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Transition to first marriage in China

genders (Huebler and Lu, 2012). As the country becomes more integrated in the global economy after the World Trade
Organization (WTO) access in 2001 and consumerism takes root in everyday life, youths meet unprecedented economic
pressure to tick their adulthood markers such as marriage and childbirth. Steeper social stratification along the lines
mentioned above could create differential levels of stress for different youth groups in their marriage formation.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Entry into first marriage
During the past two decades, in a general trend of a “less orderly and more protracted” transition to major milestone
events of adult life for youths in Western industrialized societies (Furstenberg, 2010), researchers have documented
increasing rates of delayed marriage or non-marriage (e.g., in Goldstein and Kenney [2001] and in Billari and Liefbroer
[2010] for European countries). Some researchers attribute such social changes to macro-level structural constraints that
impose barriers for youths to acquire the otherwise aspired marriage formation, including lengthy formal education and
skills training, unstable labor market, and growing financial needs to settle down among popular consumerism. Others
turn to shifting gender dynamics as an explanation. According to Becker’s (1981) gender role specialization model,
better-educated women with more employment opportunities find marriage less appealing than their lower-educated
counterparts. Oppenheimer’s (1988) preference entry theory posits that higher-educated women could afford more time
to choose ideal partners. Scholars of the second demographic transition, however, underscore the ideational changes that
lead to deinstitutionalization of marriage and decoupling of marriage and childbirth in these societies (Lesthaeghe, 2010).
Sociologist Cherlin (2004) famously declared “the deinstitutionalization of American family,” where the meaning of
marriage has been redefined with a focus on emotional satisfaction, personal choice, and self-development, due to long-
term cultural and material trends in America.
Although scholars observe an overall “delayed but orderly” pattern in transition to adulthood (Furstenberg, 2013),
given diverse economic, cultural, and institutional contexts in this region, paths of Asian youths’ transition to marriage
are heterogeneous. For example, Japan has seen a steady rise of delayed marriage and non-marriage to a level comparable
to that in industrialized Western societies (Raymo, 1998; 2003). In South Asian countries such as India and Nepal,
however, the average age of first marriage remains low (Yeung and Alipio, 2013), where the family may play a significant
role in facilitating women’s negotiation of marriage and education (Ji, 2013). In the case of China, Yeung and Hu’s
(2013) analysis of five birth cohorts who come of age from early communist years until the post-reform era finds neither
substantial delay of nor retreat from marriage. Similarly, Tian’s (2013) exploration of CGSS data documents no significant
cohort differences (between the 1970s birth cohort and the 1960s cohort) in marriage timing, despite a salient age-specific
education effect: Higher education encourages men’s but reduces women’s marriage odds at older ages. Piotrowski
et al. (2016) further unpacked the gendered transition patterns by rural/urban divide, revealing that higher education is
negatively associated with rural women’s marriage chances, while such a relationship does not exist for urban women’s
marriage transition, probably due to modernizing effects. Ji and Yeung (2014) reported regional variations in marriage
prevalence and timing, with those living in the eastern and urban areas entering marriage later, but almost all women
and over 95% of men being married by 35–39. Such patterns are accompanied and compounded by the country’s unique
contours of change and continuity in legal, structural and ideational contexts. First, the 1950 Marriage Law and its revised
version in 2001 have brought about a trend of privatization of marriage (Davis, 2014). Second, an unbalanced sex ratio
(Poston and Glover, 2005; Trent and South, 2011) and gender discrimination in the labour market (Zhang, Hannum,
and Wang, 2008) implicate gendered transitions to marriage. Third, increasing educational homogamy (Han, 2010) and
remaining parental involvement in marriage decisions (Riley, 1994) coexist. Fourth, there emerge paradoxical aspirations
for traditional family ideals and personal freedom under the joint influence of state regulations, traditional ideals and
Westernization among youths (Yeung and Hu, 2016).
3.2. Assortative marriage

Besides the marriage formation tempo, the question of “who marries who” is also an indicator of social dynamics in
particular societies. Homogamy, whether measured by socioeconomic status or other ascriptive factors, leads to social
closure where boundaries are maintained and inequalities escalate (Mare, 2016). A study by Smits et al. (1998) found an
inverted U-curve relationship between the level of economic development and educational homogamy. They also reported
the higher levels of educational homogamy in Catholic, Muslim, Confucian, and mixed Catholic/Protestant countries.
Replicating the above study, Raymo and Xie’s (2000) analysis of data from China, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States

12 International Journal of Population Studies | 2018, Volume 4, Issue 1