturally we would be able to construe a statement as follows: The statement S is **analytic for L_o** . Quine stresses that the problem for such a statement would be 'analytic for', and the general problem of analyticity would still persist to exist. That is because we would still act like we already know what '*analytic* or *analytic*

³ I will come back to this section further below without going into much detail here.



for' is, but we actually do not and it was, in the first place, our main objective to expound. All we know, in such a scheme, is which statements are under the heading of analytic and which are not. (Quine, 31-34).

As to the second dogma, *the verification theory and reductionism*, to Quine it is important for two reasons: (i) It is strictly related to the first dogma of analytic vs. synthetic distinction and (ii) Although Carnap has given some thought on it and has given up on this project once and for all, it has lingered in empiricism from Pierce onward. For this article, however, it has a major role for expounding Quine's theory as he himself, also, does in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The verification theory and reductionism basically is the idea that the meaning of a statement is to confirm or infirm it empirically. Put this way an analytic statement is infirmed or confirmed no matter what and existence of such a statement is enough to show us the strict relationship of the two dogmas. At this point, if synthetic statements could be confirmed or infirmed based on empirical data, even if on a loose germaneness, then it would be possible to have statement synonymy, and thus save analyticity. In doing this, as Quine puts it, "*The dogma of reductionism survives on the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information at all.*" (Quine, 38). However, Quine at this point has a countersuggestion that he deduces from Carnap's *Aufbau* which is a doctrine based on physical world. That is, the statements related to the external world face sense experience not individually, but as a corporate body (Quine, 38). Because "*Taken collectively science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one.*", in Quine's own words (Quine, 39). Till now what we have sketched above is more or less Quine's ideas on analyticity. Now, let us have a look at how Grice and Strawson miss the main points in the Two Dogmas of Empiricism and get lost.

Grice and Strawson: A Futile Rebuttal

Grice and Strawson, in short, has a prevailing critique among others and a suggestion in their *In Defense of a Dogma* both of which are related and both of which are cunningly construed. I define them as cunningly construed because when the reply they have given is read for the first time it is inevitable to find their arguments as true and well put. However, under



a detailed scrutiny and after some critical thought given it becomes crystal clear that their arguments actually do not add up at all, and that some of them are easily reversible.

a) The Prevailing Critique

The first point to delve into is the point of cognitive synonymy, on which Grice and Strawson base their critique related to Quine's ideas. This point seems to be a huge mistake, if not a well-designed and cunningly construed escape door. The point that Grice and Strawson make about cognitive synonymy seems to be their best formulated critique throughout all the paper. Once read, it seems inevitable to applaud them for their victory. However, shortly after that, it leaves the reader with some sort of inconvenient mental struggle. It is an inconvenient mental struggle because when the two texts are compared on the subject matter of cognitive synonymy it is really difficult to end up with the conclusion of skepticism in meaning unlike Grice and Strawson who do. It is important to understand Quine's approach on this matter, all he does in the section of cognitive synonym and interchangeability is to stress upon extensionality, only through which he seems to accept that there might be a chance to solve the problem of synonymy⁴ and thus that of analyticity. Of course, at the end of the discussion Quine, once more, demonstrates us that two terms can reach an agreement extensionally, however, this does not necessarily mean they are synonyms such as it is in the case of '*creature with a hart*' and '*creature with kidneys*', and even one example that does not work in terms of interchangeability is enough for him to show us that defining analyticity is impossible. The reason he is using some statements such as '*Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men.*' in the section of cognitive synonymy is to draw the reader's attention to the term 'necessarily' which in its nature is not *extensional*, but which is *intensional*. He

⁴ Pigden on the term synonymy has some sort of a suggestion. I do not know if it is worth noting, but it goes like this: "*No doubt 'bachelor' and 'unwed man' mean much the same. But if analyticities can be reduced to logic via substitution of synonyms, there must be more to synonymy than this- at least if 'analytic' is to retain its fifties range. To accept this account of analyticity, but stick with everyday synonymy, would leave us with a very restricted analytic... So synonymy is used in extended, theoretic sense. But no theory of extended or philosophic synonymy exists... In these circumstances we may feel that synonymy 'stands in need of clarification.'*" (Pigden, 187-188).



needs to get rid of the term ‘necessarily’ which to him is generally used to describe what analyticity is, but again to him, which is in need of explanation as much as analyticity is. That is why eliminating the terms intensional and referring to the terms only extensional surfaces as an option worth inquiring (Quine, 27-31). Put this way, it is okay to say that Quine’s main claim here focuses on the synonymy problem with a different approach which is just one among the others preceding it.

However, for Grice and Strawson the skepticism in meaning reaches to such amounts that it becomes impossible even to have a language at all, let alone being able to make a distinction between what is analytic and what is synthetic. Their main argument for this goes as such:

“If talk of sentence synonymy is meaningless, then it seems that talk of sentences having a meaning at all must be meaningless, too. For if it made sense to talk of a sentence having a meaning, or meaning something, then presumably it would make sense to ask, ‘What does it mean?’. And if it made sense to ask, ‘What does it mean?’ of a sentence, then sentence synonymy could be roughly defined as follows: Two sentences are synonymous if and only if any true answer to the question ‘What does it mean?’ asked of one of them, is a true answer to the same question, asked of the other.” (Grice & Strawson, 147).

To remember again, Quine’s main problem is with analyticity, not with the first group of analyticity called logical truths such as ‘No unmarried man is married’, but with the second group of analyticity in which one synonymous term is used for another such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried men.’; *bachelor* for *unmarried man* here. As it is seen clearly enough the general argument is on the possibility of two terms being synonymous or not. One implicit aspect of reiterating Quine’s ideas on the two groups of analyticity is that he wants to draw our attention to the fact that logical truths are impenetrable, unchangeable, and fixed laws in a sense; while, in the second group where two different terms are used synonymously, there is not any law indicating that the two so-called synonymous terms are necessarily synonymous based on an unchangeable or a fixed law. That they are merely products of general or preferred usage and as data they have



been recorded by lexicographers⁵, which in a sense means they are arbitrary. This is a spike for the *skepticism in meaning* critique put forward by Grice and Strawson in that it clearly shows us that Quine's problem is not with meaning in general, but with the general account that two arbitrary terms taken as synonymous in an effort to expound analyticity is based on shaky grounds, not on firm grounds or any laws. Although Quine did claim that there is not sentence or statement synonym in the section of interchangeability, if I be bold enough to take a step further, I am still not sure whether this would lead to some kind of skepticism in meaning in general as Grice and Strawson argue. After all, it is possible to have statements built up on synonymous terms and yet accept that the synonyms used in the statements are arbitrary⁶ in nature. That they are not based on any kind of law and that we could still have a language or sense. The most paramount point that Grice and Strawson miss in this argument is the claim that we cannot expound the second group of analyticity based on so-called two synonymous terms which are not originating from or based on a *law*, but, on the contrary, which are merely based on general or preferred usages. Yet, another point that needs our attention is one specific statement that Quine uses in his article. He is explicitly telling us that:

"I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended.' is analytic or not. Now, does my indecision on this example really betray an incomplete understanding, an incomplete grasp of '*meanings*'⁷ of 'green' and 'extended'. I think not. The trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended', but with analytic." (Quine, 31).

As it can be clearly seen he is not lost in a kind of oblivion in terms of meaning in general. That his only problem is with the traditional

⁵ Quine, in his *Two Dogmas in Retrospect* (1991), puts it clearly that the repudiation of the analyticity dogma is based on empirical criteria (referring to the absence of any sort of impenetrable laws on this matter) for the semantic concepts of synonymy and meaning; while the repudiation of the reductionism dogma is holism. See: Quine, W. V. (1991). *Two Dogmas in Retrospect*. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, pp. 272.

⁶ It might do good for the sake of the argument to remember Ferdinand de Saussure on the arbitrary nature of the *sign*. For further information see: Saussure, F. d. (2011). *Course in General Linguistics*. (P. Meisel, & H. Saussy, Eds.) New York: Columbia University Press, pp: 67-70.

⁷ Italic is mine.



explication of the second group of analyticity which he believes is unsolvable and it is on the grounds of this reason that he gives up on the distinction of analytic vs. synthetic and finds it illusory.

b) The Suggestion

As to the suggestion that Grice and Strawson have for Quine's ideas on refusal of the distinction of analytic vs. synthetic, the situation is not at all heartwarming just like it is in the critique they put forward which shows Quine guilty of leading to some kind of skepticism in meaning in general.

Their suggestion mainly amounts on the section that is related to the second dogma, the dogma of verification theory and reductionism, but it is related to the overall reply they give. Their suggestion is what they call *conceptual revision*. They lay this suggestion on two assertions that Quine has: (i) There is "no statement immune to revision" and (ii) "An individual statement taken in isolation from its fellows, cannot admit of confirmation or disconfirmation at all." (Grice & Strawson, 154). They are, basically, claiming that the first assertion is not at all at odds with analytic vs. synthetic distinction, while the second assertion "*leaves the way open to just the kind of explanation which Quine thinks it precludes.*" (Grice & Strawson, 154). I will continue this paper starting with the second assertion as Grice and Strawson do in their paper.

Grice and Strawson, just like what Quine claims, are aware of the close relationship of these two assertions. Because, as Quine puts it well enough, when the second assertion stands and is successful, this naturally leads us to the first assertion that there is no statement immune to revision. However, the case with Grice and Strawson on this matter is simply *denialism* in mild terms, they do not seem to accept the reality Quine forges. What they do is to put forward a counter claim and tell us that Quine is not at odds with the tradition at all and they go further and claim that what Quine puts forward simply indicates a kind of amendment in his theory. They do this by overlooking at Quine's claim that statement synonymy, as it is strictly related to our experiences and our experiences are related to the world as a whole, cannot be either confirmed or infirmed by isolating them from their fellows. Quine tells us that the two dogmas are identical at root by referring to Carnap's Aufbau as we stated above. That "Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience



not individually, but only as a corporate body; that the truth of statements depends on both language and extralinguistic fact.” (Quine, 38). Quine, in another sense, tells us that the verification theory leads us back to the first dogma in that “*As long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic.*” (Quine, 38). Quine maintains that, as we clearly see, in the verification theory and reductionism the problem with the distinction of analytic vs. synthetic persists to exist. Quine continues with the suggestion that:

“My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one... What I am now urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid too finely. *The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.*”⁸ (Quine, 39).

However, as I stated above, Grice and Strawson do not seem to be pleased with this claim and they claim that Quine is not at odds with traditional distinction, and they claim that the only thing that such an approach indicates is some sort of amendment in the traditional explication of the analytic vs. synthetic distinction which they call conceptual revision. They open up by stating that:

“More generally, Quine wishes to substitute for what he conceives to be an oversimple picture of the confirmation-relations between particular statements and particular experiences, the idea of a looser relation which he calls ‘germaneness’. But however loosely ‘germaneness’ is to be understood, it would apparently continue to make sense to speak of two statements as standing in the same germaneness-relation to the same particular experience. So, Quine’s views are not only consistent with, but even suggest, an amended account of statement synonymy along these lines...Now for the doctrine that there is no statement which is in principle immune from revision, no statement which might not be given up in the face of

⁸ Italic is mine.



experience. Acceptance of this doctrine is quite consistent with adherence to the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.” (Grice & Strawson, 156-157).

Thus, by forming the relationship between the two assertions with their own terms, they continue with conceptual revision. They claim that any set of words held to express something true at one time may end up expressing something false at another time. This is what they call as a shift in the meanings of words as a consequent of a change of opinion only as to matters of fact and it is in part as a result of a shift in the sense of the words. When this kind of a shift takes place, there must be a necessary condition for the change in the truth-value. In such a case, they claim, it can be simply summarized as: To explain the analytic vs. synthetic distinction on better grounds, this change is out of necessity, and now with some new concepts it is possible to make a distinction between analytic vs synthetic distinction much better. If we can explain analytic vs. synthetic better as a result of deploying new concepts or with a shift of meaning in the already existing concepts then there is no use in giving up on the distinction, but to expect some conceptual revision. That is why Quine must be wrong in his radical decision on giving up on the distinction (Grice & Strawson, 157-158).

However, it is eminent to remember Quine on this matter. In the section on the *Empiricism Without Dogmas* in his *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, Quine explains his general ideas empiricism related and how science and experience are in a kind of duality. To him, “*The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.*”. The total science, in this sense, is a system with a periphery and a center. Taken this way, to Quine, “*Total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience.*” and a conflict with experience at the periphery leads to new adjustments in the interior or the center of the field. Truth-values known to be applied in a certain way have to be re-evaluated and re-applied to some of our already existing statements. These re-evaluated statements will naturally cause other fellow statements to be re-evaluated as well, because they are interconnected in the totality of the system. Thus, what was once periphery in the system has the potential to be the center and what was once the center has



the potential to be periphery (Quine, 39). After all this has happened all throughout the history of science as Quine puts it: “*Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?*” (Quine, 40). Now, based on what Quine claims here, are we really ready to be naïve enough as to accept that there would not be any conceptual revision in line of this argument? That conceptual revision of any kind did not take place when Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton? I think it did. That is why the suggestion of *conceptual revision* put forward by Grice and Strawson must fail.

Now, let us accept that Grice and Strawson are right in what they are suggesting for a second, and think of it in terms of Quine’s claims, by taking into account their reply to Quine as a whole. In this case we have a new set of concepts or a shift in the meanings of already existing concepts. Now, we have a question that logic imposes on us by force. The question is clear, and simple: Is there a guarantee that that new set of concepts are going to be the last?, Is there a guarantee that they will be able to explain the distinction on better grounds? If not so, would not that naturally lead to the expectation for new sets of concepts without a guarantee again, *ad infinitum*? Now, how is this really different than what Quine claims? Where do these arguments put forward by Grice and Strawson take them to? Back to Quine, I suppose. These mistaken or confused arguments that Grice and Strawson put forward ‘rest squarely’ on themselves. It seems Quine is inevitable. The periphery changes on the face of our experiences by leading to new changes in the interior, making the ground more of a shifting kind rather than a fixed and a static one. In this sense, the shift of any kind has the potential to change the already existing concepts which will be applied to the freshly changed periphery. In addition, basing a claim on the expectation for the arrival of some new concepts, or some kind of a shift in their already existing meanings, and believing that such an arrival will consolidate everything, or solve the problem by demystifying seems to be a matter of much concern. It is even ridiculous. Instead of playing the role of prophets and promising prophecies, accepting the reality Quine mentions seems



to be more appropriate by staying in our present day knowledge we already have.

More to the general argument in this article, I think, Grice and Strawson's claim that "*Philosophers are notoriously subject to illusion, and to mistaken theories.*" (Grice & Strawson, 143) has something to say. That not just one philosopher, but a line of philosophers in a tradition also might be subject to illusion, and to mistaken theories, if we are at liberty of likening it to the case of Darwin and Aristotle. This basically leads to the claim that, on the grounds of what Grice and Strawson tell us, it is a possibility that the philosophers in the tradition who take refuge in the analytic vs. synthetic distinction might be subject to an illusion, and to mistaken theories, as well.

Conclusion

Quine creates a huge impact on philosophy by claiming that the distinction between the second form of analytic propositions and synthetic propositions is rather blur, and that it is rather unconceivable. To him the second form of analytic propositions is impossible, and thus claiming that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is nothing, but a metaphysical article of faith.

Grice and Strawson, however, believe in the existence of this distinction and they claim that Quine is wrong in his claims. For this they have a prevailing criticism and a suggestion both of which somehow support the idea that the distinction stands. In this study, as the first step, I tried to show that their criticism of skepticism they formulate against Quine does not work by stressing on some points such as the arbitrary nature of the synonyms. As the second step, I mentioned about the suggestion or the amendment which they think Quine needs to apply to his claims. In doing this, I argued that Grice and Strawson are in a kind of denialism, and that they simply do not want to see the reality Quine forges. I tried to demonstrate that the conceptual revision they suggest for Quine is actually what Quine claims, and instead of refuting Quine, they somehow contribute to his claims.



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Öz: Kant'ın önermeleri iki farklı gruba ayırmak amacıyla ilk defa kullandığı analitik ve sentetik ayrımından bu yana, kendinden sonra zamanla aynı ayrımı kullanan birçok filozof olmuştur. Ancak bu ayrıma kendi felsefi amaçları doğrultusunda değinen her filozofun zorunlu olarak bu ayrımdan yana bir tavır sergilediği söylenemez. Bu ayrımdan yana tavır sergilemeyen en önemli filozof şüphesiz Wiltard Van Orman Quine'dır. Quine, bu ayrımın varlığını ampiristlerin ampirik olmayan bir dogması ya da inancın metafizik bir ürünü olarak tanımlar. Ona göre böyle bir ayrım var değildir. Quine, Ampirizmin İki Dogması adlı eserinde bu iddiasına yönelik yeterince kanıt sunduğunun kanısındadır. Öte yandan Grice ve Strawson bu ayrımın varlığına dair güçlü bir inanca sahiptirler ve bu amaca yönelik Quine'in iddialarına cevap niteliğinde bir makale ele alırlar. Bu amaçla yazdıkları Bir Dogmayı Savunmak adlı eserlerinde Grice ve Strawson Quine'in iddialarını çürütmeye çalışırlar. Bu bağlamda bu çalışmadaki amaç Grice ve Strawson'un verdiği cevabın işlevsiz olduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Analitik ve sentetik ayrımı, analitik önermeler, sentetik önermeler, ampirizmin iki dogması, bir dogmayı savunmak.

