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Journal of Chinese
            Architecture and Urbanism                                      Urban regeneration market mechanism research






























             Figure 5. Caixi historic area, Dongcheng (Eastern) District, Beijing. Source: Drawings by the authors (Data in the figure are derived from interviews or
             project introductions during our research investigation and do not necessarily represent the accurate final data); photos from the platform company

            Table 2. Benefits distribution in different governance structures
            Governance structure                   Value type                       Benefit distribution
                                                                        Government       Market       Residents
            Welfare protection-oriented type      Public welfare          (++,+)          (+,+)        (+,++)
            Economic growth-oriented type         Economic value           (o,+)        (++,++++)       (o,o)
            Integrated development-oriented type  Public welfare+economic value  (++,+)  (++,++)        (+,+)
            Note: “+” denotes the scale of input or benefit, and the magnitude increases with the number of “+”. On the other hand, “o” denotes that no input is
            made or no benefit is obtained.

            implementation with balanced costs and benefits under   market transaction price of second-hand housing in this
            government financial investment. In this type of project,   community is about 114,500 yuan/sqm, and the market
            facilities and public space projects have a relatively high   price of a 50 sqm room should be about 5.7 million,
            degree of publicity, which can be used by all urban residents.   which is 10 times the investment of the project. Overall,
            The source of government investment also comes from the   this is a good deal for the original residents. According
            tax revenue provided by urban residents, forming a closed   to the feedback from the implementation enterprise, the
            loop that balances cost input and users. However, the use   proportion of residents who have agreed reached 100%
            rights of residential regeneration projects are owned by the   each time in the three rounds of consultation, which is
            residents, and the degree of publicity is low. The government   rare in old community regeneration projects. Some public
            invests in renovation funds in a targeted manner. The   opinions on the Internet said, “Residents in this project
            residents of the regenerated community have benefited   bought a new dwelling of more than 5 million yuan with
            from the improved spatial conditions, while the residents   150,000 yuan, which is almost an unexpected fortune.”
            of the unrenovated community have never obtained any   The economic growth governance structure is mainly
            benefits. In fact, it is an unfair distribution of regeneration   aimed at tapping the economic value, meeting the profit
            rights. For example, in the Guangming Building 17 project,   demand of various market players, and promoting the
            the original residents invested in the purchase of the rebuilt   efficient use of spatial resources through the reasonable
            houses. The renovation cost of the original house area is   allocation of spatial property rights, which is a kind of
            1560 yuan/sqm, and the new parts for purchase after the   mature market regeneration model, and the government
            renovation are based on the comprehensive reconstruction   can obtain certain tax revenue through the development
            cost of 6564 yuan/sqm; the average investment of 157,000   of  industries.  In  projects  such  as  old  buildings  and
            yuan per household can buy a room of about 50 sqm, the   industrial plants, the original low-efficiency industries


            Volume 6 Issue 1 (2024)                         10                       https://doi.org/10.36922/jcau.0885
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