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From Philia to Ṣadāqa: The Transformation of Aristotelian Friendship in Islamic Philosophy and Its Relevance for International Ethical Relations

Philia'dan Ṣadāka'ya: Aristotelesçi Dostluk Anlayışının İslâm Felsefesindeki Dönüşümü ve Uluslararası Etik İlişkiler Açısından Önemi

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Abstract: This article examines the concept of friendship (*ṣadāqa*) in Islamic philosophy through its engagement with Aristotelian ethical theory and its subsequent transformation within Islamic intellectual traditions. After outlining the Qurʾānic, moral, and Sufi vocabularies of friendship, the article situates Islamic philosophical discussions within the Aristotelian framework of *philia*, particularly the distinction between friendships based on pleasure, utility, and virtue, and the role of friendship in achieving human flourishing (*saʿāda*) and moral perfection (*kamāl*). The article traces a conceptual trajectory from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to five key Muslim philosophers: Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. ca. 414/1023), al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. fifth/eleventh century), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). The article advances three central arguments: first, that Islamic philosophers did not merely inherit Aristotelian friendship but fundamentally transformed it into a metaphysical and spiritual concept; second, that this transformation progressively integrates ethical, theological, and communal dimensions; and third, that this enriched conception of friendship offers a valuable normative resource for contemporary international ethical relations.

Keywords: Friendship, ṣadāqa, philia, Islamic philosophy, Aristotle, Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, al-Ṭūsī, international ethics, virtue ethics.

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Introduction

In Islamic literature, the concept of "friendship" is expressed through terms such as *ṣadāqa* (friendship), *ukhuwwa* (brotherhood), *mawadda* (love, friendship), and *ṣuḥba* (friendship, companionship); *walī* and *rafīq* are also used in the context of "friend" alongside other meanings. The word used most frequently in the Qurʾān is *walī* ('Abd al-Bāqī 1364; Çağrıcı 1994). Moreover, friendship is a topic in traditional Islamic moral literature, where the focus is on rights and responsibilities stemming from religious brotherhood, as elucidated in Qurʾānic verses and *ḥadīth*s (Prophetic traditions). One of the earliest such works is Ibn Qutayba's (d. 276/889) *ʿUyūn al-Akhbār* ("Fountains of Reports"). One of the most prominent systematic works of Islamic ethics dealing with friendship is al-Māwardī's (d. 450/1058) *Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn* ("Ethics and Rules of Life in This World and The Religion"). Furthermore, most Sufi works have sections called *ādāb al-ṣuḥba* or *ādāb al-ukhuwwa* (ethics of companionship or brotherhood), which deal with the etiquette and manners of Sufi friendships (Çağrıcı 1994).

In Islamic philosophy, the concept of *ṣadāqa* is sometimes perceived as a virtue and can coexist with other virtuous qualities. Friendship is connected with human acts and contributes to human wellbeing (*saʿāda*) and moral completeness (*kamāl*). A friend can be a mirror, illuminating one's moral state and enabling the individual to recognise areas of weakness; moreover, the bond of love shared between friends may inspire virtuous behaviour (Özturan 2017, pp. 175–190). The concept of love and its transformative role in human existence and moral community has also been explored in relation to Sufi thought, where love serves as a bridge between the individual and the divine and between persons and communities (Çevik 2011).

This article advances three central arguments. *First*, Islamic philosophers did not merely inherit Aristotelian friendship but fundamentally transformed it into a metaphysical and spiritual concept, enriching it with dimensions of divine love, mystical union, and Neoplatonic emanation that go far beyond anything envisaged in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Second*, this transformation follows a discernible progressive trajectory, with each major thinker integrating additional ethical, theological, and communal

dimensions into the concept, building cumulatively towards an increasingly comprehensive vision of friendship as a principle of cosmic and social order. *Third*, this enriched conception of friendship offers a valuable normative resource for contemporary international ethical relations, providing a cross-civilisational model for solidarity, justice, and cooperation that transcends the limitations of both realist and purely procedural frameworks.

Methodologically, this study adopts a comparative-philosophical and intellectual-historical approach, analyzing how the Aristotelian concept of philia was received, interpreted, and transformed within major currents of Islamic ethical and philosophical thought. Through close textual engagement with both primary classical sources and contemporary scholarship, the article traces the progressive conceptual development of ṣadāqa across different thinkers and intellectual traditions.

This article builds on the rich tradition of Islamic philosophical friendship to develop these arguments. After a summary of the Aristotelian background, it provides an overview of the *ṣadāqa* concept by focusing on five selected Muslim philosophers: Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. ca. 414/1023), al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. fifth/eleventh century), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). The conceptual arc traced below runs from (1) the Aristotelian theory of friendship, through (2) Miskawayh's modifications of the Aristotelian theory, to (3) al-Tawḥīdī's less Aristotelian and more spiritually integrative account, (4) al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's elevation of love above justice, and (5) al-Ghazālī's and al-Ṭūsī's comprehensive syntheses. A concluding section reflects on what this intellectual trajectory offers contemporary thinking about ethical relations between nations and cultures.

1. The Aristotelian Theory of Friendship

The Aristotelian theory of friendship rests on two foundational tenets. The first is that the human being is a political or social animal (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1169b18; *Politics* 1278b19). Aristotle's characterisation of human beings as "political animals" (*zōon politikon*) is foundational to his political philosophy: individuals are naturally inclined to form communities and engage in political life. Aristotle posits that the essence of being human is not merely to exist but to participate in a *polis*, a structured community where individuals can pursue the common good and achieve

eudaimonia. This notion is supported by the idea that humans, unlike other social animals, possess *logos*, or the capacity for reason and speech, enabling them to deliberate and make collective decisions (Güremen 2018). While other animals exhibit social behaviours, it is the unique capacity for articulate reason that elevates humans to a more complex form of political existence (Cammack 2013; cf. Altuner 2013).

The second tenet (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8–9) is that friendship is based on a shared goal between two persons, which is (1) pleasure, (2) benefit, or (3) virtue. For Aristotle, the last is the best kind of friendship because a connection based on virtue is lasting, while shared pleasure and benefit may subside quickly. The highest form of friendship occurs between two equally virtuous individuals who engage in activities that exercise their virtues – what Aristotle calls "perfect" friendship. Aristotle further narrows the concept of true friendship to virtue-based friendships in which friends wish each other well for the other's sake. While true friends benefit each other because of who they are, in utility-based relationships one values the profit, not the person. Finally, Aristotle relies on the idea of a friend as "another self," since a virtuous person values recognising their own virtue, and a close friend provides another source of this recognition (Kraut 2022).

2. Miskawayh: Aristotelian Friendship in an Islamic Key

Among Islamic philosophers, Miskawayh engages the subject of love and friendship more systematically than many predecessors, such as al-Fārābī (d. 339/951) (Çağrıcı 1994, pp. 511–513). Goodman (1996, pp. 164, 176) describes Miskawayh's discussion of friendship as the acculturation of the Aristotelian ideal in the Islamic context. A recent study (Topkara 2022) maintains that his *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* ("The Refinement of Character") exhibits a profound influence from Aristotelian ethical frameworks, as Miskawayh not only adopts a Platonic interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy but also integrates various strands of Islamic intellectual tradition. Fundamentally, Miskawayh endeavoured to reconcile philosophical and theological notions of knowledge, elucidating the interconnectedness of perspectives that are frequently regarded as irreconcilably divergent.

In his *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, Miskawayh follows Aristotle in stating that "the human being is communal/political by nature" (*inna l-insān madanī bi-l-*

ṭab') (Mottahedeh 2016, p. 230; Miskawayh 1968, pp. 155/139; 2011, p. 359). As a result, human well-being can only be achieved with the assistance of friends. Miskawayh divides friendship, based on durability, into four types: (1) develops and dissolves quickly; (2) develops quickly but dissolves slowly; (3) develops slowly but dissolves quickly; and (4) develops and dissolves slowly. This fourfold division corresponds to the Aristotelian threefold division of the human goals of the pleasant, the good, and the useful (Fakhry 1994, p. 116; Welle 2024, p. 104). Similar to Aristotle, only a friendship based on virtue is enduring for Miskawayh, because the essence of good is immutable in contrast to the constantly changing utility or pleasure (Fakhry 1994, p. 117).

While Miskawayh exhibits substantial influence from Aristotle, he also adapts the Aristotelian paradigm by introducing the Platonic theme of divine friendship. Topkara (2022, chapter 4) argues that Miskawayh's conceptualisation of friendship is distinguished by the amalgamation of a religious framework with a socio-political interpretation of interpersonal relations. Safeguarding the distinctiveness of the self while perceiving oneself as an integral component of a broader collective – navigating this balance without yielding to either extreme – is rooted in Aristotelian thought; however, Miskawayh elevates it to a foundational principle of his *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, significantly aligning himself with Neoplatonic philosophies. This move beyond Aristotle constitutes the first step in the transformation this article traces: the introduction of a metaphysical and divine dimension to the ethical ideal of friendship.

3. Al-Tawḥīdī: Friendship as Spiritual Unity

Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, a philosopher and litterateur, contributes to the philosophical discussion of friendship particularly through his work *al-Ṣadāqa wa-l-Ṣadīq* ("The Friendship and the Friend") (al-Tawḥīdī 1964). His concept of *ṣadāqa* is based on four key elements: (1) soul (affinity in spiritual disposition), (2) intellect (shared pursuit of wisdom), (3) nature (innate compatibility), and (4) morals (ethical alignment) (Alshaar 2021, p. 330). True friendship is rooted in shared love for knowledge and intellectual pursuits, serving a pedagogical purpose aimed at achieving perfection and happiness. These four components reflect a Neoplatonic-ethical synthesis: the soul and intellect elevate friendship beyond mere utility, while nature and

morals ground it in human experience.

Al-Tawḥīdī also expands on the political and social aspects of the Aristotelian concept of friendship by introducing a deeper spiritual element: friendship is a unique experience of unity, self-revelation, and self-effacement between two individuals. To demonstrate this, he cites a verse by the Sufi poet al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) alluding to the concept of *ḥulūl* (union or merging of the human and divine selves). In this context, the mystical union with the divine is paralleled by unity between friends. Al-Tawḥīdī's notion of *ṣadāqa* thus goes beyond Aristotle: it involves not only wishing well for each other but also uniting as one soul, jointly pursuing knowledge and perfection (Alshaar 2021, p. 332; 2015, p. 167). This represents the second transformative step this article identifies – the spiritualization of friendship into a quasi-mystical concept of union.

Al-Tawḥīdī notably draws on a Christian source to illustrate divine love, citing Jesus from the Gospels as relayed by the Christian Ibn al-Jamāl (fl. 10th century) (Alshaar 2015, p. 209). This ecumenical move – drawing on Christian, Islamic, and philosophical sources simultaneously – demonstrates his aim to create a universal framework transcending the religious boundaries of his time. The connection between friendship and political governance is also highlighted: moral virtues extend from personal relationships into the realm of politics and social reform (Alshaar 2021, p. 335; 2015, pp. 173–174). Although Miskawayh and al-Tawḥīdī were contemporaries rather than master and student, both emphasise reason and moderation in friendship and share the conviction that friendship is the ethical foundation of social and political life (Welle 2024, p. 105).

4. Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī: Love Beyond Justice

Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, a Qurʾān commentator, grammarian, and moral philosopher, discusses the concept of friendship in his *Risāla fī Ādāb Mukhālaṭat al-Nās* and his ethical book *al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa* (Aksu 2021). He is heavily influenced by Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb* in particular (Mohamed 2006, p. 358), yet also diverges from Miskawayh in various topics (Aksu 2021, pp. 29–30).

Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī takes the link between friendship and virtue further than his predecessors. While Aristotle and Miskawayh view

friendship as a means for virtue, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī argues that friendship not only facilitates the attainment of virtue, but also allows individuals to transcend it. While justice, as the Platonic umbrella term for all virtues, is the most authoritative virtue, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī posits love (the foundation of friendship) and friendship as superior to justice. When people treat each other with love, justice becomes unnecessary; the reverse, however, is not true: justice cannot replace love (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2010; Aksu 2021, p. 14). This elevation of love above justice constitutes the third transformation in this article's trajectory: a reorientation of the entire hierarchy of ethical categories around the concept of love and friendship, with profound implications for both personal ethics and political philosophy.

5. Al-Ghazālī: Friendship as a Path to the Divine

Goodman (1996, p. 164) argues that al-Ghazālī's ethics are founded on a selective reading of Miskawayh. Al-Ghazālī relies heavily on Miskawayh – as well as other philosophers – to reformulate the ethical principles outlined in the Qurʾān and Sunna into the paradigm of virtue ethics. However, by his inclusion of pietist Sufi themes and a Sufi interpretation of the Qurʾānic ideal of brotherhood, he also deviates from his philosophical sources. Al-Ghazālī's project is a virtue ethics that brings together scripture (the Qurʾān and Sunna), philosophy, and Sufism (Vasalou 2021b, pp. 317–318). Altuner (2012) has demonstrated that al-Ghazālī's approach to philosophy is more nuanced than a simple rejection: he engages philosophical traditions, including those of Aristotle and his Islamic successors, critically but constructively, reformulating them within a theological framework.

Al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn* ("Revival of the Religious Sciences") devotes its fifth book in the second quarter to "the ethics of sociability, brotherhood, friendship, and living with diverse sorts of human beings" (Sherif 1975, pp. 24–156; al-Ghazālī n.d., 2:157). Al-Ghazālī gives four reasons for friendship and love: (1) the inherent nature of human creation, (2) worldly purposes, (3) other-worldly purposes, and (4) God – the last representing the highest level of love (al-Ghazālī n.d., 2:161–164). For al-Ghazālī, if one's motivation for love or friendship is rooted in a divine purpose, then this love is ultimately directed towards God. Similarly, love for another

person founded on that person's love for God becomes, in essence, love of God (Goodman 1996, pp. 180–181). Even seemingly instrumental relationships are thus transformed into a direct connection with the divine – making al-Ghazālī's account of friendship simultaneously one of the most demanding and most inclusive in the tradition.

Al-Ghazālī also lists five qualities of an ideal friend: (1) intelligence; (2) good character; (3) absence of persistent major sin; (4) absence of heretical beliefs; and (5) absence of greed for worldly pleasures (al-Ghazālī n.d., 2:171). He further specifies eight rights and duties of friendship, including altruism, loyalty, forgiveness, prayer for the other, and avoidance of being a burden (al-Ghazālī n.d., 2:171–173; Goodman 1996, pp. 182–183). In Goodman's interpretation (1996, p. 182), these rights embody the ideal of self-sacrifice intertwined with religious devotion, resulting in a spiritual concept of friendship that incorporates elements from Sufi brotherhoods. This represents the fourth transformation in our trajectory: the translation of the abstract ideal of friendship into a detailed and practically demanding ethos of mutual responsibility, grounded in divine love.

6. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: Civilizational Synthesis

Philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī examines the concept of friendship primarily in his *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* ("Nāṣirean Ethics"). The work is situated, through Miskawayh, within an Aristotelian ethical framework (Walzer & Gibb 1962). Al-Ṭūsī was initially assigned the task of translating Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb* into Persian but composed instead an independent work, the first ethical part of which is based on Miskawayh's treatise (see Lameer 2015). According to Lameer (2015), while *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* is compilatory in drawing on Greek, ancient Persian, Arabic, and Islamic traditions, its comprehensive scope and unique presentation are highly original.

Like Aristotle and Miskawayh, al-Ṭūsī depicts human sociability as a sociological and emotional imperative. The friendship based on goodness is facilitated by "the simple divine substance" (*jawhar-i basīṭ-i ilāhī*) inherent within humanity, connected with a superior form of incorporeal pleasure characterised by "complete ardent divine love and celestial affection" (*ʿishq-i tāmm va-maḥabbat-i ilāhī*) (Mottahedeh 2016, p. 233). As Kars (2017, pp. 369–390) states, "Sufi and Ismāʿīlī themes, sources, and ideas are in an organic interpenetration in al-Ṭūsī's works throughout his career." Both

Miskawayh and al-Ṭūsī introduce a third, non-classical, category of friendship between the human being and God; however, as Mottahedeh (2016, p. 235) notes, al-Ṭūsī is more religiously inclined than Miskawayh, his notion of a "simple divine substance" drawing on both Neo-Platonic and Sufi ideas. Al-Ṭūsī's synthesis was highly influential on later ethical discussions, including Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's (d. 908/1502) Persian *Akhlāq-i Jalālī* and Kınalızāde ʿAlī Efendi's Turkish *Akhlāk-ı ʿAlā'ī*. Al-Ṭūsī thus represents the fifth and final transformation in our trajectory: the synthesis of Greek, Persian, Arabic, and Islamic traditions into a unified metaphysical account of friendship that is simultaneously philosophical and deeply spiritual.

Conceptual Overview

The following table summarises the conceptual trajectory traced in the preceding sections, showing how each thinker transformed the Aristotelian inheritance:

Thinker	Type of Friendship	Key Transformation	Philosophical Contribution	Ethical Level
Aristotle	Virtue / Utility / Pleasure	Ethical classification	Friendship as moral virtue	Ethical
Miskawayh (d. 421/1030)	Virtue + Divine	Islamic adaptation of philia	Ethical-social integration	Ethical-Religious
Al-Tawḥīdī (d. ca. 414/1023)	Unity of souls	Spiritualization & ecumenism	Cross-civilisational & political	Spiritual
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 5th/11th c.)	Love > Justice	Ethical elevation of love	Love as supra-justice	Love-Centred
Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)	Divine-oriented	Sufi-scriptural integration	Friendship as path to God	Divine
Al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274)	Synthesized	Metaphysical grounding	Civilizational synthesis	Civilizational

Table 1. The Conceptual Trajectory from Philia to Ṣadāqa

The progressive transformation across six thinkers can be represented as follows, showing both the historical sequence and the deepening ethical register:




Figure 1. The Transformative Trajectory from Philia to Ṣadāqa

7. From Ṣadāqa to International Ethical Relations

The intellectual trajectory traced in the preceding sections substantiates this article's first two arguments: Islamic philosophers did not merely inherit Aristotelian friendship but fundamentally transformed it, and this transformation follows a progressive pattern of ethical, theological, and communal enrichment. The third argument – that this tradition offers normative resources for contemporary international ethics – now requires elaboration.

Mainstream Western frameworks for international relations have long relied on notions such as national interest, balance of power, contractual justice, or, in more idealist variants, cosmopolitan solidarity based on shared human dignity (cf. Mattila 2022). The Islamic philosophical tradition of *ṣadāqa* offers a complementary and in some respects richer resource: a relational ethics grounded in genuine care for the other, in the mutual cultivation of virtue, and in the recognition that human flourishing is irreducibly communal. The concept of love and its role in binding communities across cultural and religious boundaries, as emphasised by thinkers from al-Tawḥīdī to al-Ṭūsī, speaks directly to challenges of pluralistic coexistence at the international level (Cevik 2011; Altuner 2011).

Several dimensions of this tradition are particularly suggestive for international ethics. *First*, the concept of the friend as "another self" – developed by Aristotle and expanded by Islamic philosophers in distinctive directions – provides a philosophical basis for taking seriously the perspectives and interests of other communities and nations, not merely as strategic partners but as participants in a shared pursuit of the good. Al-Tawḥīdī's vision of *ṣadāqa* as "unity of souls" suggests a form of intersubjective solidarity that transcends transactional calculations.

Second, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's argument that love is superior to justice

– that when people treat each other with genuine care, justice becomes unnecessary – offers a provocative corrective to the dominant juridical and procedural frameworks of international order. While justice is indispensable as a minimum standard, a world in which states and peoples relate to one another through something approaching *ṣadāqa* would not merely enforce rights but would cultivate flourishing.

Third, al-Tawḥīdī's ecumenical vision – his willingness to draw on Christian, philosophical, and Islamic sources in constructing his account of friendship – models a form of cross-civilisational dialogue that is urgently needed in contemporary global ethics. His work demonstrates that traditions can be in genuine conversation without any one being dissolved into the other, a model for what contemporary philosophers sometimes call "comparative philosophy" or "transcultural ethics."

Fourth, al-Ghazālī's account of the concrete rights and duties of friendship – altruism, loyalty, forgiveness, prayer for the other, avoidance of burden – translates the abstract ideal of friendship into an ethos of practical responsibility. Applied to the international domain, such an ethos would ground obligations that go beyond the merely legal: obligations of solidarity, of active support for others' flourishing, of honest speech, and of forgiveness for historical wrongs.

Finally, the recurring theme of divine love as the ground of human friendship – found in al-Tawḥīdī, al-Ghazālī, and al-Ṭūsī – points to the importance of shared ultimate commitments in sustaining genuine solidarity. While international ethics cannot presuppose any particular theology, it can recognise that the depth of commitment required for genuine solidarity between peoples may need to be sustained by something more than rational self-interest alone. The Islamic philosophical tradition suggests that friendship, properly understood, is not a luxury but a necessity for both individual and communal flourishing – a lesson as relevant across nations as within them.

Conclusion

This article has traced the transformation of Aristotelian *philia* into the Islamic philosophical concept of *ṣadāqa* across five major thinkers: Miskawayh, al-Tawḥīdī, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ghazālī, and al-Ṭūsī.

Each thinker adopted, modified, and expanded the Aristotelian framework, incorporating Neoplatonic, Sufi, Qurʾānic, and other resources to produce a concept of friendship that is simultaneously philosophical and deeply Islamic. The result, as the table and diagram above illustrate, is a progressive trajectory from an ethical concept to an ethical-religious one, then to a spiritual and ecumenical account, then to a love-centred ethical theory, and finally to a divine and civilizational synthesis.

The three central arguments advanced in this article have been substantiated. Islamic philosophers did not merely inherit Aristotelian friendship – they fundamentally transformed it into a metaphysical and spiritual concept. This transformation followed a progressive trajectory, with each major thinker integrating additional ethical, theological, and communal dimensions. And this enriched conception of friendship offers valuable normative resources for contemporary international ethical relations, providing a cross-civilisational model for solidarity, justice, and cooperation. From *philia* to *ṣadāqa*, the philosophical tradition of friendship offers humanity what Beytulhikme itself embodies: a house of wisdom in which East and West can meet around the shared pursuit of human flourishing.

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Öz: Bu makale, *sadāka* (dostluk) kavramını İslâm felsefesinde Aristotelesçi etik teorisiyle ilişkisi ve İslâm entelektüel gelenekleri içindeki dönüşümü bakımından ele almaktadır. Makale, Kurʾânî, ahlakî ve tasavvufî dostluk sözlüklerini özetledikten sonra İslâm felsefî tartışmalarını Aristotelesçi *philia* çerçevesine yerleştirmekte; zevk, yarar ve erdeme dayalı dostluklar arasındaki ayrımı ve dostluğun insanın mutluluğuna (*saʿāda*) ve ahlakî yetkinliğine (*kamāl*) katkısını incelemektedir. Makale, Aristoteles'ten (d. 322 Önce M.) beş önemli Müslüman filozofa kavramsal bir yol izlemektedir: Miskeveyh (d. 421/1030), Ebû Hayyân et-Tevhîdî (d. y. 414/1023), Râgıb el-İsfahânî (d. beşinci/onbirinci yüzyıl), Gazâlî (d. 505/1111) ve Nasîrüddîn et-Tüsî (d. 672/1274). Makale üç temel argüman ileri sürmektedir: birincisi, İslâm filozoflarının Aristotelesçi dostluk anlayışını salt miras almadığı, aksine onu metafizik ve ruhanî bir kavrama dönüştürdüğü; ikincisi, bu dönüşümün etik, ilahiyatî ve toplumsal boyutları aşamalı biçimde bütünleştirdiği; üçüncüsü, bu zenginleştirilmiş dostluk anlayışının çağdaş uluslararası etik ilişkiler için değerli normatif bir kaynak oluşturduğu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dostluk, sadāka, philia, İslâm felsefesi, Aristoteles, Miskeveyh, Gazâlî, Tüsî, uluslararası etik, erdem etiği.