

Is it Possible to Engage in Dialogue with Generative AI Technologies?

Üretken Yapay Zeka Teknolojileri ile Diyaloga Girmek Mümkün müdür?

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Abstract: This study analyses the linguistic interaction of human beings with Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) technologies in terms of Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It can thus be concluded that: i) a distinction must be drawn between imitating a function and possessing a property when dealing with the ontology of GAI; ii) GAI technologies are capable of imitating certain human-like mental functions without necessarily possessing the human-like properties that underpin these functions; iii) the transformation of perception that has occurred in the postmodern period, coupled with the perception that GAI possesses human-like properties, gives rise to an ontological illusion.

Keywords: Philosophy of technology, generative ai, Gadamer, philosophical hermeneutics, dialogue.

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Introduction

At the time this study was written, it was announced that ChatGPT had reached 250 million weekly users 30.12.2025 18:39:00. This statistic indicates the widespread use of Generative AI (GAI) technologies across various fields. The increasing functionality of GAI day by day necessitates addressing certain philosophical issues.

The fundamental basis for considering GAI as a philosophical issue lies in the belief that this technology performs human-like actions in a manner resembling human cognitive processes. Moreover, it is suggested that there exists a popular belief attributing human's essential features to GAI (Colombatto & Fleming, 2024). Investigating whether GAI possesses human-like features raises questions about which aspects it shares with humans and which aspects differentiate it from humans. Addressing this issue requires distinguishing which features are essential to humans and which are merely functional—an important distinction in philosophical discourse. While defining humans as thinking beings may seem outdated in the history of philosophy, it remains a usable definition for this analysis. Language usage of human as a thinking being is directly related to cognitive processes, although language usage and the act of thinking are distinct phenomena. Language usage is a function of the mind. Without possessing the essential features of humans, GAI fulfills this function with its essential features. In spite of this, it demonstrates poor efficacy in every scenario that involves the mental modeling and manipulation of factual, worldly information (Farina, Lavazza, et al., 2024, p. 3027).

For instance, consider the experience of perceiving color. While humans achieve this through their eyes, GAI does so via a camera. Let us assume both recognize and describe the color as “red”. The perception and expression of red by GAI using a camera demonstrate its ability to perform the function of a human-like characteristic. However, this does not mean that GAI operates through the essential features specific to humans or possesses human-like attributes. It merely performs the function of perception with its own inherent properties. The inherent features of GAI make it worthwhile to hypothesize philosophically that it cannot possess human-like essential attributes. These features will be examined in more detail in the following sections of the study. Beyond the technical and



functional features of GAI, the hypothesis that it lacks human-like features is supported by certain ontological consequences arising from its expanded usage. For example, GAI has been found to create more successful advertisements for rational and utilitarian products than for emotional or hedonic ones (Bakpayev et al., 2022). From this example, the theoretical examination of GAI can rely on two types of data: its outputs and theoretical information about its operation. The study by Bakpayev and colleagues compares GAI's functionality with human-created outputs, concluding that in certain cases, GAI fails to perform specific functions appropriately. Another topic that could be addressed is the negative impact of text generated uncontrollably by GAI on the publishing industry (Floridi & Chiriatti, 2020).

Another aspect of the GAI-human interaction pertains to emotions. Emotional responses elicited by humans in their interactions with GAI provide new insights. A study conducted in the U.S. in 2018 by Shank and colleagues found that people exhibited various emotional responses during interactions with GAI. Participants reportedly responded with astonishment when GAI answered complex questions. These reactions reflect the emotions accompanying the different outputs GAI produces in various situations. Participants who described GAI as possessing human-like features reported feelings of amazement, concern, and confusion (Shank et al., 2019). This suggests that the perception of GAI possessing human-like features is intertwined with its ability to perform the functions of these features. However, the accompanying intense emotions in that interaction highlight a critical point. Emotions such as amazement, astonishment, and apprehension when attributing human-like features to GAI reflect a resistance to accepting this idea.

On the other hand, the question of whether GAI can be considered an agent producing human-like actions immediately brings to mind whether GAI technologies can be evaluated as moral agents. Sullins emphasizes three fundamental characteristics of humans in discussing whether robots can be considered agents: autonomy, intentionality, and responsibility (Sullins, 2006, pp. 26–29). In addition to these ethical qualities, the epistemological and ontological aspects of humans as historical beings with profound meaning in their experience of understanding and language usage must



also be considered. From a phenomenological perspective, the existence of the human body shapes the human mind and experience, making it unique (Merleau-Ponty, 2002).

Based on these studies, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Users tend to attribute human-like features to GAI.
2. GAI's ability to perform the functions of human-like features leads to such features being attributed to it.
3. GAI is inadequate in performing functions similar to humans, especially in emotional or hedonic contexts.
4. GAI lacks the autonomy, intentionality, and sense of responsibility required to be considered an ethical agent.

These conclusions regarding GAI's lack of human-like features enhance the philosophical significance of examining human-GAI linguistic interactions. Particularly, the intense emotional reactions of humans during their linguistic interactions with GAI suggest that these interactions are worth philosophical investigation. People often choose to interact with GAI in their daily lives, which provides them with a new avenue for linguistic interaction.

However, claiming that GAI possesses human mental features is highly debatable philosophically. On one side of the debate are the optimists, who believe that these technologies can access human cognitive capacity and become dynamic and creative, and the pessimists, who argue that they produce things that are completely static and not new in terms of intertextuality (Farina, Pedrycz, et al., 2024, p. 151). While GAI is equipped to solve problems human minds address, this does not mean it approaches these problems like a human mind. The ability of an electronic dictionary to provide correct word meanings is insufficient evidence to assert that it truly "knows" these meanings.

It has been claimed that productive artificial intelligence has reached a level beyond human control by replicating itself without human intervention. This situation may open the door slightly to inferences that the GAI has self-consciousness, autonomy, situation awareness, self-perception, etc. (Pan et al., 2024). However, we believe that these are functions that GAI imitates, not features that GAI possesses. Distinguishing between



human and GAI according to some criteria allows us to clearly show the differences in terms of knowledge and language processes. (Table 1)

Criteria	GAI	Human
Autonomy	Lacks autonomy	Possesses autonomy
Intentionality	Determined by external input	Has intentionality
Responsibility	Non-responsible	Capable of responsibility
Analytical thinking	Statistically valid	Rational thinking
Historicity	Absent	Integral to understanding
Understanding	Relies on data and algorithms	Experiential and dynamic
Organism	Mechanical system	Biological organism (human body)
Originality of outcomes	Intertextual repetition	Creativity

Table 1. Comparison of the Essential Features of GAI and Humans.

The evaluation of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) as an agent capable of acquiring or understanding knowledge necessitates a discussion on whether it is capable of accessing and making sense of knowledge as well as its capacity to be a moral agent. In this context, referring to the holistic relationship between human ontology and meaning is appropriate. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which explores the integral relationship between human ontology and understanding, provides a suitable framework for discussing GAI ontology. Gadamer emphasizes the centrality of dialogue in the process of understanding and the existential role it plays in human cognition. This makes it a meaningful starting point for discussing GAI’s ontological structure.

Since human-GAI interaction occurs linguistically, exploring the ontological differences of GAI through this lens is insightful. Comparing human-human dialogue with human-GAI linguistic interaction can clarify these differences.

A methodological approach to such an analysis involves using Gadamer’s hermeneutic perspective to analyze the information presentation



processes of GAI. By comparing these two domains, the study aims to highlight differences. Gadamer's dynamic truth, shaped by historical consciousness and dialogue, contrasts with the static, data-based information generation processes of GAI. This analysis questions the feasibility of considering GAI as a Gadamerian dialogue partner. The findings aim to illuminate fundamental philosophical differences.

Philosophical inquiries into GAI have been conducted within various theoretical frameworks. Some researchers trace the literature on artificial intelligence to Alan Turing's paper (1950) "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" in *Mind*. This paper is often considered the starting point of philosophical discussions on GAI (Bellini et al., 2022; Genç, 2024, p. 10). Turing's central question—"Can machines think?"—has sparked debate, with criticisms directed at the question itself (Turing, 1950). The paper presents an ontological discussion on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and computational imitation, revisiting concepts like thinking, intelligence, learning, and consciousness. According to Turing, the success of machines can be assessed by the similarity between their outputs and human outputs. Known as the "Turing Test," this test focuses on behavioral outputs or task responses. Although this debate is conducted in a direct ontological framework, Turing ultimately argues from a functionalist point of view that this ontologically based debate leads to a vicious circle. Subsequent advancements in artificial intelligence have continued to provoke philosophical questions. An example of an ontological debate is Searle's 'Chinese room' experiment. In this thought experiment, Searle argues that the fact that machines give contextually appropriate answers does not mean that they actually understand the questions (Searle, 1980). Searle's experiment can be seen as a critique of Turing's test. The opposing perspectives of Turing and Searle on AI philosophy are echoed in modern studies.

An example of a functionalist approach aligned with Turing's view is the work of Bakpayev and colleagues, who examined GAI's performance in advertising and marketing. Their findings reveal that GAI often produces less persuasive advertisements than humans in certain scenarios (Bakpayev et al., 2022). This research focuses on the functional capabilities of GAI. Similarly, studies exploring the application of philosophical



methods in prompt engineering often reflect this functionalist perspective. For instance, research on applying Socrates's maieutic methods to prompt engineering demonstrates that logical reasoning techniques such as induction, counter-examination, deduction, and abductive methods can improve the quality of GAI outputs (Chang, 2023). On the other hand, research like Wang's, rooted in Searle's stance, examines GAI's ontological status, arguing that GAI does not experience understanding as humans do, given its lack of historicity and intentionality (Wang, 2021).

This study belongs to the category of philosophical inquiries discussing GAI's ontological status, without directly focusing on its functions. While comparable to Wang's research in this sense, it differs by emphasizing Gadamer's concept of dialogue and exploring the distinctions in human-GAI linguistic experiences.

1. Generative AI, Prompt Engineering, and Human-Machine Linguistic Interaction

GAI, a subfield of artificial intelligence, encompasses systems capable of producing data such as text, images, and video. These models learn the patterns and structures within their input data and generate new data with similar characteristics. Advances in transformer-based deep neural networks, particularly large language models (LLMs), during the early 2020s, led to a surge in GAI systems. This discussion focuses on the Transformer architecture and its adaptation in GPT models, which are widely used in LLM-based AI technologies.

The Transformer architecture, characterized by a self-attention mechanism, is a deep feedforward artificial neural network. It has proven highly effective in modeling sequential data, particularly in natural language processing (NLP) (Phuong & Hutter, 2022, p. 1). The key feature relevant to our discussion is its vector-based representation mechanism, realized through two primary stages: Token Embedding and Positional Embedding. The architecture learns to represent each word in the dataset and its position within sentences, paragraphs, and so forth, in a vector space (Phuong & Hutter, 2022, p. 4).

Transformers have been adapted for various NLP tasks, with decoder-only transformers like GPT-2, GPT-3, and Gopher being particularly relevant here. These autoregressive language models predict the next token



based on previous tokens, making them suitable for text generation and linguistic interaction systems (Phuong & Hutter, 2022, p. 8).

Despite variations in technologies, a defining feature of GAI applications is their reliance on user guidance, facilitated through a mechanism known as “prompts”. In terminological terms, a prompt involves composing textual instructions that guide the GAI in producing the desired response. These inputs may include questions, instructions, or data. Users direct the large language model according to *their objectives* through the inputs into the prompt. This interaction continues until the user decides to terminate the application.

It is evident that the prompt mechanism is indispensable for effectively and appropriately utilizing GAI technologies. Studies have shown that the quality and quantity of input provided through prompts influence the responses generated by language models (Dang et al., 2022).

The prompt mechanism plays a crucial role in aligning the structure and functionality of GAI technologies. Features provided in prompts help narrow the model’s response objectives and achieve more precise results. This creates a linguistic interaction process between users and GAI models, allowing users to tailor outputs to their needs. For this interaction to proceed effectively, the prompts themselves must be well-constructed. The importance of this has led to the emergence of a specialized field known as “Prompt Engineering.” Research in this area focuses on optimizing the interaction process between users and GAI technologies (Brown et al., 2020; Chang, 2023; Zhou et al., 2022). Software tools have even been developed to provide automatic prompt scores to enhance prompt quality (Zhou et al., 2022).

Ultimately, these technologies, which always depend on a linguistic model, will generate responses based on data older than the user’s time of access. On the other hand, language models do not have natural language understanding, but they can generate accurate responses to tasks (Bender et al., 2021, p. 610). Thus, GAI is inherently static. Furthermore, since the model is trained on a vector space, its responses are entirely based on data and statistical probabilities.



2. Reading Gadamer's Concepts of Dialogue and Dialectics Through Human-GAI Linguistic Interaction

This section focuses on Gadamer's concepts of dialogue and dialectics, examining their relationship with the human ontological position as shaped by the experience of understanding. The presence of humans as biological organisms within an experience of understanding constitutes the underlying differences. Human vitality enables sensory, rational, and conscious experiences and others, all of which cease with the loss of life. From Aristotle's perspective on the concept of the soul, functions like emotion, sensation, and thought vanish with the body (Aristotle, 1984, pp. 1407–1408).

The biological mode of physical existence gains functionality through unique sensitivity to the external world. As Carter notes, designing AI requires first developing sensory pathways that establish its relationship with the external world (Carter, 2007, p. 206). Carter also emphasizes our capacity for embodied experience (Carter, 2007, p. 206). These emphasis suggest that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics regarding the human experience of understanding resurfaces implicitly in discussions about GAI.

2.1. Gadamer on the Dynamism of Understanding and the Static Nature of GAI

Gadamer's conceptualization of truth as a dynamic, historically implicit experience indicates that it can only be encountered by historical beings. Thus, GAI cannot experience truth, as it is not a historical entity.

For Gadamer, truth is shaped by human experience and historical consciousness. The static nature of GAI's dataset—even when extensive—does not align with the dynamic notion of truth. Although GAI processes data and algorithms to produce linguistic responses reflecting human mental acts such as knowing, thinking, and understanding, it lacks essential components of these acts. Knowing or understanding something always exceeds the mere formulation of meaningful sentences about it.

Gadamer discusses the transformative role of experience in the context of historical consciousness, emphasizing that understanding reshapes the individual (Laçin, 2024, p. 104). In Gadamer's conception of truth, meaning evolves dynamically according to the historical and cultural context



of the interpreting subject. However, as we mentioned above, GAI produces information based on a static dataset, without the dialogical process required for Gadamerian truth to emerge. As Gadamer emphasizes, dialogue is necessary for the emergence of the experience of truth; GAI, on the other hand, produces knowledge by processing data, far from the nature of dialogue.

Moreover, GAI's inability to comprehend language within a historical horizon is evident. It is crucial to distinguish between fulfilling the communicative function of language and understanding and using language meaningfully. We recognize that translation programs construct coherent sentences but do not comprehend the language. However, this does not mean that they do not use the language including the communication effectively. The philosophical intuition behind this distinction is exemplified in Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment. The high similarity between human and machine outputs in Turing Tests demonstrates that machines can generate responses about a subject without experiencing the understanding of it.

For example, if GAI is asked whether honey is sweet, it can provide the response, "Yes, it is sweet." However, its knowledge of honey's sweetness is not derived from experience. Two epistemological conditions can explain this knowledge:

1. Honey and sweetness may have been paired axiomatically in the dataset.
2. Honey and sweetness could have been related through experiential content, enabling their conceptual association.

In the first scenario, the association lacks experiential justification. Without any experience of either concept, GAI can meaningfully articulate the proposition "Honey is sweet." In the syllogistic forms developed in logic, it is similar that propositions define something and valid inferences can be made on the basis of these definitions. For example, in a syllogism in the form of modus ponens, valid inferences can be made from the definitions of the propositions. However, it is not enough to say that the truth-values and meanings of the propositions in the syllogism are known by the individual.



GAI employs axioms and weighted analysis of their interrelations to generate answers in its linguistic structure. Responses produced via weight analysis adhere to a logical pattern, enabling linguistic interaction to persist without understanding the content of the questions or answers. GAI uses language axiomatically, pairing symbolic signifiers based on their linguistic arrangement frequencies and probabilities. This is not an experience of understanding but a formal and functional use of language. Notably, in formal logic, determining the validity of an inference—whether the conclusion logically follows the premises—does not require knowing the propositions' truth values.

In summary, GAI's use of language on a formal and functional level demonstrates its distance from experiencing understanding in Gadamer's sense.

2.2. Evaluating GAI's Use of Language in Light of Gadamer's Concepts of Truth and Language

This section assesses GAI's linguistic features based on Gadamer's notion of truth and question-answer dialectics. Human-GAI linguistic interaction predominantly occurs in a question-answer format. Gadamer's concepts of dialogue and dialectics offer a lens to examine the feasibility of such interactions. According to Gadamer, humans relate to external existence linguistically (Gadamer, 2004, p. 471). Consequently, human-GAI linguistic interaction inherently possesses a linguistic character. While Gadamer's question-answer dialectics emphasize the experiential nature of truth, human-GAI interactions in a question-answer form reveal structural similarities but ontological differences.

Gadamer's dialectic method, often associated with Hegel's dialectics, is framed within historical and hermeneutic contexts. Gadamer's dialectical understanding examines how historical and cultural contexts shape knowledge. The aim of this method is to bring together contradictory views and different understandings and to handle these differences in a unified manner. This process ensures the continuous development and refinement of meaning. The role of dialogue in fostering understanding is evident in Socratic conceptions of truth, where dialogue aims to uncover truth through a dialectical process of questioning. According to Gadamer, the truth experience of the Socratic method arises when the unknown



becomes apparent through questioning (Gadamer, 2004, p. 359). From this perspective, Gadamer views questioning as a quest for the unknown. In Gadamer's framework, questions serve as starting points for human experience, driven by the inquiry's cyclical and continuous nature (Gadamer, 2004, p. 356).

The question, in this regard, is the act of placing the object of inquiry within a perspective and directing the mind toward knowing it, and it reveals that the meaning of the question is hidden in the existence of the unknown object (Gadamer, 2004, p. 356). In this sense, asking questions is more difficult than producing answers (Gadamer, 2004, p. 356).

From the human perspective, acquiring knowledge occurs as a result of the experience of understanding. The dialectical process, which is directed toward questions and continues with answers, brings forth knowledge in human experience (Gadamer, 2004, p. 356). Thus, asking a question initiates the act of uncovering the being directed toward it (Gadamer, 2004, p. 357). For Gadamer, who asserts that the meaning of something is contingent upon the meaning of the question itself, true understanding aligns with the meaning of the question.

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, which aims to frame the human-to-human dialogue in terms of the meaning of a text and its comprehension, can be used to analyze human-AI linguistic interaction and, based on this, open up a discussion on the ontological status of AI.

The predetermination of the knowledge framework of the GAI and the fact that this framework cannot be expanded is another point where it differs from human belief-acquisition processes (Wang, 2021). For Gadamer, understanding means the expansion of this framework.

Building on these explanations, it is necessary to account for the tool of the human-GAI linguistic interaction, namely the prompt. The question or instruction contained in the prompt constitutes the starting point of the human-GAI linguistic interaction and takes place in a static framework, contrary to the historical and dynamic search for meaning discussed in Gadamer's theory.

The concepts in Gadamer's theory that facilitate the examination of human-GAI linguistic interaction include historicity, dialogue, intentionality, dynamism, understanding, interpretation, and dialectics. It is



important to remember that these concepts provide explanatory power for human understanding's ontology. The analysis of human-GAI linguistic interaction through these concepts will be further elaborated in the third section. Firstly, it is necessary to clarify the role these concepts play in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.

Gadamer describes the experience of understanding-interpretation as the experience of something presenting itself as truth. Undoubtedly, what enables this experience is the acquisition of language in a historical context. Understanding is the experience of something presenting itself as truth as a dialectical process. Understanding should always be considered in conjunction with interpretation, and in this respect, for Gadamer, every understanding is an interpretation. In human-human dialogue, both parties confront the text, and from the point where their historical contexts intersect, they construct the text and the dialogue according to their own intentions. Therefore, dialogue is the experience, understanding, or interpretation of something that presents itself as truth to the person.

In human experience, as a result of understanding, knowledge emerges, which includes both the thesis and the antithesis within the dialectic of question and answer (Gadamer, 2004, p. 359). In the dialogue process, the ignorance of the parties concerning a subject is the motive for questioning from the Socratic method. The experience of understanding, referred to as the fusion of horizons, is an interpretation in which meaning is revealed. Understanding brings forth a pleasure similar to the aesthetic pleasure derived from a work of art. This points to the necessity of understanding, as Gadamer expressed, for the experience of a work of art (Yıldız, 2023, p. 65).

For Gadamer, in the forms of human-human dialogue, the experience of truth, like the aesthetic experience, takes place from the perspective of both sides of the dialogue. In human-GAI linguistic interactions, this experience occurs only on the human side. The GAI's lack of historical acquisition of language shows that it does not engage in dynamic historical interaction. The key difference between human-human dialogue and this interaction lies in the GAI's static nature. The distinction between these two forms of linguistic interaction can be illustrated as follows (Table 2):



Linguistic Interaction Parties	Linguistic Interaction Processes
Human-to-Human Dialogue Cycle	Historical Interpretation - Historical Interpretation
Human-AI Linguistic Interaction	Historical Interpretation - Non-Historical Statistical Interpretation

Table 2. Differences Between Two Linguistic Interactions

As the table shows, GAI can perform a statistical interpretation function without understanding or interpreting. According to Henrickson, as prompts become more detailed, the GAI’s interpretive function becomes limited, but its ability to convey analytical information more accurately improves (Henrickson & Meroño-Peñuela, 2023). While GAI’s role in linguistic interaction can be restricted depending on the prompt entered, certain functions may be enhanced. However, the narrowed *context window* (Dong et al., 2024) established by the prompt cannot be expanded again within the same interaction process. This should not lead to the belief that human-GAI linguistic interaction constitutes a fusion of horizons in the Gadamerian sense. According to Gadamer, the fusion of horizons is that “... *this as the horizon of the question within which the sense of the text is determined*” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 363). When understood in terms of the GAI’s context window, the fusion of horizons would suggest that human-GAI linguistic interaction is not a true hermeneutic experience.

In addition to the historical and static barriers of human-GAI linguistic interaction, the context window function based on the ontological status of GAI technologies further suggests that this interaction is not a type of dialogue. Once the context window is exceeded, the GAI may produce inappropriate answers by detaching from the context of the question. This eliminates the possibility of a continuous dialogue, as is the case in human-human interaction. In fact, what happens is that the GAI moves away from the meaning and biases contained in the question directed at it. This shows that GAI does not harbor the biases that initiate the historical experience of understanding. These biases are contained in the questions that initiate historical understanding. The main issue here is the GAI’s detachment from the context of the question. In Gadamer’s dialectical



question-answer process and concept of dialogue, the horizon of the question does not detach from the person's horizon; rather, they intertwine and fuse. Therefore, the GAI's detachment from context indicates that its answers or the questions it generates are not formed in a way that mirrors human understanding. True dialogue is a continuous dialectical process initiated by persistent questioning (Gadamer, 2004, p. 360). As a result, from the perspective of GAI's ontology, human-GAI linguistic interaction is not a hermeneutic experience.

From the perspective of a human who understands language from a historical horizon and is capable of experiencing what presents itself as truth, the process begins with the question itself. However, since the dialecticity of the process is lost, the linguistic interaction between human and GAI is a hermeneutic experience which, from the human side, consists only in intersecting the horizon of the question posed. This is because elements such as tradition, comprehension, and purposeful questioning are put forward by human beings. Therefore, in the experience of understanding, only the human horizon will intersect with the horizon of the question. Therefore, at the end of this interaction, it can be said that the human's knowledge base could expand. However, it would be incorrect to claim that the GAI's horizon intersects with that of the human. In fact, it seems impossible to claim that the GAI has any understanding horizon. The GAI's lack of tradition, bias, and historical consciousness means that it cannot generate a purposeful question or respond to a self-posed question. What we refer to as thinking in general terms is the human ability to respond to self-directed, purposeful questions. From this perspective, we can claim that GAI cannot think. For thinking, the human's intention toward something that presents itself as truth, formed through a purposeful question, is essential. GAI lacks this intention and depends on the user's guidance. As soon as this direction gives it a context for bias or interaction, it begins to mimic the function of thinking.

Users often encounter signs that show GAI lacks the conditions of intention and ignorance that humans possess when asking the first question. The human-GAI linguistic interaction can be compared to an actor playing Socrates in a theater, responding to questions according to his



views, but without actually being a philosopher. This can be likened to Turing's "imitation game" theory.

The fact that GAI transforms its database into functional answers should not lead us to believe that it knows everything or that it can answer every question. Socrates' claim, "I know that I know nothing," points to the notion of intention. Since GAI cannot know what it doesn't know, it lacks intention. Understanding is the result of the experience of understanding, and it is revealed through questioning. Therefore, GAI lacks the act of directing itself toward something unknown, which is the driving force behind the dialectical process. For this reason, interpreting human-GAI linguistic interaction as a dialogue aimed at understanding the unknown would lead us to mistakenly believe that GAI is involved in a false form of understanding. Understanding is the manifestation of the thing itself in language. When things are perceived as vectors, this obstructs their expression in language. Rather than a dialogue where things themselves come into language, it involves the articulation of their statistical positioning in the data. Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that the human-GAI linguistic interaction constitutes a form of understanding experience.

After all, humans can understand and direct questions to GAI. However, since GAI lacks intention, it will never possess the meaningful questions that humans have. While the functionality and quality of GAI outputs can be improved to surpass human products, this does not mean that fulfilling a function appropriately equates to knowledge or understanding.

Another important point related to intention is that GAI lacks the ability to recognize and correct linguistic cycles and significant errors during linguistic interaction (Wang, 2021). During these interactions, GAI detects errors through the prompter's inputs and adjusts its responses accordingly. It is even open to misdirection from the prompter. Therefore, GAI lacks a mental ability to correct errors and misguidance, which is a philosophical concept of autonomy. The concept of autonomy is crucial not only from a moral perspective but also in the ontology of the experience of understanding. Autonomy, according to Kant, gives rise to the possibility of morality (Kant & Gregor, 1998). For Kant, autonomy is the



will to perform something spontaneously. From the perspective of understanding's ontology, GAI cannot will something on its own or directly confront the external world and the essential features of objects.

In conclusion, a lack of intention means a lack of autonomy. The absence of autonomy presents an obstacle to GAI producing reliable answers. The linguistic aspect of human-GAI interaction, starting with the prompt, contrasts with Gadamer's historical and dynamic search for meaning due to its static framework. Gadamer's concepts of historicity, dialogue, intentionality, dynamism, understanding, interpretation, and dialectics highlight the explanatory power of the human ontology of understanding. These concepts serve as tools for analyzing human-GAI linguistic interaction, which will be explored in greater depth in the following section.

3. What Does Enhancing Human-GAI Linguistic Interaction Through Philosophical Inquiry Methods Entail?

Although human-GAI linguistic interaction cannot be classified as a dialogue in Gadamerian terms, the potential for improving this interaction should not be overlooked. Research in the relevant literature suggests that human-GAI linguistic interaction can improve through enhanced prompts, and that philosophical methods can make GAI outputs more aligned with reality (Chang, 2023; Henrickson & Meroño-Peñuela, 2023). These studies indicate that philosophical inquiry methods positively contribute to the development of prompt engineering.

However, such efforts focus on improving language functionality rather than enabling GAI to comprehend language. Enhancing human-GAI interaction creates better and more efficient engagement opportunities for users. Nevertheless, interpreting this interaction as a source of knowledge, a decision-maker, a dialogue, or a source of truth often stems from perception and constitutes a postmodern illusion.

Using philosophical methods to make GAI more functional is akin to experiencing the *simulacra* provided by a brilliantly designed Disneyland.¹

¹ The details of the connection with Disneyland will not be discussed here. It is possible to find the relevant details in Baudrillard's related work. Reading the similarities between GAI and Disneyland through postmodernism allows for a new philosophical interpretation. The phrase 'meaning attacked by meaning' summarises the issue and is a key phrase that needs to be further elaborated upon. See: Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation.



GAI, like Disneyland, appears to offer augmented reality but lacks genuine experiential depth. The bypassing of the dialectical process renders both phenomena a kind of simulacra. Baudrillard's postmodernism, described as *attacking meaning with meaning* (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 161), highlights how linguistic mimicry in human-GAI interaction undermines the meaning derived from historical experience. The dialectical stage is emptied (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 161). As with Disneyland, the possibility of historical experience disappears in GAI. The researches that emphasized the perception of GAI as possessing a reality akin to human reality have been mentioned above. This self-presentation as a reality to human perception supports its characterization as a simulacra.

From the perspective of philosophy, the task of explaining human-GAI linguistic interaction can be categorized into two subfields:

1. The contribution of philosophical methods to improving human-GAI interaction.
2. The analysis of human-GAI linguistic interaction through philosophical theories.

The first task involves enhancing prompt inputs and outputs to optimize interaction. For instance, the philosophical importance of asking appropriate questions in human-GAI interaction is undeniable and can be operationalized through Gadamer's concept of dialogue. However, this effort operates in a contradictory position. While dissecting the concept of dialogue or applying principles of the maieutic method to GAI makes its language functions more "realistic" it fails to enable genuine comprehension of language. These efforts focus on to enhance functionality of GAI, not on bringing GAI in human-like essential features.

To examine human-GAI linguistic interaction also requires considering the mutual consideration of the participants each other. Establishing mutual consideration of other facilitates the question-answer dialectic (Gadamer, 2004, p. 360). In most cases, human-GAI interaction is limited to asking a question and receiving a response. This highlights the lack of a sustained question-answer cycle necessary for genuine dialogue. In authentic dialogue, questions deepen meaning, and every new question allows the understanding process to evolve dynamically. Responses to questions



exceed the meaning of the questions themselves, enabling new “unknowns” to emerge, thus fostering further inquiry.

As a result, the philosophical development of human-GAI linguistic interaction and interpreting this interaction as providing the conditions for an experience of truth can be seen as the reason for the aforementioned misunderstandings.

Conclusion

This study explores the fundamental differences between the linguistic process of GAI and the human experience of language and meaning. It underscores that GAI does not perceive words as concepts formed by the human mind through experience but instead processes them as vector-based statistical weights. While GAI's language processes rely on statistical probabilities, humans engage with language in historical, interpretive, and intentional contexts.

GAI's independence from intentionality and historicity distances it from the ontological foundations of human meaning-making and dialogue-building capabilities. Unlike human-human dialogue, where meaning emerges through mutual exploration in a historical and intentional context, GAI's limitations confine it to producing language within a static statistical framework.

Searle's Chinese Room analogy illustrates that GAI's responses do not reflect a “mind” but instead rely on a data-driven system of statistical and vector-based semantics. This highlights the ontological gap between human language experiences and GAI's language functionality, emphasizing the multi-layered and historically embedded nature of human meaning-making that GAI cannot replicate.

Future philosophical inquiry into concepts like intentionality, historicity, interpretation, autonomy, emotional-language integration, and recursive learning could advance GAI's functionality. However, understanding its ontology requires a critical philosophical approach to assess and refine its limitations. In terms of human-human dialogue and human-GAI speech interaction, the results of the study can be summarised as follows. (Table 3)



Criteria	Human-Human Dialogue	Human-GAI Language Interaction
Experience of Understanding	It is based on a dynamic search for truth through the processes of understanding and interpretation.	It is based on statistical response generation; there is no real process of meaning or interpretation.
Intentionality	In the processes of asking questions and receiving answers, the quest to know the unknown is pursued.	GAI has no intrinsic motivation to demand knowledge of something; all intentionality is provided by prompt.
History and Cultural Context	The dialogue is shaped by the historical and cultural background of the individuals; this contributes to the deepening of meaning.	The GAI has no historical or cultural context; it is based on a static dataset.
Experience of Truth	There is a constant search for meaning between the parties in dialogue in order for truth to emerge.	GAI cannot imitate the experience of truth; the answers it produces are limited to certain algorithms.
Biases	Biases shaped by historical context and personal experiences guide the search for meaning.	GAI does not acquire certain biases through experiential accumulation, but rather statically through data sets.
The Capability of Questioning	Questions constitute the basic element of the quest for knowledge by turning towards the unknown.	GAI does not have the capacity to generate questions on its own; it only generates answers in line with the given prompts.
Dialectical Process	It involves an interactive search for meaning and an exchange of ideas that progresses through questions and answers.	GAI lacks a dialectical process; it responds directly to the inputs it receives, but this process is not dynamic.



Criteria	Human-Human Dialogue	Human-GAI Language Interaction
Self-Consciousness and Thinking	It has the ability to develop intention with the awareness of “knowing what is not known”.	GAI does not have the ability to ‘know what it does not know’ or to think; all answers are determined by prompts and algorithms.
Autonomy	In dialogue, the process is carried out by autonomous agents.	GAI does not have autonomy.

Table 3. Comparison of Criteria Between Human-Human Dialogue and Human-GAI Language Interaction

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Öz: Bu çalışma, insanların Üretken Yapay Zeka (ÜYZ) teknolojileri ile dilsel etkileşimini Hans-Georg Gadamer'in felsefi hermeneutiği açısından analiz etmektedir. Çalışmada elde edilen sonuçlar şu şekilde sıralanabilir: i) ÜYZ'nin ontolojisi ele alınırken bir işlevi taklit etmek ile bir özelliğe sahip olmak arasında bir ayrım yapılmalıdır; ii) ÜYZ teknolojileri, bu işlevlerin temelini oluşturan insan benzeri özelliklere sahip olmak zorunda olmaksızın belirli insan benzeri zihinsel



işlevleri taklit edebilir; iii) Postmodern dönemde meydana gelen algı dönüşümü, ÜYZ'nin insan benzeri özelliklere sahip olduğu algısıyla birleştiğinde ontolojik bir yanılsamaya yol açmış durumdadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Teknoloji felsefesi, üretken yapay zeka, Gadamer, felsefi hermeneutik, diyalog.

