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Digital Humanities, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Religion: Methods, Projects, and a Future-Oriented Assessment

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Abstract

The application of computational techniques such as text mining, network analysis and statistical modeling to the sources of philosophy and the religious sciences makes it possible to study conceptual structures and patterns of argument on a large scale. Although such methods are established in many areas of the humanities, philosophy (and the philosophy of religion in particular) has engaged with them only to a limited extent. This article surveys the methodological possibilities that digital humanities holds for philosophy and the philosophy of religion through leading projects worldwide and assesses those projects critically against the objections raised within the humanities themselves. It covers digital corpora and scholarly editions, text mining and topic modeling, concept ontologies and citation networks, agent-based modeling and the automated checking of arguments, the analysis of Gödel's ontological proof with theorem provers, databases and simulations in the religious sciences, and large language models. It also assesses the state of the field in Türkiye and proposes a concrete research agenda. Digital methods, it argues, do not replace philosophical thinking: They make conceptual structures visible, test the validity of arguments and analyze large corpora, and in doing so they change what the philosopher has to judge without deciding it.

Keywords: Philosophy of religion, digital humanities, computational philosophy, computational metaphysics, large language models.

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1. Introduction

Digital humanities is the systematic use of computational methods and information technologies in humanities research (Schreibman et al., 2016). It is not simply a matter of adding new tools to old questions. Large collections of text can now be searched, compared and modeled at a scale that no reader could manage alone; this changes which questions can be asked at all: A historian of kalām, for example, may ask how often a given formula recurs across three centuries of commentaries, a question that no single reader could answer with confidence. Franco Moretti's (2000) notion of distant reading names the shift. Attention moves from the close reading of individual texts toward the statistical and computational analysis of large corpora, a program Moretti later gathered under the same title (Moretti, 2013).

As it happens, the field began with a philosophical and theological corpus. In 1949 Roberto Busa, an Italian Jesuit, set out to prepare a computer-assisted concordance of the works of Thomas Aquinas, the *Index Thomisticus*; his own account of the project remains the best introduction to it (Busa, 1980; see also Drucker, 2021). So the first large encounter between computation and text took place through the works of a philosopher-theologian. Yet in the more than 70 years since, these methods have become established in literary studies, history and linguistics, whereas philosophy, and especially the philosophy of religion, has engaged with them only to a limited extent. Why? Part of the answer lies in the discipline itself. Philosophy deals in concepts, arguments and their historical transformations. Concept maps, ontologies and formal logic fit such material well. But philosophy is also a normative, argumentative activity. No computation can determine that a philosophical conclusion is correct. This tension, between what computation can map and what it cannot decide, runs through everything that follows.

In Turkish-language scholarship the intersection of digital humanities with theology and the Islamic sciences has only recently become a topic in its own right. Saraçoğlu (2022) maps digital research processes broadly, with examples drawn from theology; Dereli (2022) sets out the digital methods available to the sociology of religion. Neither, however, addresses the methodological problems specific to philosophy and the philosophy of religion, and neither could take into account the capabilities that large language models have acquired since. As far as I can tell there is no Turkish-language survey of computational work in philosophy and the philosophy of religion. There is an international literature, and it is richer, but it is scattered across journals of computer science, digital humanities and philosophy, and much of it is unknown to philosophers of religion.

My aims are to present the methodological possibilities that digital humanities hold for philosophy and the philosophy of religion through leading projects, to assess those projects critically instead of merely describing them, and to ask what the results mean for Turkish academia. What follows is a narrative review, not a systematic one; I should say what that means. A project was included if it applies a computational method to a philosophical or religious-sciences corpus or question, if it is documented in peer-reviewed publications or on an institutional site, and if its outputs are publicly accessible. Within these limits I have preferred projects that illustrate a distinct method, so that the survey covers the range of what is being done rather than every instance of it. English-language work is overrepresented; I make no claim to completeness, and where a project that meets these criteria is missing, the omission is probably mine. For the Turkish material in Section 5 I searched DergiPark, the İSAM databases and the publications of the relevant research centers, and negative findings there should be read with that limitation in mind.

Some explanation of scope is needed as well. The philosophy of religion is treated here within the setting that institutionally surrounds it in Türkiye. In Turkish faculties of theology, departments of Philosophy and Religious Sciences (Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri) group the philosophy of religion together with the sociology, psychology, history and phenomenology of religion and with religious education. I use "religious sciences" for these companion disciplines. Its nearest anglophone equivalent is "religious studies." Computational work in these empirical fields is therefore included alongside philosophy proper. There are reasons internal to the subject for this breadth too. Computational studies specific to the philosophy of religion are still few; they concentrate on the formal analysis of theistic arguments and on the cognitive and social modeling of religion. And the general digital infrastructure of philosophy (bibliographic databases, digital editions, tools for argument analysis) serves the philosophy of religion directly.

Section 2 sets out the theoretical basis of computational methods in philosophy and the objections raised against them within the humanities, draws the epistemological limit that I take to be decisive, and then surveys the datafication of philosophical texts: corpora, scholarly editions, text mining, concept ontologies and citation networks. Section 3 turns to computation as a philosophical method, from agent-based models to the automated checking of Gödel's ontological proof, and from there to argument mining and language models. Section 4 deals with databases and simulations in the religious sciences, Section 5 with the situation in Türkiye and a research agenda, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Foundations, Limits, and the Datafication of Philosophical Texts

Computational methods entered philosophy, as they entered the other humanities, by way of indexing. Busa's concordance, for example, was a tool for finding passages, and for decades the digital contribution to philosophy consisted of searchable texts. Contemporary computational work goes further: It maps conceptual relations and argument structures through network models, extracts thematic structure from large text collections by statistical means, and in some cases hands the philosopher's pen to a theorem prover. Statistical analysis does not displace conceptual examination in this picture. It brings out structural tendencies in bodies of text too large to be read whole.

None of this has been accepted without dispute. Stephen Ramsay (2011) argues that quantitative analysis cannot take the place of interpretation, although it can serve a reading practice he calls "algorithmic criticism" (p. 1), one that uses computation to put new questions to texts. Johanna Drucker goes a good deal further than Ramsay. Data in the humanities are not given but taken: "*Capta* is 'taken' actively while *data* is assumed to be a 'given'" (Drucker, 2011, para. 3), and every count rests on prior decisions about what is to be counted. Nan Z. Da (2019) has stated the strongest objection: Much computational literary study is statistically fragile; its results do not survive small changes of method. Her argument may not apply to every method, but it applies with full force to the clustering and topic models that philosophy has begun to borrow. Writers in critical digital humanities add that the theoretical and social assumptions behind the tools themselves need examining (Berry & Fagerjord, 2017). I take these objections seriously, and in what follows I test three of the projects surveyed against them; the test is not always passed. For now the lesson is that digital methods belong in philosophy as complementary instruments, which supply macro-scale patterns to interpretation without replacing it.

Within philosophy the picture has a further feature. Computation can be applied to philosophy in two different ways; the distinction, although my own rather than one drawn in the literature, organizes the rest of this article. In the first, philosophy itself is the object: Its texts, concepts and citation networks are analyzed as data. In the second, computation is the method: Arguments are formalized and checked, epistemic communities are simulated, metaphysical proofs are tested with theorem provers. In the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (SEP), Grim and Singer (2020) define computational philosophy in the second sense only, as "the use of mechanized computational techniques to instantiate, extend, and amplify philosophical research" (para. 1), though they count textual and big-data analysis among its prospects (Introduction section, para. 3). Both ways matter to the philosophy of religion.

Where, then, does the limit lie? Philosophy is largely an activity of conceptual analysis, justification and normative evaluation. An argument's validity can be checked formally; whether its premises are true, and whether a philosophical position should be adopted, cannot. No procedure decides that being God-like is a positive property, or that a belief caused by fear of death is for that reason unjustified; such questions are matters of philosophical reasoning. Digital tools therefore scale up and enrich source analysis, concept mapping and the checking of arguments, but they do not replace philosophical judgment. This thesis is hardly controversial. I do not intend to keep repeating it. What is less obvious, and worth asking, is whether the tools leave the philosopher's task untouched. A theorem prover does not choose its premises. But if it can show which premises may be weakened without loss of the conclusion, it changes the set of options over which the philosopher deliberates. Suppose, for instance, that a prover reports that an argument's conclusion follows from only two of its five premises; the philosopher who then drops the other three has not been replaced, but has been handed a choice that did not exist before. Section 3 takes up this question with the case of Gödel's ontological proof; I argue there that the division of labor between computation and judgment is stable in principle but moves in practice. In the philosophy of religion, a field dense with content both conceptually and existentially, the question matters more than elsewhere.

Everything in the first way of using computation depends on texts that machines can process, and here two terms that are often run together need to be distinguished. A text is machine-readable when software can read its characters, as a scanned and OCR-processed PDF is, whereas it is machine-actionable when its structure (chapters, paragraphs, apparatus, names, dates) is encoded so that software can act on it, for example by retrieving every passage a commentator attributes to his source. If the commentary is only machine-readable, a search returns strings; if it is machine-actionable, the search returns passages with their attributions. Markup, in short, is what makes the difference. Most digitized philosophy is machine-readable. Comparatively little is machine-actionable, a difference that explains much of what follows. Two kinds of resource provide the basic infrastructure: comprehensive bibliographic and encyclopedic databases, and digital scholarly editions of individual philosophers.

PhilPapers is the most important example of bibliographic infrastructure. Developed since 2006 by David Bourget and David Chalmers, it indexes more than 3 million

books and articles and organizes half a million of them into a structured bibliography of more than 6,000 topics (PhilPapers, n.d.). Because this taxonomy includes the philosophy of religion as an explicit subfield, the general infrastructure can be used directly to map and measure that literature; if one wants to know, for example, how the output of the philosophy of religion has grown since 2000, PhilPapers is where the count begins. As for the SEP, it serves both as a reference work kept up to date and as a corpus for computational analysis; the Indiana Philosophy Ontology, discussed below, was built on it.

Digital scholarly editions of individual philosophers are among the most mature products of digital humanities in philosophy. Foremost among them is the edition of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* prepared by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Founded in 1990, the archive set out to encode the philosopher's roughly 20,000 pages of manuscripts and typescripts in machine-actionable form; the work took shape as the *Bergen Electronic Edition*, published on CD-ROM by Oxford University Press (Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2000). Since then the archive has converted its transcriptions to XML-TEI (Text Encoding Initiative) and, through the Wittgenstein Source platform, has made the whole *Nachlass* available online as the Bergen Nachlass Edition (Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, n.d.). As far as I know, there is nothing comparable for any philosopher of the Islamic tradition, although the OpenITI corpus discussed below supplies the raw material from which such an edition could be built. A second example is Nietzsche Source, directed by Paolo D'Iorio. It provides free access to a digital critical edition (eKGWB) based on the Colli–Montinari text and to a facsimile edition (DFGA); because the digital edition integrates numerous philological corrections, it is now the most up-to-date version of Nietzsche's works available (D'Iorio, 2010). Kant, Leibniz, Plato and Aristotle, among others, can be consulted in commercial full-text collections such as InteLex Past Masters (InteLex Corporation, n.d.). Editions of this kind make classical texts not only readable but searchable, comparable and analyzable.

Once such corpora exist, several methods of analysis become possible. Topic modeling is a family of machine-learning techniques, of which latent Dirichlet allocation is the best known (Blei et al., 2003), that uncovers hidden thematic structure in large collections. Applied to the archive of a journal, it maps the dominant topics and their change over time; Malaterre et al. (2019), for example, modeled eight decades of the journal *Philosophy of Science* and traced the rise and decline of its themes. Stylometry, the statistical study of writing style, serves authorship attribution and dating (Eder et al., 2016). It can be used to assess disputed attributions and pseudepigraphic texts. It matters most for corpora in which works of uncertain authenticity abound, as they do in ancient and medieval philosophy and in kalām. Text reuse detection, finally, traces how a thinker uses his sources, which passages he reproduces and how ideas circulate between texts, and for classical Islamic thought this is perhaps the most promising method of all, because the literature of commentary (*sharḥ*) and gloss (*ḥāshiya*) is built on reuse and because it is the one area in which Arabic has an infrastructure comparable to that of European languages. OpenITI, the Open Islamicate Texts Initiative, provides a machine-actionable corpus of several thousand Arabic texts (Romanov & Seydi, 2019); the KITAB project at the Aga Khan University runs the passim reuse-detection algorithm across this corpus and publishes the resulting alignments as open data (Smith et al., 2020); and tools adapted to Arabic morphology have begun to find more reuse than passim does on this material (Kelly, 2025). Romanov (2017) has shown with biographical collections what algorithmic analysis of such a corpus can yield. As far as I know, the philosophical and theological parts of OpenITI remain largely unexplored by these methods, which is an opportunity rather than a limitation. It seems likely that the first computational results on Ottoman kalām will come from reuse detection rather than from topic modeling, simply because the data are closer to ready.

Philosophy is a discipline of concepts and of the relations between them, and concept maps, ontologies and citation networks suit it especially well. Here the pioneering project is the Indiana Philosophy Ontology (InPhO), developed by Colin Allen and his collaborators at Indiana University and since renamed the Internet Philosophy Ontology. Its aim was to build "a dynamic computational ontology for the discipline of philosophy," primarily to serve the metadata needs of the SEP (Niepert et al., 2009, para. 1). What distinguishes InPhO is its method, which proceeds in stages: Natural language processing first generates statistical hypotheses about relations between philosophical concepts; domain experts then evaluate these hypotheses through online interfaces; and a logic program finally combines the expert feedback with the statistical measures to populate the ontology (Buckner et al., 2011; Niepert et al., 2009). What results is a model of human–machine collaboration. It goes beyond both fully automatic and fully manual approaches. InPhO now analyzes more than 37 million words of philosophical content and publishes its data through an open API (InPhO, n.d.).

PhilPapers' subject classification can itself be read as an expert-built ontology of philosophy; the platform also hosts the PhilPapers Surveys, which measure philosophers' views quantitatively. In 2020 the survey put 100 questions to 1,785

philosophers worldwide; clustering and principal component analysis of the answers brought out correlations between positions as well as demographic effects (Bourget & Chalmers, 2023). Set beside the first survey of 2009 (931 respondents, 30 questions; Bourget & Chalmers, 2014), this amounts to a quantitative form of metaphilosophy, philosophy about philosophy itself.

Citation networks, in turn, map the structure of the recent discipline. Maximilian Noichl (2021) downloaded the citation data of 68,152 articles from Web of Science, following the journal list of PhilPapers, and analyzed them with dimensionality reduction (UMAP) and clustering (HDBSCAN). His results suggest that the division between analytic and continental philosophy is often exaggerated, that analytic philosophy does not form a single coherent cluster, and that the discipline consists rather of many interconnected subfields. How far does Da's objection reach here? Noichl's clusters depend on parameter choices within the algorithms; the corpus is limited to journals indexed in Web of Science, which underrepresents books and non-English publication; a different corpus might well draw the map differently. Yet the finding is modest in the right way. It does not claim to have measured philosophy; it claims that one traditional narrative about the discipline fails to appear in one large body of data, a claim the narrative can fairly be asked to answer. Bibliometric analysis thus allows the discipline's stories about itself to be tested, provided the test is read with the corpus in view.

3. Computation as Philosophical Method: Simulation, Theorem Proving, and Language Models

In the second way of using computation, modeling itself is the philosophical method. Over the past two or three decades computational modeling has become an established practice in several areas of analytic philosophy, as the examples collected by Grim and Singer (2020) show, and Mayo-Wilson and Zollman (2021) now describe simulation as a core philosophical method.

One branch of this work investigates questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science through agent-based modeling and computer simulation. Kevin Zollman's (2007) study of the communication structure of scientific communities is a classic. Its question is how a community should share information in order to reach the truth reliably; the candidate answers are tested in a model, where the real communities would be hard to observe (Mayo-Wilson & Zollman, 2021). One of its results, for example, is that the best-performing communication network is not the fully connected one, because in a tightly connected community a misleading early result spreads before it can be corrected (Grim & Singer, 2020). Bayesian formal epistemology, as practiced at centers such as the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, belongs to the same family; the topical collection introduced by Scheller et al. (2022) conveys its range. Behind all of this lies Patrick Grim's *Philosophical Computer*, which used exploratory models to test the robustness of philosophical claims and their sensitivity to variables, beyond what thought experiments and intuitions can do (Grim et al., 1998).

For the philosophy of religion the relevant branch is the checking of arguments with automated theorem provers after their translation into formal logic. Fitelson and Zalta (2007) called it computational metaphysics and used the prover Prover9 to derive theorems of Zalta's object theory; Oppenheimer and Zalta (2011) then reported that a prover had found a simpler derivation of Anselm's ontological argument than the standard reconstruction uses. In work of this kind the computer tests whether an argument's conclusion really follows from its premises, whether the premises are consistent, and which logical assumptions are necessary; it does nothing else.

Kurt Gödel's ontological proof, in the version revised by Dana Scott, has produced the most discussed results. Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo (2014) translated it into higher-order modal logic and analyzed it with the provers LEO-II and Satallax and the model finder Nitpick; the provers confirmed that the conclusion "Necessarily, God exists" follows from Scott's axioms and that these axioms are consistent (pp. 93, 97). They also found that the conclusion does not require the modal logic S5, which the argument is usually assumed to need and for which it has often been criticized; in fact the weaker logic KB suffices, so that this criticism, in the authors' words, "is thus provably pointless" (p. 97). And they verified that the axioms entail modal collapse, the thesis that whatever is true is necessarily true, confirming by machine the objection that Sobel (2004, Chapter 4) had raised against Gödel's argument by hand (p. 97). Yet a second study added a finding of a different kind. In Gödel's own 1970 manuscript the axioms lack a conjunct that Scott added to the definition of essence, and without it they are inconsistent, a fact that went unnoticed for four decades until LEO-II detected it in 2013 (Benzmüller & Woltzenlogel Paleo, 2016, pp. 936–937). Fuenmayor and Benzmüller (2017) have since extended the line to the emended versions of the argument that later authors proposed in order to avoid modal collapse.

What should a philosopher of religion make of this? Certainly the computer does not prove that God exists, nor that God does not exist. It checks whether, given certain premises, the argument is valid and consistent, which logical assumptions it rests on, and where it breaks. Whether the premises are accepted, for example the axiom that being God-like is a positive property (Benzmüller & Woltzenlogel

Paleo, 2014, p. 93), remains a philosophical question. So far the limit drawn in Section 2 holds. But the case also reveals how the limit moves. Consider the finding that KB suffices: It removes an objection philosophers had argued over for years, and nobody chose a weaker logic; the prover found one. Consider, next, the inconsistency of Gödel's own axioms, which means that the result depends on which formalization is checked. This is Drucker's point about *capta* in logical dress. Decisions made by the formalizer come before the computation and determine what it can find. And the work on emendations maps which weakenings of the axioms avoid modal collapse while preserving the conclusion, so that the philosopher now deliberates over a charted space of premise sets instead of a single argument. Premises are still chosen by judgment, as they always were. If the philosopher had never seen the prover's output, the choice among emendations would still be hers to make, but it would be made blind. The tools decide which choices are live, and in that sense computational metaphysics does not leave the philosopher's task where it found it. Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel Paleo (2016) present their result as a success story for artificial intelligence (AI) in metaphysics. I would put it more cautiously, as a success story for a division of labor that the philosopher has to keep renegotiating.

Theorem provers work only on arguments that are already formalized. A different line of research, argument mining, aims to extract argument structure (claims, premises and the relations of support and attack between them) automatically from natural-language text (Lawrence & Reed, 2019). It has developed mainly in computational linguistics, on corpora of persuasive essays and online debate; its application to philosophical prose, where arguments are long, implicit and nested, remains largely untried. Probably the obstacle is less the algorithms than the absence of annotated philosophical corpora on which they could be trained. Yet it is the natural bridge between the two ways of using computation surveyed here, since it would turn the texts of Section 2 into the formal objects of this section. Large language models have recently revived that prospect.

Such models, trained to predict the next token in a text, have entered the toolkit of computational philosophy for data structuring and text classification; they serve as assistants in preprocessing the philosophical literature and in extracting information from large masses of text. Their limits need stating precisely, because they are easy to misjudge in both directions. A language model's output is not constrained by logical consistency or by the validity of what it asserts. Fluency guarantees neither. That does not make the models useless for argument analysis, but it does mean that their output, if it is to be used at all, has to be checked, by the methods just described or by a reader. Retrieval-augmented generation, which grounds a model's answers in documents retrieved for the purpose (Lewis et al., 2020), reduces the risk of fabricated sources; it does not supply the reasoning. Even if retrieval grounds every citation, the inference from the cited passage to the conclusion remains the model's to get wrong.

One experiment displays both the power and the limit. Eric Schwitzgebel, David Schwitzgebel and Anna Strasser (2024) fine-tuned GPT-3 on the works of Daniel Dennett, named the result DigiDan, put 10 philosophical questions to Dennett himself and the same 10 to the model, and asked Dennett experts to tell the answers apart. Experts on Dennett ($N = 25$) succeeded only 51% of the time, above the 20% chance level but far below the 80% the researchers had expected; for two of the 10 questions the experts chose the model's answer more often than Dennett's own. So the model can produce text that reads like a philosopher's in style and content. Whether it was doing philosophy is another matter. It had no view to defend and no reason for what it said. Potential applications in philosophy and the philosophy of religion include the extraction of arguments and concepts from large corpora, the semi-automatic analysis of arguments before formalization, literature review and translation across the languages of philosophy. Against these stand the familiar failures: fabricated references, such as an article with a real author and a real journal that was never written; missed conceptual distinctions; inconsistent answers to small changes in a question. In the philosophy of religion and kalām, where the subtleties of school and tradition and the weight of historical context are everything, such failures are more consequential than elsewhere; the models are best treated as instruments of preparation.

4. Digital and Computational Methods in the Religious Sciences

A methodological distinction is needed at this point. But it should not be drawn too sharply. Philosophy of religion is a normative, argument-based discipline: Its questions are whether belief is justified, whether the theistic proofs are valid, whether religious propositions are true. By contrast, the sociology, psychology and cognitive science of religion are empirical disciplines. They study observable behavior, social patterns and cognitive mechanisms. Large databases and agent-based simulations, the methods introduced in this section, belong to the empirical side; projects such as the Modeling Religion Project discussed below fall within the religious sciences, not within the philosophy of religion. Yet the two sides meet at a point of real philosophical interest. Cognitive scientists of religion explain belief in gods as the product of ordinary cognitive mechanisms, and from such explanations some philosophers have built debunking arguments: If belief in gods arises, for example, from an

oversensitive tendency to detect agents, then it is not formed by processes that track truth; to that extent it is unjustified. Whether the inference goes through is disputed (Jong & Visala, 2014; Leech & Visala, 2011), but the dispute is a normative one that turns on empirical premises, and a computational model that tests the causal story thereby bears on the philosophical argument. So the distinction between the two fields is functional rather than absolute: Empirical results do not resolve normative questions, but they can change which normative questions are worth asking.

Two approaches dominate the empirical side: large-scale databases and simulation. Among databases the most comprehensive is the Database of Religious History (DRH), developed at the University of British Columbia under Edward Slingerland. Conceived in 2012, it aims to be an online, open-access encyclopedia, both quantitative and qualitative, that records religious beliefs and practices across world history in a standardized form (Slingerland & Sullivan, 2017). Experts answer structured questionnaires, mostly in a present/absent/field-doesn't-know format. Their answers allow both instant visualization and large-scale hypothesis testing. Slingerland and Sullivan (2017) call the approach "Durkheim with data" (p. 312); it is a notable attempt to turn the accumulated scholarship of the humanities into data that can be analyzed quantitatively. It is also the place where Drucker's objection applies most directly. A present/absent answer about, for example, ancestor worship in a given polity compresses a judgment made from fragmentary sources by a scholar working within a particular framework; the "field doesn't know" option acknowledges uncertainty, but the coding still turns *capta* into data at the moment the questionnaire is designed. Its designers are aware of this. Their response is to let qualitative commentary be attached to each answer. Whether it is enough is something each user of the database has to decide for the question at hand. Perhaps the honest answer is that the database suits broad comparative hypotheses far better than it suits questions about any single tradition.

Among simulations the principal example is the Modeling Religion Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation from 2015 to 2017, with Patrick McNamara and Wesley Wildman as project leaders, under the title "Modeling Religion: Simulating the Social Effects of Religion with Cognitively Complex Agents" (John Templeton Foundation, n.d.). It was coordinated by the Center for Mind and Culture in Boston, of which Wildman is executive director, in partnership with the Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center at Old Dominion University and the Center for Modeling Social Systems at the University of Agder, where F. LeRon Shults leads the work (Center for Mind and Culture, n.d.). Its models include a simulation of religious entanglement in Neolithic Çatalhöyük, a model of terror management theory in which mortality salience amplifies the tendency to posit supernatural agents, a model of mutually escalating religious violence and an agent-based forecast of changes in religiosity and existential security at the population level (Center for Mind and Culture, n.d.; Shults, 2019, pp. 113, 115). In Shults's (2019) own assessment, such modeling has implications not only for the religious sciences but for the philosophy of religion, because a model forces the causal assumptions behind a theory of religion into the open, where they can be tested.

These studies stand at the intersection of the cognitive science of religion and computational social science, and here too a limit applies. Simulations test hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying religious phenomena and explore counterfactual scenarios; they do not answer questions about the meaning, truth value or normative standing of belief. But as the debunking debate indicates, they can change the evidence on which such questions are argued; that is a genuine contribution, and philosophers of religion in Türkiye, who have so far had little contact with this literature, might find in it the most direct route from their own questions to computational work.

5. Türkiye: The Current State and a Research Agenda

How far has this methodological shift reached Turkish academia? In history and literature it has institutional form. Marmara University's Digital Humanities Research Center (Dijital Beşeri Bilimler Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi), established by regulation in November 2021 and active since March 2023 under the direction of Yunus Uğur, describes itself, on its own website, as still the only center of its kind in the country (Marmara Üniversitesi Dijital Beşeri Bilimler Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi, n.d.); the volume *Dijital Beşerî Bilimler ve Osmanlı Çalışmaları* that Uğur (2023) edited brings together pioneering studies that combine traditional methods with computational ones. Both initiatives are directed predominantly at history and literature.

In philosophy and the religious sciences, the picture is thinner. On the religious-sciences side, Dereli's (2022) framework for digital methods in the sociology of religion is a pioneering step; the psychology of religion, for its part, has begun to use machine-learning techniques: Kızılgeçit and Çinici (2020) predicted levels of religious coping during the COVID-19 pandemic with an artificial neural network, and Çinici and Kızılgeçit (2023) have argued for the wider applicability of such networks in the field. Much of the

remaining work, however, belongs to "digital religion" research, which studies religious phenomena in digital environments (online religiosity, religion on social media) without applying computational methods to philosophical or theological texts. For the direct application of text mining, formal argument analysis or concept ontologies to philosophy and the philosophy of religion I have found no publicly documented Turkish example; a search of DergiPark and the İSAM databases may of course have missed work in progress, and I would be glad to be corrected.

Why the gap? Lack of technical skill is the usual explanation; it is part of the truth, since researchers in philosophy and the religious sciences are trained in a qualitative and conceptual tradition, while the methodological problems that Taştan (2018) observed in graduate theses in these departments indicate how unsettled even the discussion of method remains. But the caution has intellectual grounds as well. It stems partly from the concern that quantitative reduction would impoverish normative and conceptual reasoning and sever the text from its context and its layers of meaning; in that respect methodological conservatism should often be read as a considered position on the nature of the discipline, not as technophobia. After all, the objections of Section 2 are the same concern stated by digital humanists themselves. There are institutional factors as well: the structural separation of faculties of theology and letters from faculties of engineering, the absence of joint funding and training channels and the scarcity of researchers competent in both philosophy and computation.

Infrastructure tells the same story: Turkish digital effort in theology has concentrated on digitization and access, and here the achievement is real. Although the online TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, the bibliographic databases of İSAM and the national platform DergiPark have transformed access to sources, these resources provide readable digital text; they do not, for the most part, provide corpora that are machine-actionable, explicitly tagged and fit for computational analysis. For Turkish and Ottoman Turkish philosophical and kalām texts no such corpus exists. So the threshold the field faces is not digitization but the step from digital text to analytical data.

An agenda follows from this diagnosis; it can be made concrete. What is needed before anything else is an open-access collection of Turkish and Ottoman Turkish texts in philosophy, kalām and the religious sciences, prepared according to critical-edition principles and encoded in a standard that makes it machine-actionable: XML-TEI, the standard of the Wittgenstein and Nietzsche editions, or OpenITI's lighter mARkdown scheme, which has the advantage of compatibility with the existing Arabic corpus and its reuse-detection pipeline. OpenITI (Romanov & Seydi, 2019) and the Ottoman work collected by Uğur (2023) indicate that such an infrastructure is technically feasible; a natural host would be a partnership between the Marmara center and İSAM, whose bibliographic databases already cover the material. A pilot could begin modestly, with a handful of Arabic-language Ottoman kalām works that already exist in critical editions, encoded in TEI and released under an open license, and with a reuse-detection run against the Arabic texts in OpenITI that they cite; within a year such a pilot would tell us whether the map of commentary and gloss that Section 2 envisaged can be drawn for Ottoman kalām. If it succeeded, the same workflow could be extended to the philosophical texts of the madrasa curriculum, and the corpus would grow by use rather than by decree. For the religious sciences the DRH provides a template for a parallel effort. Alongside the corpus, training is needed: An interdisciplinary research culture that combines computational methods with traditional textual criticism has to be built from graduate programs upward, through joint programs between Philosophy and Religious Sciences departments and computer science units and through short courses of the kind the Marmara center already runs. Within this culture the role of generative AI should be defined as that of a research and preparation assistant, useful for large-scale scanning, preliminary analysis and data structuring, with the checking of validity and the formation of normative judgment reserved to formal methods and to the researcher, for the reasons given in Section 3. Finally the agenda needs institutional backing: a national digital corpus project, and priority for such projects in the funding programs of TÜBİTAK and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK).

6. Conclusion

This article has surveyed what digital humanities holds for philosophy and the philosophy of religion, in its conceptual, technical and institutional dimensions, and has tried to assess the offer critically. Digital methods, it turns out, bring philosophy new questions as well as new tools: whether the discipline has the structure it attributes to itself, which premises a classical proof really needs, how a theory of religion behaves once its causal assumptions are made explicit.

For the philosophy of religion the most instructive lesson comes from computational metaphysics. Analyzed with theorem provers, Gödel's ontological proof makes the point exactly: The computer does not prove the existence of God; it checks, under given premises, the validity, consistency and hidden assumptions of the argument. That exemplifies a general principle: The tools test and display the formal skeleton of an argument, while judgment about the truth of the premises and the acceptability of the conclusion

belongs to the philosopher. But the same case also makes clear that the tools change what the philosopher has to judge, by finding weaker logics, exposing inconsistent formalizations and charting the space of emendations. In the religious sciences, the DRH and the Modeling Religion Project show what quantitative databases and agent-based simulations can do, and the debate over debunking arguments explains why their results matter to philosophy. Language models, still at an early stage as research instruments, hold real potential for preliminary analysis, data structuring and cross-source search; the DigiDan experiment is a reminder that imitating a philosopher's style and doing philosophy are different things.

In Türkiye, the absence of a machine-actionable corpus for philosophy and the philosophy of religion, the lack of interdisciplinary training and the weakness of institutional collaboration are the main obstacles; the agenda proposed above addresses each of them. Digital humanities is a complementary paradigm that widens the methodological horizon of philosophy and the philosophy of religion. Its fruitful adoption depends on open corpora, interdisciplinary networks, digital literacy in the curriculum and a careful observance of the epistemological limits of AI tools. Philosophy and the philosophy of religion, with their centuries-old argumentative tradition, offer rich ground for these methods; cultivating that ground would be an investment both in a deeper understanding of the past and in the future of the fields.

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