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International Journal of
Population Studies Drivers of reproductive delay in the UK

over 6% in 1980 (Heazell et al., 2018). Given that female which changes in family structures, reproductive behavior,
fecundity peaks at around 25 years, and steadily decreases and individual lifestyles are increasingly influenced by
after age 30 (Igarashi et al., 2015), postponement for this post-materialist values. Key elements include increased
long means that the window of reproductive opportunity divorce rates, declines in marriage rates, and shifts in family
is restricted to only a few fertile years in later adulthood. At formation where having children are seen more as optional
this point, people quickly try to achieve their family goals than a social expectation. It emphasizes the changing role
but along with problems of low fecundity, families run of women including that women postpone fertility as
higher risks of difficult pregnancies, a higher likelihood of they gain decision-making power and move away from
preterm babies, and an increased likelihood of conditions traditional gender norms and changing values, that have
such as Down syndrome and autism spectrum disorder. been observed across Europe (Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004).
The question then is why are people leaving it so late This is related to Gender Revolution Theory (GRT),
to have children? What are the barriers to reproduction which focuses on the SDT implications for women, and
in the UK? Previous work has indicated that educational changes in family dynamics with women occupying
expansion for women is a leading cause of fertility more roles outside of the home. Higher-educated women
postponement (Ní Bhrolcháin & Beaujouan, 2012) but who seek to partner with similarly-educated men face a
this explanation is limited; years of education per se is not “marriage squeeze” as women’s rates of education exceed
associated with late childbearing, it is the career pathway men’s but they are nevertheless less inclined to “marry
that higher education brings, with factors associated with down” (Van Bavel, 2012). Once a partner is found;
financial security and career precarity likely to be the actual however, negotiations around the equity of childcare
reasons for postponing having children (Berrington, 2004; ensue. The GRT explains how when women are doubly
Billari et al., 2006; Testa et al., 2016). Higher education for burdened with childcare and paid work, fertility is
women elevates their position in the professional labor expected to be low, but when partners share the unpaid
force and this leaves them having to make difficult choices work, fertility should increase (Goldscheider et al., 2015;
in workplaces that are often unsupportive of motherhood Raybould & Sear, 2020). This is likely to be more relevant
(McDonald, 2000). for higher-educated women, given their place in the labor
force although empirical data on this are lacking for the
However, having a higher education cannot explain UK. The GRT explains the transformation of gender roles,
all postponement of children because lower-educated which are both a driving force and a result of the changes
women are also delaying childbearing relative to previous described by the SDT. The SDT provides a demographic
generations, although not as much as educated women framework for understanding how these shifts in gender
who are the stronger drivers of this correlation (Beaujouan roles and family structures have developed over time.
& Berghammer, 2019). In their cross-national study in
Europe, Mills et al. (2011) showed that even women with a The male fertility gap – the difference between men’s
lower-secondary school education had a mean age at first desired family size and what they get – is similar to
birth of around 24 or 25 years in most countries, which is women’s in the UK. A study conducted with two of the
older than the average age at finishing university. There is UK birth cohorts showed that there was a gap of almost
a paucity of literature on the reasons why lower-educated half a child for men and only 36% of men had achieved
women postpone, which this study aims to redress by their intended complete family sizes by age 46 (Berrington
examining the barriers to reproduction within educational & Pattaro, 2014). This research also showed a U-shaped
groups. educational curve in male fertility: university-educated
men and those with no qualifications were more likely to
Women’s educational expansion can be construed as have three children compared with those of intermediate
part of a wider, more general, and ideational change that education who had smaller family sizes. There is an
has seen gender equality increase over the past half century, implicit assumption in the literature that men’s fertility
which partly describes the Second Demographic Transition schedules are driven by women’s, that is, their partners
(SDT) (Lesthaeghe, 2014). The primary argument of the make the decisions (Kneale & Joshi, 2008). This argument
SDT theory is that the demographic changes occurring arises from empirical observations that individuals tend
in high-income societies are not driven by economic to partner with people of similar socioeconomic and
factors alone but by profound shifts in cultural and value educational backgrounds (Erát, 2021; Klesment & Van
systems. This theory, developed by demographers such Bavel, 2015) and the fact that having children tends to be
as Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, posits that the initial a joint decision between couples (Bernardi & Keim, 2007;
demographic transition, characterized by declining Kneale & Joshi, 2008). However, to my knowledge, there
mortality and fertility rates, is followed by a second phase in are no studies dedicated to examining the reasons behind

Volume 11 Issue 3 (2025) 126 https://doi.org/10.36922/ijps.3600