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Lv, et al.

the public through annual reports or ESG reports, robust sample for studying policy implementation. On
while failing to match such claims with substantive the other hand, the implementation of CEPI functions as
actions. This type of behavior not only undermines a powerful policy tool for environmental regulation and
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the sustainable development of the enterprises but also enforcement, curbing perfunctory practices, superficial
hinders the attainment of the SDGs. rhetoric without action, and passive compliance that
Extant literature demonstrates that the formulation lacks substantive implementation. Consequently, it
of targeted national environmental policies constitutes exerts a more direct and effective impact on corporate
a critical measure for effectively regulating corporate ESG Gws behavior. 10
behavior, enhancing regulatory efficacy, and improving In terms of theory background, most relevant studies
environmental protection outcomes. Examples include have explored the impact of CEPI on corporate ESG
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Brazil’s voluntary environmental policies, India’s Gws behaviors based on stakeholder theory, principal–
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environmental information policies, and Turkey’s agent theory, and cost–benefit theory. However,
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environmentally friendly agricultural land conservation these studies have overlooked a critical link: for CEPI
programs. However, national policies often exhibit to truly exert an influence on enterprises, it must first
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limited effectiveness during implementation. A primary be perceived by corporate executives, thereby shaping
contributing factor is the significant information their subsequent behaviors. In addition, existing
asymmetry between central and local governments. research has not addressed specific action pathways,
Driven by local interests such as regional economic such as how executives adjust corporate strategies and
development and performance evaluations, local make targeted investment decisions after perceiving
governments may engage in selective information inspector-related pressures. Executive interpretation of
disclosure or lower policy implementation standards CEPI policy is directly reflected in investment choices,
during policy execution, leading to policy distortions including investments in environmental protection
at the implementation stage. This, in turn, results in equipment, green technology research and development
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inadequate regulation of corporate ESG Gws practices. (R&D), and regulatory circumvention. Meanwhile,
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Existing research has rarely explored how national corporate financial slack (Fs) serves as a key resource
policies influence corporate ESG Gws behavior within for executives to translate policy perceptions into
this context, indicating a notable research gap. practical actions. When Fs is sufficient, enterprises are
Since 2013, China has continuously deepened more capable of engaging in substantive ESG practices,
reforms in environmental protection policies, with thereby reducing the likelihood of Gws. Conversely,
the central government repeatedly emphasizing the when Fs is insufficient, effective implementation
need to prioritize environmental protection alongside remains challenging even if executives are attentive to
economic development. However, China has policy directives.
witnessed a phenomenon where local governments This paper examined the impact of CEPI on corporate
have implemented environmental protection standards ESG Gws behavior from the perspective of executive
ineffectively despite explicit central government attention, drawing on attention theory and utilizing
mandates for their enhancement. To mitigate information panel data of Chinese A-share–listed firms in Shanghai
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asymmetry between the central and local governments and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2022. Concurrently, it
during policy implementation, the central government investigated how executives respond to the impact
launched the Central Environmental Protection of CEPI based on available resources, with Fs as the
Inspection (CEPI) in 2015. Its core objective is to break measurement variable. The marginal contributions of
institutional constraints and create effective pressure this paper are as follows: first, it explores the impact
mechanisms, serving as a basis for official accountability of CEPI, an external pressure mechanism, on corporate
and performance evaluation. This initiative aims to ESG Gws behavior and clarifies its key role in regulating
urge local governments at all levels to heighten their corporate environmental conduct and curbing Gws.
attention to environmental protection and incentivize Second, it examines the association between CEPI
enterprises to practically fulfill their environmental and corporate Gws behavior from the perspective of
responsibilities. Such a context provides an important managerial attention, expanding the application scope
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research sample for this paper. On the one hand, China, of attention theory in corporate management practices.
as a centralized country with distinct characteristics, Third, it introduces Fs as a moderating variable to
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boasts strong coordination and policy implementation investigate the influencing mechanism between CEPI
capabilities at the central government level, offering a and corporate Gws behavior. By fully considering the

Volume 22 Issue 4 (2025) 220 doi: 10.36922/AJWEP025280219