ACCSCIENCE PUBLISHING

Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy

ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE

Dimensions of the Interaction between Logic and Māturīdism in the Context of the Logic–Kalām Relation: From the Physician-Logician to the Mutakallim -Logician

Harun Takcı [1]*

[1] Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Theology, Amasya University, Amasya, Turkey

Abstract

This article aims to examine the relationship between logic and kalām, a topic situated within the broader subject of the relationship between philosophy and kalām, from a different dimension. It is necessary to investigate the relationship between kalām, which seeks to ground and defend what is true and real in matters of belief and creed, and logic, which claims to be a path and method that protects human beings from error in thinking and leads them to the truth. In this context, the study considers it more fitting to first look at the relationship between logic and kalām in general terms, and then to focus on the relationship between Māturīdism and logic, taking into account the stages of its development and the position it occupies within the debates on opposition to logic. To make this relationship more distinct and meaningful, a reading based on the relationship between logic and medicine has been developed. Proceeding from this, it is argued that the kalām-logical tradition developed through a dynamic similar to that of the medical-logical tradition, and the notion of a "kalām-logical tradition" is put forward as a finding of the study. Accordingly, the study discusses the profiles of the physician-logician and the mutakallim-logician and employs these conceptualizations. The kalām-logical tradition is assessed both as a natural and Islamic transformation of the physician-logician tradition, which began with Galen and reached its peak with Ibn Sīnā, and as a mode of construction containing motifs specific to the Islamic intellectual world. In addition, the study addresses the debates on the claim that logic did not develop significantly in the Māturīdī tradition. Moreover, by focusing on two points, namely Imam al-Māturīdī's references to the views of philosophers in his exegesis and his conspicuous omission of Aristotle's name, the issue is opened to discussion from two angles, and an effort is made to develop a new perspective..

Keywords: Logic, philosophy, kalām, māturīdī, medicine-logic, kalām-logic.

*** Corresponding author:**
Harun Takcı
(harun.takci@amasya.edu.tr)

Citation: Takcı, H. (2026). Dimensions of the Interaction between Logic and Māturīdism in the Context of the Logic–Kalām Relation: From the Physician-Logician to the Mutakallim -Logician. *Beytulhikme An InternationalJournal of Philosophy*, 16(3): 1115-1127. https://doi.org/10.36922/BIJP95396

Received: July 13, 2026

Revised: August 20, 2026

Accepted: September 28, 2026

Published online: September 30, 2026

Copyright: © 2026 Author(s). This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNon-Commercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits all non-commercial use, distribution,and reproduction in any medium,provided the original work is properly cited.

Publisher's Note: AccScience Publishing remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutionalaffiliations.

1. Introduction

Within the Islamic intellectual tradition, the relationship between logic and the religious sciences, including kalām, is explicitly stated by some authors. For example, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) notes that later scholars accepted and employed the science of logic as an instrument in kalām and the uṣūl al-fiqh (Ibn Khaldūn, 2004, p. 788). The introduction of Greek logic and philosophy into the Islamic world began with translations; it was reconstructed by al-Kindī (d. 252/866 [?]) and above all by al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) completed al-Fārābī's views and produced a formidable system of logic and philosophy. Through the influence of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), logic in particular gained an important place and became strongly integrated into Sunni kalām. With al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, philosophy was taken up in the Islamic world in its full maturity. For this reason, al-Ghazālī criticized the two opposing attitudes that had become widespread up to his time, namely the complete rejection and the complete acceptance of philosophy, and concerned himself with "the refutation and invalidation of philosophical discussions contrary to religious creeds." In the post-Ghazālī period, particularly at the hands of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) (Çapak, 2013; Kahraman, 2021, p. 90) and al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), "Sunni kalām also became fused with Aristotelian philosophy." This becomes clearer when these mutakallims/theologians are compared with Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767). It is also observed that the mutakallims who came after al-Ghazālī treated Greek philosophy carefully from an Islamic perspective. In addition, it should be noted that philosophers who understood and assimilated this philosophy very well emerged in the circles of Baghdad and al-Andalus (Köprülü, 1986, pp. 21-24; Yörükan, 1953, pp. 133-142).

The close relationship between logic and kalām can also be read through the similarity of names between the two disciplines. Indeed, it seems possible to speak of a certain overlap and commonality in the meaning of “speech-logos/word- kalām” in the naming of both sciences (Aydın, 2003, pp. 2-3; İmamoğlugil, 2018, p. 107; Gündüz, 2023, pp. 34-39). The science of kalām has been an important means by which logic was taken up in a lively and effective manner throughout the Islamic intellectual tradition. Indeed, al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) was the first within the kalām tradition to include a theory of knowledge, and his approach was followed by later mutakallims, so that the topic of knowledge came to be treated at the beginning of nearly all kalām texts. Likewise, in his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (al-Māturīdī, 2014), al-Māturīdī included the ten categories discussed in the *Categories* (Aristotle, 1980, 1989, 2016), the first book of Aristotle’s (d. 322 BC) *Organon* corpus, and offered assessments of them. This is highly noteworthy in that it shows the scope of al-Māturīdī’s intellectual world (Köz, 2008, pp. 90, 95-96; İmamoğlugil, 2018, p. 121; Coşar, 2014, pp. 375-376).

This study first focuses on the formative and developmental stages of both sciences, with the aim of making the firm relationship between logic and kalām more visible. In this context, it addresses the developmental trajectories of the sciences of logic and kalām as well as that of the Māturīdī tradition, which we wish to foreground. Second, it examines how al-Māturīdī and later Māturīdī mutakallims dealt with the concepts and theories of logic. Third, in the context of the debate over opposition to logic, it seeks to determine the position of the Māturīdī tradition within that opposition. Finally, it proposes a reading based on the typology of the physician-logician and the mutakallim-logician. By drawing attention to the paradigm-founding and transformative character of the relationship between the Māturīdī tradition and logic, this conceptualization is intended to support the central claim of the study.

2. The Development and Interaction of Logic and Māturīdism

Although it is not possible to speak of a systematic science of logic before Aristotle, the subjects addressed particularly by Zeno of Elea (d. 430 BC) and Pythagoras (d. 495 BC) have taken their place in the history of thought as the first discussions undertaken in the field of logic. Socrates (d. 399 BC), who struggled against the Sophists who denied knowledge, argued that stability exists in moral matters, even if not in mathematics and physics, and thereby pointed to the existence of universals. Plato (d. 347 BC) then made an important contribution by developing the theory of universals so as to encompass the entire domain of knowledge (Bingöl, 2012, p. 4). Finally, with the aim of silencing the Sophists, Aristotle formulated his response to them by employing the *Organon*, that is, the science of logic, and achieved considerable success (Durusoy, 2020, p. 201).

Andronicus of Rhodes (d. 1st century BC) compiled Aristotle’s works on the science of logic into six books. Later, Alexander of Aphrodisias (d. 3rd century BC) was the first to give this corpus the name *Organon*, and the Byzantine logicians also used this name (Çetin, 2015, p. 694). Aristotelian logic greatly influenced the Syriacs, and Syriac thinkers strove to learn and use the science of logic mostly in order to defend their own religion. Through the Syriacs, Aristotle’s *Organon* corpus was translated into Arabic during the time of Caliph al-Manṣūr (d. 158/775), and Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910), the son of the renowned translator Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (d. 260/873), was the first to complete the translation of all eight books of the science of logic into

Arabic (Köz, 2008, pp. 80, 82-84; Aydın, 2003, pp. 3-4, 10; İmamoğlugil, 2018, pp. 109-110; Yıldırım, 2014, p. 50).

Al-Fārābī is the figure who gave the science of logic its identity in the Islamic world, freed it from being a merely translated science, and reconstructed logic in Arabic for the second time (Bingöl, 2012, pp. 9, 11). Indeed, the fact that al-Fārābī treated the science of logic by giving examples from the disciplines of kalām and fiqh is of great importance for the Islamic intellectual tradition (Çetin, 2015, p. 695). In the Islamic world, the 8th to 10th centuries were a period in which the Islamic sciences were established and developed, and in which the philosophical sciences were inherited through translations and then established by al-Fārābī. Al-Kindī, who is regarded as the first philosopher of the Islamic world and who also actively participated in and contributed to translation activities, was likewise closely interested in philosophical and kalām subjects (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, p. 182).

During the transmission of logic and philosophy to the Islamic world, the traditions of kalām and fiqh were themselves in the stages of their formation and development. Among the schools of Islamic thought of this period, two important approaches were adopted: *ahl al-raʾy* and *ahl al-ḥadīth*. These traditions dealt with the matters of faith and practice, that is, the *ʿaqliyyāt* and the *fiqhiyyāt*, or in other words, with questions of being and questions of value. The reasoning of a mutakallim belonging to *ahl al-raʾy* was termed *istidlāl*, while the reasoning and inference of a jurist was termed *ijtihād*. Fuqahas and mutakallims belonging to *ahl al-ḥadīth* refrained from expressing opinions beyond the *nuṣūṣ* (revealed texts). In this period, *ahl al-ḥadīth* in particular regarded Arabic as the method for understanding the *nuṣūṣ*, and therefore opposed the discipline of logic, which they viewed as the grammar of the Greek language (Durusoy, 2012, pp. 393-394; Yörükan, 1953, pp. 129-133; Kahraman, 2021, p. 83).

In the early Islamic kalām tradition, we generally observe that the method of *naẓar* (rational inquiry) was taken into account as a method of proof. This method was systematized as reaching the unseen from the seen and conceptualized with the expression *istidlāl bi'l-shāhid ʿalā'l-ghāʾib* (inference from the observable to the unobservable) (Kalyoncu, 2024, pp. 403-407). Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, the founder of Māturīdism, likewise set forth his views in his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (al-Māturīdī, 2014) with this method in mind. This method was also accepted by mutakallims belonging to nearly all kalām schools of early Islamic kalām, beginning with the Muʿtazila and including the Ashʿarīs and the Māturīdīs, and was used as a method of proof on many subjects (Kömürcü, 2017, p. I/442). From this perspective, it is striking that the existing practices of *naẓar* and *istidlāl* developed as a multilayered process: at times conflicting with the terminology of logic, at times overlapping with it, and finally being reorganized in the *muta'akhkhir* period.

One clear example of this rapprochement is found in Ibn Rushd. The philosopher, who explicitly states that the verses of the Qurʾān support the logical and speculative approach, argues in his *Faṣl al-maqāl*, in which he treats the relationship between philosophy and religion (Ibn Rushd, 2012, 2019), that *fiqhī qiyās* (juridical analogy) is not a *bidʿa* (innovation), and that *mantıqi qiyās* (logical syllogism) should therefore not be called an innovation either. He further notes that just as the *fuqahāʾ*, for example, may fall into error in the religious sciences, so too may some fall into error in the rational sciences. Accordingly, he states that the error of each of these individuals is personal, and that their errors should not be attributed to the science in question. The philosopher emphasizes that *naẓar al-burhānī* (demonstrative inquiry) and the sharīʿa do not conflict (Çetin, 2015, p. 703; Erkol, 2009). In the Islamic intellectual tradition, mutakallims used logic in the proof and defense of creed, while the *fuqahāʾ* used it for analogy and the issuance of rulings (Çetin, 2015, p. 693). From the perspective of the religious sciences, logic came to the fore particularly with regard to the consistency of the rulings set out in the *ulūm al-uṣūl* (sciences of legal theory), and a special interest in logic emerged (Bingöl, 2012, p. 7).

With al-Ghazālī, this approach underwent a marked transformation in kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence). Although al-Ghazālī subjected the philosophers to severe criticism on metaphysical questions, he is seen to have adopted a favorable attitude toward logic. He regarded the science of logic as a *mīzān* (balance), a *miʿyār* (standard), and a *miḥakk* (touchstone), that is, a criterion, for all other sciences, including the religious sciences (Çapak, 2016, p. 14). Al-Ghazālī's attitude toward logic appears as an extremely important, paradigm-shifting, and concept-constituting stance, particularly in that it renamed the concepts of logic within Islamic literature. In his work on uṣūl al-fiqh, *al-Mustaṣfā*, the statement that "there is no trust in the knowledge of one who does not know logic" was the most important factor in this paradigm shift. Likewise, in his *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm*, he positioned the science of logic as a science of divine origin. Moreover, in his *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, he states explicitly that logic involves nothing religiously favorable or unfavorable (al-Ghazālī, 2022, p. 67). In his *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* as well, he emphasizes that the sciences of logic are generally based on a sound method (Çapak, 2016, pp. 7, 10; Özpilavcı, 2012, pp. 146-150; Koca, 2015, pp. 224-236).

This transformation can also be traced in kalām's conception of evidence (*dalīl*). In addition to the famous

mutakallim Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), some ḥadīth scholars such as Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245) and Imam al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) opposed the science of logic (*manṭiq*) and articulated their objections particularly on the question of *inʿikās al-adilla*. Al-Ghazālī, for his part, is a cornerstone in the change of the position of the science of logic in the history of Islamic thought (Bingöl, 2012, p. 16; Demir, 2007, pp. 79-80). According to the mutakallims, al-Ghazālī introduced three fundamental innovations into Ashʿarī kalām: accepting the principles of logic, rejecting *inʿikās al-adilla*, and adding the subjects of philosophy to the science of kalām (Demir, 2007, p. 89). Al-Ghazālī contributed to the inclusion of the science of logic among the foundational sciences (*uṣūl*) with respect to the religious sciences. Among those who stood against logic, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) also holds an important place. Ibn Taymiyya developed objections and criticisms against the science of logic, particularly on matters concerning *ḥadd* (definition), *qaḍiyya* (proposition), and *qiyās* (syllogism). Logic, which entered the religious sciences at al-Ghazālī's initiative, was also incorporated into works of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Al-Ghazālī's *al-Mustaṣfā* and Molla Fenārī's (d. 834/1431) *Fuṣūl al-badāʾiʿ* are among the principal examples of these (Bingöl, 2012, pp. 16-18; İbiş, 2023, p. 228). In this context, just as with the science of kalām, another Islamic science closely related to logic has been *uṣūl al-fiqh*. This relationship began after logical texts were transmitted to the Islamic world, but it found its main channel in al-Ghazālī's practice and in what followed (Yıldırım, 2014, p. 50; Koca, 2015, pp. 221-236). This relationship can be seen clearly in works of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. In this regard, the *fuqahāʾ* such as al-Ghazālī above all, as well as Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), Ibn Juzayy (d. 741/1340), and Molla Fenārī, are foremost among the *fuqahāʾ* who gave extensive space to a summary of logic in their works. In addition, some of the *fuqahāʾ* included topics of logic under the heading of what must be known before beginning the science. Some scholars of *uṣūl al-fiqh* also summarized the discussions of signification (*dalāla*) in logic in their works, others devoted space to the theory of *ḥadd*, and still others cited the forms of *qiyās* in logic. In addition, scholars such as al-Isnawī (d. 772/1370), al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), and al-Pazdawī (d. 493/1100) expressed the view that one who is to practice *ijtihād* must know logic (Yıldırım, 2014, pp. 59-63; Koca, 2015, pp. 221-236). Accordingly, from this perspective, logic, in addition to being an *ʿilm ālī* (instrumental science), acquires a character that is reshaped according to the problems of kalām and *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

The Use of Logical Concepts and Methods in the Māturīdī Tradition

We see that the intellectual foundation of Māturīdism is traced back to Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767). As evidence for this, it is put forward that the main ideas inspiring the fundamental kalām views of Māturīdism were set forth by Abū Ḥanīfa. Since al-Māturīdī did not find accurate either the approach of absolutizing *naql* (transmitted knowledge), which forms the basis of Salafī thought, or the approach of absolutizing *ʿaql* (reason), which forms the basis of Muʿtazilī thought, he adopted a method of reconciling reason and transmission. This approach of his has been regarded as an effort to ground the principal creedal tenets of Islam in rational knowledge without neglecting the *nuṣūṣ* (revealed texts). His *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (al-Māturīdī, 2014) and *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān* (al-Māturīdī, 2015), in which he treats the *nuṣūṣ* within a framework of reason and *ḥikma* (wisdom), are the finest examples of this and carried the Sunni kalām method to a more advanced stage. In his kalām method, al-Māturīdī gave reason far more importance than al-Ashʿarī did. This does not mean that he adopted the method of the Muʿtazila as it stood, for he meticulously criticized both the Muʿtazila and the Shīʿī-Bāṭinīs and produced works to this end (Yavuz, 2000, pp. 165-168; Ak, 2010, pp. 223-238).

Al-Māturīdī's views on creed found a response within the scholarly milieu of his time; after his death they were followed and spread by his students, and after a period of about a century they were finally accepted as a creedal school. The crystallization of al-Māturīdī's views into a school became pronounced with Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, whose position has a character similar to that of al-Ghazālī within the Ashʿariyya. In particular, his works *Tabṣirat al-adilla* and *al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd* were works in which he explained and developed al-Māturīdī's views. Subsequently, in the *muta'akhkhirūn* period, Māturīdī mutakallims such as al-Kashshī (d. 550/1155), al-Ṣaffār (d. 534/1139), and al-Ūshī (d. 575/1179) became important representatives of this school; however, the most famous scholar who strengthened and spread Māturīdī kalām was al-Ṣābūnī of Bukhara (d. 580/1184), the author of *al-Kifāya fī al-hidāya* and *al-Bidāya fī uṣūl al-dīn*. From the 13th-14th centuries onward, with the rise of powerful mutakallims who were among the important representatives of the Ashʿariyya school, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) (Çoşar, 2008), al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), the mutakallims affiliated with the Māturīdiyya included the views of these figures in their works and wrote commentaries on some of their works (Yavuz, 2000, pp. 165-168; İbiş, 2023, p. 230; Ak, 2010, pp. 225-229).

According to many Islamic mutakallims, the sources of knowledge are held to be the senses, reason, and *khabar ṣādiq* (true report). Al-Māturīdī emphasizes that sound

sense data obtained through healthy sense organs give correct knowledge, and, as many mutakallims likewise accept, that the reality of things is established (*ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ thābita*). In his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, al-Māturīdī, and in his *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, al-Nasafī, emphasized that a person must exercise reasoning and must think with a correct method in order to distinguish *ḥaqq* (truth) from *bāṭil* (falsehood) (Yavuz, 2000, pp. 165-167). In this context, it should be noted that in his *al-Tanbīh ʿalā sabīl al-saʿāda*, in the course of treating the nature of the art of logic and what its benefits are, al-Fārābī presents the science of logic as the only way that enables one to know the truth as truth and follow it, and to distinguish falsehood as falsehood and keep away from it (al-Fārābī, 2018, pp. 136-137). For this reason, according to some Māturīdī scholars, a person is considered accountable (*mukallaf*) by virtue of the faculty of reasoning even if he has not encountered the Prophet's call; however, other Māturīdī scholars have maintained that this is not sufficient for accountability and that accountability is realized only through God's command. Al-Māturīdī states that a *mutawātir* report yields necessary knowledge, and that a *khabar al-wāḥid* (solitary report) may be used in *istidlāl* (inference) provided that it does not contradict the *nuṣūṣ* (Yavuz, 2000, pp. 165-168). This threefold classification is not a direct repetition of Aristotelian logic; however, it intersects with the fundamental questions of logic in that it discusses the possibility of knowledge and the conditions of valid inference. For this reason, al-Māturīdī's relationship with logic should be evaluated not merely by whether he uses the word "logic," but through the functioning of his theory of knowledge and *dalīl* (evidence).

Al-Māturīdī's reference to the *falāsifa*, that is, the philosophers, in his *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān* is another dimension of the relationship between logic and kalām. Accordingly, al-Māturīdī is the first thinker to give explicit space to the *ʿulūm khārijiyya* (sciences external to religion), while interpreting the *nuṣūṣ*. His aim in this should not be understood as making room for philosophy. Indeed, al-Māturīdī did not treat and evaluate philosophy in a systematic manner. It is normal for al-Māturīdī, as a mutakallim, to mention philosophers in a kalām work. However, it is noteworthy that he mentions philosophy in a text written in the field of *tafsīr*. Indeed, whereas the natural interlocutors toward whom the early mutakallims directed their criticisms and with whom they conducted debates were the Muʿtazila, the interlocutors of the *mutaʾakhkhirūn* mutakallims were the philosophers and the philosophical tradition. Al-Māturīdī, for his part, although he speaks of the group of philosophers in the *Taʾwīlāt*, included the philosophers in *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* without opening a separate heading for them (Öztürk, 2022, pp. 68, 70). When dealing with the philosophers, al-Māturīdī first tries to understand them and then sets forth his criticism. As is clear from the expressions he uses in the *Taʾwīlāt*, he was acquainted with the books and content of the *falāsifa*. In the context of the philosophers' debates over what the primary element or *aṣl* (principle) of the cosmos is, al-Māturīdī also takes up their view of the "four elements" and emphasizes that the philosophers *wahm* (fell into delusion) and put forward views contrary to the idea of creation *ex nihilo*. Again, al-Māturīdī takes up the subject of "the One," which the philosophers also treated, and finds it appropriate to explain this concept through "*waḥdāniyya*" (divine oneness). Al-Māturīdī treats the views of the philosophers in some places without comment, at times critically, and, in the contexts where he deems it necessary, by criticizing them. In his *tafsīr*, he also gives place to the concept of *ḥikma*, examining this concept first in light of the meanings used for it in the commentaries. In the *taʾwīl* of the concept of *ḥikma*, he sets forth that it has the meanings of *nūr* (light), *hidāya* (guidance), *rūḥ* (spirit), and *shifāʾ* (healing), and that all of these meanings are used for the Qurʾān. Al-Māturīdī focuses on what meanings the philosophers attribute to this concept (al-Māturīdī, 2015, vol. 5, pp. 32, 396) (Öztürk, 2022, pp. 73-80). This shows that al-Māturīdī approached the subjects he treated in a quite objective and, academic manner, with considerable care.

Although al-Māturīdī openly criticizes philosophy, his criticism never took the form of opposition to philosophy or of declaring the philosophers and the philosophical stance unbelievers (*takfīr*). At the same time, al-Māturīdī was not indifferent to the scientific developments of his age or to the debates current in scholarly circles; he took part in these debates by critically engaging the views the philosophers had put forward in the fields of metaphysics and physics, and he did not hesitate to set forth his own views. Although it is probable that al-Māturīdī's acquaintance with philosophy came directly through philosophical texts, there is no concrete evidence sufficient to establish that he saw Aristotle's texts or other philosophical texts directly, apart from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's (d. 142/759) translation of logic. For this reason, it seems possible to state that al-Māturīdī read philosophy and the views of the philosophers through Muʿtazilī sources. That al-Māturīdī treated philosophy and the philosophers in a *tafsīr* text is extremely important for the Islamic intellectual tradition, and it is also highly noteworthy in that it shows al-Māturīdī's originality and the considerable guidance he provided for the centuries to come (Öztürk, 2022, p. 87; Ak, 2008, p. 182).

Although not in a systematic manner, al-Māturīdī, in his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, takes up the subject of concepts and certain types of concepts, and criticizes the views on the *maqūlāt* (*Qāṭīghūriyās*) found in Aristotle's book

concerning concepts. In addition, in his *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, al-Māturīdī gives some information on concepts such as *shayʾ* (thing), *maʿdūm* (non-existent), *mawjūd* (existent), *māhiyya* (quiddity), *kayfiyya* (quality), and *ḥaqīqa* (reality). Among the concepts that al-Māturīdī treats in this work are "synonymous" (*mutarādif*) concepts, that is, those whose expressions differ but whose reality is one. Another concept he treats is that of "homonyms" (*mushtarak*), that is, concepts whose expressions are shared but whose meanings differ (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, pp. 188-189; Coşar, 2014, pp. 375-376). As is known, *mutarādif* concepts are what Aristotle terms "synonyms," and, as treated in the *Categories*, this concept is expressed as the naming of a concept having a single definition with different names. Likewise, in the *Categories* (Tekin, 2014; Coşkun, 2022), Aristotle treats equivocal concepts as "homonyms" (Aristotle, 1831, vol. I, p. 1; 1980, vol. I, p. 32; 1989; 2016). This similarity shows not that al-Māturīdī adopted the Aristotelian theory in its entirety, but that he touched upon the same problems of language and being for kalām purposes.

Al-Māturīdī also dwells on the concepts of *ḥadd/rasm* (description/depiction), *qiyās*, and *burhān* (demonstration), which is a *umda* (foundation) of the art of logic, as well as on the concept of *ḥikma*. Likewise, among the types of syllogism expressed in logic as the five arts, he explicitly mentions *burhān* and *khaṭāba* (rhetoric), and he refers to *jadal* (dialectic) by the name of *munāẓara* (disputation). Al-Māturīdī uses *burhān* in the sense of decisive proof, *khiṭāba* in the sense of good counsel, and *munāẓara* in the sense of debating in the best manner, and he interprets these concepts, as they occur in the verses he cites as examples, in this way (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, pp. 193-203). Accordingly, it should be noted that al-Māturīdī treats these concepts not in the technical senses in which they are used in logic but within the context of their creedal senses. From our perspective, it is noteworthy that these concepts are shared and that their conceptual contents largely overlap.

In his *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, al-Māturīdī includes the view of a person whom he refers to without naming him as *ṣāḥib al-manṭiq* ("the master of logic") concerning the concepts of *ẓann* (conjecture), *shakk* (doubt), and *wahm* (delusion). It is highly probable that this person is Aristotle, since the only person in the Islamic world who held this title was Aristotle himself (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, p. 184). The term *ṣāḥib al-manṭiq* is seen to be frequently used in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This usage mostly occurs, just as in al-Māturīdī's usage here, without Aristotle's name being mentioned openly. Indeed, we witness that the great Islamic philosopher and commentator on Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, uses this term in exactly this sense, intending Aristotle, in the section titled *al-Madkhal* (the Introduction to Logic) of his massive work *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ*, which is of the character of an encyclopedia of science and philosophy (Ibn Sīnā, 2006, p. 4). This reference is important in that it shows al-Māturīdī was aware of the literature of logic; however, it does not by itself prove that he directly read a particular text.

al-Bābartī (d. 786/1384) lived, from the standpoint of the science of kalām, in a period in which the formative stage of almost all the foundational texts of both the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī and the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī traditions had been completed. He himself belonged to the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī tradition and is among the important *shāriḥ* (commentators) of that tradition. Although al-Bābartī put forward criticisms of logic on certain subjects, he generally made use of the terminology and rules of logic in treating the areas of debate concerning religion and the science of kalām on a rational plane and in substantiating the views he defended. Moreover, when treating the debates on the subject matter (*mawḍūʿ*) of the science of kalām, al-Bābartī frequently resorts to the concepts and rules of classical logic. In sum, al-Bābartī wrote commentaries (*shurūḥ*) on the foundational texts within the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī tradition, and in these works he strove to put forward rational proofs (*adilla ʿaqliyya*) by making intensive use of the concepts of logic (Altunya & Hacınebioğlu, 2012, pp. 1-13). This attitude of his is extremely important in that it constitutes a significant example both of logic's close contact with kalām and of the intensive use of the science of logic in kalām texts. These examples show that in the Māturīdī tradition logic often operated not as an independent field of authorship but within the internal order of kalām and *uṣūl* texts.

Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310), one of the important representatives of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī tradition, objected in his *Tafsīr al-Nasafī* to calling philosophers who did not adopt *tawḥīd* by the name of *ḥukamāʾ* (Öztürk, 2022, p. 80). The first kalām tradition to emerge as *ahl al-naẓar* was that of the Muʿtazilī mutakallims, known as the rationalists. Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), a late Muʿtazilī mutakallim, treated the Muʿtazilī theory of knowledge in the section titled "*al-naẓar wa-l-maʿārif*" of his *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl*, in which he gathered all Muʿtazilī views, but he did not set forth any explicit judgment for or against logic. Against the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, who opposed the method of *naẓar*, Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār sought to show that knowledge can be attained only through the method of *naẓar* and that *naẓar* is *wājib shar'an* (religiously obligatory) (Durusoy, 2012, pp. 396-397, 2022, p. 20).

Despite the evidence presented above, the prevailing view is that the Māturīdī mutakallims lagged behind the Ashʿarīs in the matter of logic. Indeed, al-Ghazālī's stance

toward logic was influential in the Ashʿarīs' coming to the fore in the field of logic, and in the *muta'akhkhirūn* period the Ashʿarī mutakallims in particular attached great importance to logic and used it as a method in the science of kalām (Durusoy, 2012, p. 401). It is observed that in the post-Ghazālī period the Ashʿarī mutakallims embraced the science of logic, and that a significant portion of the works on logic produced in the Islamic intellectual world were composed by Ashʿarī mutakallims (Durusoy, 2022, p. 23; Aydın, 2003, pp. 7-8). In the post-Ghazālī period, logic was treated, particularly within the Ashʿarī kalām tradition, together with Ibn Sīnā's views on metaphysics. Among the most important representatives of this tradition are logician-mutakallims such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, and al-Taftāzānī (Durusoy, 2020, p. 206; Çetin, 2015, p. 699).

Compared with the Ashʿarī tradition, the Māturīdī tradition did not produce extensive and numerous independent works in the field of logic, but its scholars did employ the rules of logic, particularly in their works on *uṣūl*. It should also be noted that the Māturīdī mutakallims did not remain indifferent to logic, nor did they raise an open objection to it; rather, they used the method of logic by weaving it implicitly and naturally into their works (Akyüz & Dadak, 2023, pp. 193-194). Accordingly, the distinction between a "visible" use in Ashʿarism and an "implicit" use in Māturīdism is explanatory, but it should not be turned into a hierarchy of value. The number of independent works alone does not determine the extent to which a tradition benefited from logical methods. In order to assess the influence of logic in Māturīdism, one must look together at the function of *ḥadd*, *dalāla*, *naẓar*, *istidlāl*, and *qiyās* in kalām and *uṣūl al-fiqh* texts.

According to al-Māturīdī, there are three sources of knowledge: *ʿaql*, which enables the acquisition of knowledge through *istidlāl*; the senses and hearing, which enable the acquisition of knowledge through *mushāhada* (observation); and *khabar*, which enables the acquisition of knowledge through *naql*. According to al-Māturīdī, *naẓar*, that is, rational inquiry, is *wājib* (obligatory); knowledge obtained through the senses is *ḍarūrī* (necessary); and since matters such as *amr-nahy* (command and prohibition) and *waʿd-waʿīd* (promise and threat) can be known only through report, report is also necessary. According to al-Māturīdī, one does not engage in *munāẓara* with someone who denies sense knowledge, and one who denies report in fact denies his own denial. As can be seen, al-Māturīdī gives place as a source of knowledge not only to the *nuṣūṣ* but also to rational inquiry and sense knowledge (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, pp. 185-188).

Should we state our own view within the framework of the opinions discussed here, we would say that logic, which stands as the *Organon* and the introduction to the discipline of philosophy, likewise became the introduction and method of the religious sciences. Relying on this historical reality, and state that the science of logic took on a character that permeates the very spirit of the Islamic sciences. When we look at the matter specifically through a comparison of the approaches of the two important schools of the kalām tradition to the tradition of logic, we see that logic was treated in a more implicit manner in the Māturīdī tradition and in a more visible manner in the Ashʿarī tradition. However, while regarding the expression of this difference as a matter of quantity to be the identification of a fact, it must also be stated that, in terms of quality, the approaches of both schools to logic are extremely valuable for the Islamic intellectual tradition.

4. Opposition to Logic and the Critical Positions of the Māturīdīs

The translation into Arabic, through translations, of the works of Greek philosophy and logic, which belong to the *ʿulūm khārijiyya*, at a time when the Islamic sciences were continuing their formation, was an extremely important turning point in the history of Islamic thought. In this period, the famous grammar-logic debate (*naḥw-manṭiq*) came to light between the grammarian and opponent of logic Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the logician Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940), who is also known to have been al-Fārābī's teacher. According to al-Sīrāfī, one of the parties to this debate, in order to understand the Qurʾān and the ḥadīths, that is, in matters of *fiqh* and kalām, what is needed is not the science of logic, which they regarded as the grammar of the Greek language, but *naḥw* (Arabic grammar). This is because the Qurʾān was revealed in Arabic, not in Greek. For this reason, those belonging to the school of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, who absolutely gave no place to *raʾy* and rational *naẓar* among the Islamic sciences, particularly in matters of *fiqh* and kalām, opposed logic. It should be noted that opposition to logic did not disappear entirely in later periods but came to light from time to time. For Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, al-Nawawī, al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and Ibn Taymiyya took a very harsh stance against logic. Indeed, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ issued a *fatwā* that logic is prohibited (*ḥarām*) (Durusoy, 2012, pp. 393-395; Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, pp. 182-183; Köz, 2008, p. 86).

Opposition to logic developed for reasons such as the Greek origin of logic, the idolatrous beliefs of its adherents, and, most importantly, the fact that deniers of the faith were making use of logic and philosophy. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ regarded philosophy as evil and stated that, since logic is an introduction to philosophy, entering upon evil is itself of the same ruling as evil. Al-Suyūṭī likewise voiced that logic also

harms ʿ*aqīda*, stating that logic and philosophy are condemned and that those who occupy themselves with them will become *zindīq* (heretics). Again, associating logic with the Greek language and culture, he stated that the *sharʿī* sciences rest upon Arabic and that people who incline toward Aristotle's language fall into disagreement. Ibn Taymiyya similarly notes that the philosophers fell into many disagreements. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), in response to these objections and criticisms, shows that the *muḥaddiths* and *fuqahāʾ* who lived in the earlier (*mutaqaddim*) period had never read the books of logic and were therefore unaware of the truths and realities contained in them (Çetin, 2015, p. 704; İmamoğlugil, 2018, pp. 116-117; Erkol, 2009, pp. 27-28). On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya and al-Suyūṭī in particular stand out among the opponents of logic. Indeed, al-Suyūṭī criticized logic in his *Ṣawn al-manṭiq*, and in addition composed a work titled *al-Ṭibb al-nabawī* against Galenic medicine, and wrote yet another work, *al-Hayʾa al-saniyya*, against Ptolemaic astronomy (Durusoy, 2022, p. 24; Aydın, 2003, pp. 8-9).

Al-Ghazālī separated logic from philosophy, placing philosophy, which he criticized and opposed, on one side, and logic, which he regarded as free of philosophy's inconsistencies, on the other. Ibn Taymiyya, by contrast, argued that it is not possible to separate logic from philosophy; he opposed both together and found both logic and philosophy unnecessary and even harmful. Foremost among the logical topics that Ibn Taymiyya subjected to criticism is the "theory of definition" (*naẓariyyat al-ḥadd*), on account of its insufficiencies in defining God. Indeed, al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), the founder of *ishrāqī* philosophy, also put forward criticisms of philosophy and logic, and among his criticisms he gave a particular place to the theory of definition, though he did not adopt an approach that abandoned the theory altogether. Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 669/1270) likewise opposes the theory of definition for similar reasons, and he is also an important Andalusian philosopher who directed criticisms at logic because of his use of an analytic method that presents a fragmentary structure (Ibn Sabʿīn, 2013; Leaman, 2011, pp. 253-258). Another logical topic criticized by Ibn Taymiyya, closely connected with the theory of definition, is that of *kulliyyāt* (universals). Ibn Taymiyya criticized and opposed this theory because it would imply the acceptance of certain principles and beings that could exist independently of God (Leaman, 2011, pp. 260-262).

From the standpoint of the history of logic, Ibn Taymiyya was the most comprehensive critic of the science of logic. In his *al-Radd ʿalā al-manṭiqiyyīn*, he criticized logic under numerous headings, above all the logical syllogism (*qiyās manṭiqī*), as well as *ḥadd*, ʿ*ilm*, and *burhān*. He stated that Aristotelian logic is a starting point for metaphysics, and thereby argued that logic and philosophy cannot be separate (Ibn Taymiyya, 1993a, 1993b, 2021; Hasırcı, 2016; Turgut, 2021, pp. 191-197).

There is an important distinction between this systematic opposition and al-Māturīdī's critique of Aristotle. In his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, al-Māturīdī treats Aristotle and his book, which he calls logic, in the section titled "The Exposition of the Corruption of the Statements of the *Dahriyyūn*." According to him, Aristotle is a naturalist (*ṭabīʿī*) who rejects God and accepts the eternity of *hayūlā*. Al-Māturīdī criticizes Aristotle's determination in his *Categories* (Aristotle, 1831, 1980, 1989, 2016) of ten categories concerning being, and his contention that being can be spoken of by means of these ten categories. Stating that Aristotle and his followers fell into an impasse, strayed from the right path, and consoled themselves with illusion, al-Māturīdī also rejects Aristotle's holding the title of *ḥakīm* (sage). Stating that Aristotle's theory of categories would imply the eternity of the cosmos, he opposes the reduction of being to ten categories (al-Māturīdī, 2014, pp. 232-235; Durusoy, 2012, pp. 397-398; Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, pp. 191-193). Perhaps as a consequence of these debates, in the *muta'akhkhirūn* period, under the influence of mutakallims who thought that Aristotle's definition of *jawhar* did not agree with the principles of Islamic belief, the subject of the categories was largely neglected in books of logic (Bingöl, 2012, p. 19).

When we look at al-Māturīdī, we see that he put forward an approach that gives importance to both ʿ*aql* and the *naṣṣ*. This approach of his is neither the rationalism of the Aristotelian philosophical-logical tradition in the classical sense nor a rationalist understanding of the kind found in Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Māturīdī's stance is not one of preferring one over the other but a mode of treatment that takes both into account. In this respect, it presents a character that is extremely important and noteworthy for the Islamic intellectual tradition. Al-Māturīdī did not concern himself directly with the subjects of logic; with Aristotle in mind, he uttered harsh words against him and put forward serious criticisms. At the same time, however, he also put forward views on the fundamental subjects of logic, such as the source of knowledge, concepts, categories, definition, and reasoning. The contexts in which he treats these subjects are, of course, the theoretical layers of the interpretations he made while grounding his views in the course of explaining the verses. This very fact is important in showing that he was not indifferent to logic and that he had detailed knowledge of the science of logic and of the issues it treats (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, p. 183).

Al-Māturīdī made no direct reference to logic by

explicitly naming it, either in his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* or in his *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*. Nevertheless, it is understood that he was aware of the subjects and concepts of logic, and although he did not explicitly mention Aristotle's name, he openly criticizes and rejects Aristotle's view of the ten categories (Çapak & Kuşlu, 2011, p. 204). It should be noted at once that al-Māturīdī's criticism does not stand before us as a categorical and wholesale "rejection of logic" in decisive terms, as in the case of the early opponent of logic al-Sīrāfī or of the later representative Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ; rather, it appears as a criticism and rejection of a particular view. That is, al-Māturīdī criticized and rejected not logic itself but views belonging to a logician that he regarded as inaccurate and inconsistent.

In the Ashʿarī school, although al-Ghazālī openly criticized the philosophers in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, the emergence of a situation in which great importance was attributed to this logic and independent and extensive works were written on it has not been seen in the same way in the Māturīdī school, and the reason for this requires careful reflection (Durusoy, 2012, pp. 400-401; Akyüz & Dadak, 2023, p. 208). It can be said that al-Māturīdī's criticism of the theory of categories must have been extremely influential in the emergence of this situation.

After Ghazālī, the Ashʿarī school of *kalām* was divided into two periods, the *mutaqaddimūn* and the *mutaʾakhkhirūn*, and the most distinctive feature of the later period was that *manṭiq* became a methodological instrument within *kalām*. Indeed, many *mutakallimūn* after Ghazālī not only included a section on logic at the very beginning of their works on *kalām* as a matter of course, but also, not content with this, composed independent treatises on logic in which they did not hesitate to set out their own ideas and views on the discipline. Among those who adopted this method were Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a commentator on Ibn Sīnā; Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī; Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, likewise a staunch follower of Ibn Sīnā and regarded as the last representative of the Peripatetic (*mashshāʾī*) tradition; Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī; al-Taftāzānī; and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. Although it was philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā who established, constructed, and perfected logic in the Islamic world, it was the Ashʿarī *mutakallimūn*, above all Ghazālī, who ensured that logic was incorporated into the curricula of educational institutions, particularly through the Niẓāmiyya madrasas, and that it endured there (Durusoy, 2012, p. 400). It should be noted at once that the Ashʿarīs' strong championing of logic is, as nearly everyone agrees, owing to the influence of Ghazālī's statement in his work *al-Mustaṣfā*, to the effect that "whoever does not know logic cannot be trusted in his knowledge."

In the post-Ghazālī period, opposition to logic did not come to an end entirely. Scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, the foremost representative of the Salafī school, together with Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, opposed the use of logic as a method in *kalām* and *fiqh*, and produced works directed against logic. However, they remained overshadowed by the intense interest shown by the Ashʿarī tradition and were unable to come to the fore (Durusoy, 2012, p. 401). The fact that the Māturīdīs and the Muʿtazilīs did not adopt logic as a method caused them to lag behind the Ashʿarīs in developing a logical tradition and in producing independent works on logic. Consequently, the Ashʿarīs adopted logic as a methodological discipline, and thereby succeeded in keeping their own *kalām* tradition alive, in appealing to wider audiences in scholarly terms, and in becoming more widely known and visible in scientific terms. In other words, they came to have an authoritative voice both in the field of logic and in all the Islamic sciences, above all *kalām* and *fiqh* (Durusoy, 2012, pp. 401–402).

In the post-Ghazālī period, among the scholars who opposed the science of logic and stood against it was also al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388), who holds an important place in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Al-Shāṭibī rejected logic on the grounds that it was close to philosophy and remote from the structure of the *sharīʿa*, and he put forward, in place of logic, the method of "*istiqrāʾ maʿnawī*" (inductive inference of meaning). Although he rejected logic as a method, al-Shāṭibī did not hesitate to employ some of its concepts and principles of inference within his own conception of *uṣūl*. However, he treated these concepts and principles in his work *al-Muwāfaqāt* by interpreting them in accordance with his own understanding and with the structure of the *sharīʿa*. Instead of the theory of *burhān*, which rests on the deductive method, al-Shāṭibī adopted the method of *istiqrāʾ maʿnawī*, which he regarded as the method of the *salaf* and which he constructed on the basis of induction (Haçkalı & Nacar, 2019, pp. 15–41).

Ultimately, among the *mutakallimūn* as well, a number of objections to the science of logic were raised from various angles, for reasons similar to those behind the objections of the *muḥaddithūn* and the *fuqahāʾ*. The *mutakallimūn* voiced certain doubts about logic, particularly on such subjects as *māhiyya* (quiddity), the problem of *kulliyyāt*, the discussion of the *maqūlāt*, and *burhān*. However, Ghazālī's stance toward logic forestalled all the negative criticisms, and the unfavorable atmosphere against logic almost entirely dissipated. Consequently, many Muslim scholars engaged with the religious sciences did not refrain from examining nearly all the topics of logic, especially in connection with *kalām* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, in their works written from their own perspectives (Çetin, 2015, pp. 707, 711).

The criticism attributed to Māturīdī, as noted earlier,

should I am of the opinion that be regarded not as a severe stance of opposition to logic but as an intellectual critique in the nature of an objection. Indeed, later practice demonstrates this. For although the Māturīdī tradition, remaining under the influence of Māturīdī's critique of the theory of the categories, lagged behind Ashʿarism in producing independent works on logic, it must be stated that it gave place to logic mostly through texts of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Although Ghazālī went beyond criticizing the philosophers and declared them unbelievers (*takfīr*), the Ashʿarī tradition, thanks to Ghazālī's own sanction, made a philosophical discipline occupying the position of the Organon, that is, the instrument of philosophy, into a *miʿyār* of the religious sciences. Hence, as far as we can understand from this picture, earlier critiques, though influential, do not express a final value judgment. The best example of this is that, despite Ghazālī's critique, the Ashʿarī tradition's intense interest in logic stands before us as a historical fact. In this context, Dāwūd al-Qarsī (d. 1169/1756), who has a profile distinguished by his work in *kalām* and logic, likewise emphasizes that logic precedes all the sciences and that one should begin the pursuit of knowledge with logic. It is also noteworthy that, on various occasions, he frequently refers to Ghazālī's statement that there can be no trust in the knowledge of one who does not know logic (Özpilavcı, 2017, pp. 2030–2031).

In my view, the association between logic and *kalām* has remained vital throughout the Islamic intellectual tradition and has never been interrupted in any form. It must be reiterated that the interaction between the Māturīdī *kalām* tradition and logic did not reach the level of outright rejection; rather, a reserved stance, beginning with Māturīdī's critique of the categories, can be observed, although the method of logic was nevertheless followed intensively by the Māturīdīs, particularly in the field of *uṣūl*. Turning to the interaction between Ashʿarism and logic, it is likewise worth emphasizing once more that the *mutakallimūn* belonging to the Ashʿarī school were closely engaged with logic, composed independent texts on logic, and were representatives of the typology of the logician-mutakallim scholar.

5. From the Typology of the Physician-Logician to the Typology of the *Mutakallim*-Logician

To address the typology of the logician-*mutakallim* that emerged from the relationship between logic and *ʿilm al-kalām*, it is important, for a better understanding of the question under examination, first to consider the general outlines of the typology of the physician-philosopher/logician, through the relationship between logic and medicine, which we regard as a source of inspiration for the formation of the tradition in question.

First and foremost, we must state explicitly that there is an ancient association between medicine and philosophy, and therefore logic. Looking at the period of Greek antiquity, physicians such as Alcmaeon (d. 450 BC), Empedocles (d. 432 BC), Hippocrates (d. 370 BC), and Galen (d. 200) had the identity of logician and philosopher, and they stand among the important representatives of the era of the philosopher-physicians in the history of medicine. Philosopher-physicians such as Epicharmus (d. 460 BC) and Empedocles sought to explain the human body and human health on the basis of their philosophical views, and drew upon philosophical theories in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases (Ayık, 2006, pp. 63–65). Galen also wrote a biographical work in which he presented a list of his own writings and included his works on logic, and emphasized that a sound conception of medicine and a successful physician must first of all undergo a good training in logic. According to him, a physician well trained in logic in the art of medicine, which is a practical art, will have improved himself in correct reasoning and correct diagnosis. Hence, in his system, there is a necessary and indispensable relationship between logic and medicine for the attainment of virtue and excellence (Çavdar, 2023, pp. 1–3; Galenos, 2022, 2023; Ibn Rushd & Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh, 2024).

Among the leading representatives of this identity of the philosopher/logician-physician are Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925); the renowned Andalusian philosopher Mūsā Ibn Maymūn (d. 601/1204); and Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), likewise Andalusian and the great commentator on Aristotle. In this context, it is also necessary to mention Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a philosopher and *mutakallim* who holds an important place in the Islamic intellectual tradition. For he has works on medicine, entitled *Ḥifẓ al-ṣiḥḥa* and *al-Ṭibb al-kabīr* (Ayık, 2006, pp. 66–67).

After Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), who broke away from Muʿtazilism and founded a distinct *kalām* school, Ghazālī, a student of al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), made the science of logic the method of *kalām* and *fiqh*. He wrote a series of works on logic, which he entitled *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*, *Miḥakk al-naẓar*, *al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl*, and *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm*, and thereby established an entirely new tradition (Durusoy, 2012, p. 400). Since the occasion arises, it must be restated here that the typology of the "logician-physician" philosopher/thinker, which emerged in the Hellenistic commentary tradition and was widely represented, and whose most accomplished example we see in the person of the great Islamic philosopher Ibn Sīnā, who bore the title *al-shaykh al-raʾīs*, was now transformed, after this move by Ghazālī, into the typology of the "logician-*mutakallim*" philosopher/scholar, particularly within the Ashʿarī school of *kalām*. This situation stands before us as a

 https://doi.org/10.36922/BIJP95396

matter that, especially in view of the debates on the originality of Islamic philosophy, should be evaluated as showing that the Islamic intellectual tradition's approach to the Greek philosophical tradition went beyond mere repetition and beyond adding its own interpretation, and that it also built its own institutional structure, and as a matter on which more comprehensive and in-depth studies need to be undertaken.

Before Ghazālī, in the world of Islamic thought, it is highly noteworthy that the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm stated, in his work *al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya*, that the science of logic is a *miʿyār* and a methodology for all other sciences and for the correct understanding of the Qurʾān and the Sunna (Ibn Ḥazm, 1983, pp. 102, 349; 2018, pp. 50–51, 478–479; Durusoy, 2020, p. 205; İmamoğlugil, 2018, p. 117; Yıldırım, 2014, p. 53). Offering an assessment that also functions as a response to the criticisms directed at logic, Ibn Ḥazm maintains that the science of logic has been greatly wronged; that those who have no knowledge of it criticize it blindly; that it is inconsistent to regard logic as extraneous to religion; and, finally, that those who give logic its true value and use it correctly are very few (Durusoy, 2020, p. 208; Çetin, 2015, p. 696). It is worth recalling that Ghazālī, too, voiced views similar to these views of Ibn Ḥazm to a certain extent. Accordingly, Ghazālī states that it would not be appropriate to criticize and reject in their entirety all the sciences accepted by the philosophers, and he sets out that denying the sciences accepted by the philosophers, such as geometry, arithmetic, logic, and astronomy, is neither fitting nor meaningful. Likewise, noting that these sciences contain no harm to the foundations of religion, he states that denying them also brings no benefit to religion (al-Ghazālī, 1981, pp. 13–16; Çapak, 2016, p. 16). As can be seen, Ghazālī here distinguishes between sciences that are harmful or beneficial to creed (*iʿtiqād*).

The similarity between the physician-logician and the *mutakallim*-logician lies in the fact that, in both fields, logic is positioned as a criterion that reduces the likelihood of error and regulates practice. The physician proceeds from symptoms to diagnosis and treatment, whereas the *mutakallim* proceeds from premises to doctrinal (*iʿtiqādī*) conclusions and to their defense. However, this similarity is not sufficient to construct a linear historical thesis according to which the typology of the physician-logician was directly transformed into the typology of the *mutakallim*-logician. Numerous intermediary processes lie between them, such as the translation movements, the debates between philosophy and *kalām*, the madrasa institutions, and the literature of *uṣūl*. For this reason, the concept of "transformation" does not denote an uninterrupted genealogical chain among individuals; rather, it denotes the refunctioning of logic as it was carried from one field of expertise to another. This analytical model also clarifies the position of Māturīdism. Although Māturīdī and his followers produced fewer independent works on logic than the Ashʿarī *mutakallimūn*, they regarded the tasks of distinguishing *ḥaqq* from *bāṭil*, classifying the sources of knowledge, clarifying concepts, and organizing evidence as central problems of reasoning. For this reason, in the Māturīdī tradition, the *mutakallim*-logician type often emerges as a profile of a scholar (*ʿālim*) who does not foreground the title of "logician" but who employs logical instruments within *kalām* and *uṣūl*. The originality of Māturīdism lies not in excluding logic altogether, but in using it by selecting and transforming it in accordance with *kalām*'s own purposes.

6. Conclusion

The relationship between logic and *kalām* does not consist merely of a one-way transmission of a translated discipline to the religious sciences. The practices of *naẓar* and *istidlāl* in early *kalām* had produced rule-governed modes of proof even before its encounter with logic. The circulation of the Aristotelian legacy through the Syriac and Arabic translation milieus, al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's systematization of logic, and Ghazālī's repositioning of it as a legitimate instrument of *kalām* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* brought distinct methodological traditions closer to one another. Māturīdī's position in this process is twofold. On the one hand, he dwelt on the sources of knowledge, concepts, definition, *istidlāl*, *qiyās*, and *burhān*, and discussed the views of the philosophers in the context of *tafsīr* (Qurʾānic exegesis) and *kalām*. On the other hand, he criticized the ontological implications of the Aristotelian categories. This criticism was not a systematic rejection directed at logic as a whole, but a selective objection directed at a particular theory and its metaphysical implications. The use of logical terminology and patterns of inference within *kalām* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* in the later Ḥanafī-Māturīdī literature also supports this conclusion.

In the ancient period, the identity of the philosopher/logician-physician, embodied above all in the persons of Hippocrates and Galen, was also sustained by the Alexandrian tradition, and we observe that this tradition was transmitted through the schools of Antioch and Ḥarrān to the Syriacs, and from them to the Islamic world. It is worth noting that a similar situation continued in a notably vital form during the period of the translation movements as well. For, especially during the time of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, the majority of the physicians at court appear as figures who both possessed a strong philosophical formation that contributed to translation activities and personally and actively practiced medicine. This situation is

an important indication that the identity of the logician-philosopher/physician has continued since antiquity. It must be stated that, in the person of Ibn Sīnā, who was at once a philosopher, a logician, and a successful physician, we see this identity represented in its most original form within the Islamic philosophical tradition as well.

Since the beginning of my study, I have sought to address the important points of the relationship between logic and *kalām*. On the basis of all the data I have discussed, I have emphasized that the identity of the physician-philosopher/logician, which has persisted since antiquity, continued in a vital form without interruption in the subsequent course of history. I have stated that this identity was also successfully represented in the Islamic philosophical and intellectual tradition. Proceeding from this, I have likewise stated that the identity of the *mutakallim* was added to the identity of the logician-philosopher/physician that had persisted since antiquity. In conclusion, it must be stated clearly that the identity of the logician-*mutakallim* is represented widely among the Ashʿarī *mutakallimūn*, and in a comparatively lesser degree among the Māturīdī *mutakallimūn*. It is therefore worth noting that, in the mutaʾakhkhir period, the identity of the logician-*mutakallim* came to dominate the Islamic intellectual world.

Acknowledgments

This article has been developed from a paper that was presented—but not published—at the Silk Road and Beyond Congress Series (SIRCON 2024): "One Belt, One Road – Language, Human Capital, and Cultural Heritage" Congress, held on May 23–24, 2024.

Funding

None.

Conflict of interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Author contributions

This is a single-authored article.

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Not applicable.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Availability of data

No datasets were generated or analyzed during the currentstudy.

References

Ak, A. (2008). Büyük Türk Âlimi Mâturîdî ve Mâturîdîlik. Bayrak Matbaası.

Ak, A. (2010). Mâturîdîliğin Hanefilik İle İlişkisi. VII(2), 223–240.

Akyüz, T., & Dadak, F. (2023). Matüridi Kelamcıların Mantık Görüşlerine Dair Bir Değerlendirme: Ebu Mansur el-Matüridi, Şemseddin es-Semerkandi ve Molla Fenari. Kadim Akademi SBD, 7(2).

Altunya, H., & Hacınebioğlu, İ. L. (2012). Dinî Epistemolojinin Mantıksal Analizinde Rasyonel Dil İnşası: Bâbertî Örneği. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, (28).

Aristoteles. (1831). Katêgoriai. In Aristotelis Opera. E. Bekker (Ed.). (Vol. 1, pp. 1–16).

Aristoteles. (1980). Kitâbü'l-Mekûlât. In Mantiku Aristû. A. Bedevi (Ed.). (Vol. II, pp. 32–96). Daru'l-Kalem.

Aristoteles. (1989). Organon I Kategoryalar (H. R. Atademir, Trans.). MEB Yayınları.

Aristoteles. (2016). Kategoriler (S. Babür, Trans.; 4th ed.). İmge Kitabevi.

Aydın, Ö. (2003). Kelam-Mantık İlişkisi. İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, (7).

Ayık, H. (2006). Tıp-Mantık İlişkisi Üzerine Bir Deneme. Selçuk Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Edebiyat Dergisi, (16).

Bingöl, A. (2012). Uyanış Döneminde İslam Kültür Evreninde Mantık Geleneğinin Oluşumu. Felsefe Dünyası, (56).

Coşar, H. (2014). Mâturîdî Düşüncesinde Felsefe Kelam ilişkisi. 371–381.

Coşkun, A. (2022). Meşhur ve Hakiki Ayrımı: İbn Sînâ'da Kategorilerin Bağlamına Dair Bir İnceleme. Mantık Araştırmaları Dergisi, IV(1), 41–62.

Çapak, İ. (2013). Mantık Tarihinde Râzi. Felsefe Dünyası, (58), 39–65.

Çapak, İ. (2016). Gazzali ve Dikkat Çektiği Bazı Meseleler. Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 2(1).

Çapak, İ., & Kuşlu, H. (2011). Matüridi ve Mantık Literatürü. In Matüridi'nin Düşünce Dünyası, Ş. A. Düzgün (Ed.). (pp. 182–205). Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı.

Çavdar, M. (2023). Galen'in Mantık Anlayışı ve Mantık-Tıp İlişkisi. Dicle Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.

Çetin, A. (2015). Mantık, Kelam ve Usul-u Fıkıh İlişkisi Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme. Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi, 13(2).

Çoşar, H. (2008). Seyfeddin Amidi'nin Hayatı, İslam Düşüncesindeki Yeri ve Eserleri. Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 8(2).

Demir, H. (2007). Kelam Düşünce Tarihinde Yaygın Bir Hatanın Tashihi (İn'ikas-ı Edille) ve Mütekaddimin Kelamı ile Mantık İlişkisi Üzerine Bir Eleştiri. Dini Araştırmalar, 10(29).

Durusoy, A. (2012). Matüridi Kelamcıların Mantığa Yaklaşımı. 393–402.

Durusoy, A. (2020). Niçin Mantık. Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 6(1).

Durusoy, A. (2022). Felsefenin İslami İlimler ile İlişkisi Üzerine bir Değerlendirme. In Felsefe ve İslami İlimler (pp. 17–26). Paradigma Akademi Yayınları.

el-Farabi. (2018). Mantığa giriş risaleleri: Et-Tavtıa, el-Fusulü'l-hamse, Kitabu Îsâgûcî. Litera Yayıncılık.

el-Gazzali. (1981). Tehafütü'l-felasife: Filozofların tutarsızlığı. Çağrı Yayınları.

el-Gazzalî. (2022). Dalaletten Kurtuluş: El-Munkız mine'd-dalal ve'l-mufsıh bi'l-ahval (M. Kaya & M. C. Kaya, Trans.). Klasik Yayınları.

Erkol, A. (2009). Felsefeden Kelama Yöntem ve İçerik Eleştirisinde İbn Rüşd'ün Kelam Karşıtlığı. Şarkiyat İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi, 1(1).

Galenos. (2022). Doğal Yetiler Üzerine (O. F. Akyol, Ed.; N. Nirven, Trans.). Albaraka Yayınları.

Galenos. (2023). Ruhun Duygulanımlarının ve Hatalarının Teşhis ve Tedavisi (H. Özturan, Ed.). Albaraka Yayınları.

Gündüz, R. (2023). Kilisli Hocazâde Abdullah Enverî'ye Göre Mantığın Önemi ve Mantığın Eğitim, Kelam ve İnanç ile İlişkisi. Osmanlı Medeniyeti Araştırmaları Dergisi, (16).

Haçkalı, A., & Nacar, T. (2019). Şâtıbî'nin Aristo Mantığına Karşı Çıkış Gerekçeleri ve Alternatif Yöntem Teklifi. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, (16).

Hasırcı, N. (2016). İbn Teymiyye'nin Mantık Eleştirisi (2nd ed.). Araştırma Yayınları.

İbiş, F. (2023). Kelâmın Felsefileşme Süreci. Kader, 21(1).

İbn Haldun. (2004). Mukaddime (H. Kendir, Trans.; Vol. 2). Yeni Şafak.

İbn Hazm. (1983). Resailu İbn Hazm el-Endelüsi. In Et-Takrib li-Haddi'l-Mantık, İ. Abbas (Ed.) (pp. 91–356). el-Müessesetü'l-Arabiyye li'd-Dirasat ve'n-Neşr.

İbn Hazm. (2018). Et-Takrîb li-Haddi'l-Mantık (İ. Çapak & Y. Arıkaner, Trans.). Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları.

İbn Rüşd. (2012). Felsefe—Din İlişkileri Faslu'l-Makal el-Keşf an minhaci'l-edille (S. Uludağ, Trans.). Dergah Yayınları.

İbn Rüşd. (2019). Felsefe, Din ve Te'vil / Faslu'l-Makâl (M. Kaya, Trans.). Klasik Yayınları.

İbn Rüşd, & Ebu Muhammed Abdullah. (2024). Galenos'a Orta Şerhler (H. Kaya, Trans.). Albaraka Yayınları.

İbn Seb'in. (2013). Sicilya Cevapları (İ. Dervişoğlu, Ed.; Ş. Yaltkaya, Trans.). Büyüyenay.

İbn Sînâ. (2006). Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ, Mantığa Giriş (Ö. Türker, Trans.). Litera Yayıncılık.

İbn Teymiyye. (1993a). Against the Greek Logicians (W. B. Hallaq, Trans.). Clarendon Press.

İbn Teymiyye. (1993b). Er-Redd ale'l-Mantıkîyyîn (R. el-Acem, Ed.; Vols. 1–2). Daru'l-Fikri'l-Lübnanî.

İbn Teymiyye. (2021). Meşşai Mantığın Eleştirisi (H. Akpur, Trans.). Endülüs.

İmamoğlugil, H. (2018). Mantık-Kelam İlişkisine Genel Bakış. Turkish Studies, 13(9).

Kahraman, H. (2021). El-İktisâd fi'l-iʿtikâd Adlı Eseri Örnekliğinde Gazzâlî'nin Kelam Metodolojisi. Mütefekkir, 8(16).

Kalyoncu, R. T. (2024). Fârâbî'ye Göre Teolojik-Kelâmî Yöntem. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, XI(1), 400–428.

Koca, F. (2015). İslâm Düşüncesinin Kurucu Unsuru Olarak Usûl-i Fıkıhın Kelâm, İslâm Felsefesi ve Tasavvufla İlişkisi. 167–281.

Kömürcü, K. (2017). Kelamdaki "İstidlal bi'ş-Şahid ale'l-Gaib" Metoduna Maturidi'nin Yaklaşımının Mantıksal Analizi ve Değeri. 1, 441–452.

Köprülü, F. (1986). İslami İlimler. Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, (12).

Köz, İ. (2008). Mantık Kelam İlişkisi. 75–96.

Leaman, O. (2011). Klasik İslam Düşüncesinde Mantık Düşmanlığı (Y. Daşdemir, Trans.). Selçuk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, (31).

Mâtürîdî. (2005). Tefsîrü'l-Mâtürîdî: Te'vîlâtü Ehli's-Sünne (M. Bâsellûm, Ed.; Vol. 2). Dârü'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.

Mâtürîdî. (2014). Kitâbü't-Tevhîd (B. Topaloğlu, Trans.; 6th ed.). İsam Yayınları.

Mâtürîdî. (2015). Te'vîlâtü'l-Kur'ân Tercümesi (Y. Ş. Yavuz, Ed.; B. Topaloğlu & K. Sandıkçı, Trans.; Vol. 2). Ensar Neşriyat - Ümraniye Belediyesi.

Özpilavcı, F. (2012). Gazzali'nin Mantık İlmini Meşrulaştırmasının Mantık Tarihi Açısından Değerlendirilmesi. İslami İlimler Dergisi, 7(13).

Özpilavcı, F. (2017). Davud-i Karsi'nin Şerhu İsaguci Adlı Eserinin Eleştirmeli Metin Neşri ve Değerlendirmesi. Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi, 21(3).

Öztürk, M. B. (2022). Te'vîlâtü'l-Kur'ân'da Mâtürîdî'nin Felsefe Algısı. Marife Dini Araştırmalar Dergisi, 22(1).

Tekin, A. (2014). Kategoriler Kitabı'nın Meşşâî Mantıktaki Mertebesi Üzerine Tartışmalar. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 4(1), 61–72.

Turgut, H. (2021). İbn Teymiyye'nin Mantık Eleştirilerinin Kelâm İlmi Açısından Değerlendirilmesi. Kocaeli İlahiyat Dergisi, 5(1).

Yavuz, Y. Ş. (2000). Maturidilik. In DİA (Vol. 28, pp. 165–175). İSAM.

Yıldırım, İ. (2014). Fıkıh Usûlü Mantık İlişkisinin Anatomisi. Eskiyeni, (29).

Yörükan, Y. Z. (1953). İslâm Akaid Sisteminde Gelişmeler ve Ebû Mansur-i Matüridî. Ankara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 2(2–3).