Page 79 - EER-2-3
P. 79

Explora: Environment
            and Resource                                            The development of the river chief in Nantong and Huzhou



              By loosening policymaking restrictions at lower levels   The issue becomes even more significant when it is
            of government, the Chinese central government and   realized that most rivers in China flow across different
            party created “policy laborites”  that helped launch the   administrative areas. This created a situation where local
                                      2
            internal policy transfer processes – phenomena that have   governments and agencies found themselves in conflict
            occurred in the United States since its founding.  As local   when  pollution  events  occurred,  particularly  when
                                                   3
            governments engaged in policy experimentation (under an   upstream  pollution  impacted  downstream jurisdictions
            environment of intense competition to be seen as leading   and  when left  and  right  banks  fell under  different
            or advanced), the same issues that have been discussed   administrative jurisdictions. 17
            in  the  policy  transfer  literature  emerged  across  China,   To address these (and other) issues, Wuxi established
            including problems associated with the transfer of what is   river chiefs at the municipal and county levels to monitor
            often discussed as “best practice” models. 4-16  To illustrate   and take direct responsibility for 79 river sections in the
            this, we will draw on the movement of the river chief from   area. Based on Wuxi’s success in cleaning river pollution
            Wuxi to the Jiangsu Provincial government, Nantong, and   and bringing accountability to the water management
            Huzhou, focusing on the role of structural and individual   system, other municipalities began their experiments with
            motivations in shaping the outcomes of the transfer   river chiefs.  As information on the river chief system
                                                                         18
            process.
                                                               filtered up to provincial governments and eventually the
              In 2007, a cyanobacteria outbreak on Taihu Lake   central government (and the party apparatus), a decision
            threatened Wuxi’s drinking water. In response, Jiangsu   was taken to implement the river chief nationwide between
            province issued the Wuxi City river section water quality   2016 and 2018.
            control objectives and assessment methods policy (on a trial   The problem we will examine in the remainder of this
            basis). The core idea was to allow Wuxi to establish a river   article is that the best practice developed in Wuxi turned
            chief system that held the named party and government   out to be the best for only a few places outside of Wuxi. 19-22
            officials accountable for water quality management and   Part of the reason for the disjuncture is due to the need
            restoration. In addition to holding named individuals   for learning in the transfer process and the complexity of
            accountable for water quality (based on the level of core   the processes needed to engage in hard learning versus
            pollutants in the water), the trial instituted the office of the   soft  learning. 15,23,24   This comes  to the forefront when  it
            river chief to better coordinate the range of departments
            and  subunits  involved in  water management.  The   is realized that transferred information tends to move
            problem created by having over 10 different departments   through  a  range  of  networks,  agents,  and  institutions
                                                               during the transfer and adaptation processes.
                                                                                                   25-34
            and subunits involved in water management was the
            confusion of responsibility for overall water quality and   While discussions of how policies are translated
            the development of numerous approaches and policies   (transformed) during the transfer process have added to
            governing the same body of water. Furthermore, having   the transfer literature, in general, these discussions fit into
            multiple agencies responsible for water led to a lack   the  original  continuum  offered  by  Dolowitz  and  Marsh
                                                                                                             5
            of bureaucratic and individual accountability in water   relating to what happens to a policy as it transfers and enters
            management. To give a flavor of this issue, we note that   its  new  setting.  Specifically,  Dolowitz  and  Marsh   argue
                                                                                                       7
            the core departments involved in water management   that transfer can fall along a continuum running from a
            include (but are not limited to) the Water Conservancy   perfect copy of the original model to being translated to
            Department, the Environmental Protection Bureau, the   such an extent that a new policy is little more than a hybrid
            Bureau of Housing and Urban–Rural Development, the   of many different policies drawn from a range of actors and
            Development and  Reform  Bureau,  the  Department of   settings. As such, we will be utilizing a slightly modified
            Natural Resources, the Health Bureau, the Bureau of   version of the continuum originally offered by Dolowitz
                                                                        5
            Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and even the Economy and   and Marsh (Figure 1) to analyze the transfer of the Wuxi
            Trade Bureau. This complex arrangement led to a situation   river chief system.
            where:                                               At its base, a transfer is possible because policymakers
               [T]he local water pollution control is not effective,   face similar issues and challenges despite differences
               though the local governors are accountable for this,   between systems and settings. When faced with similar
               they would shirk part of their responsibility toward   issues, transfer is an attractive option because it allows for
               the departments in the vertical line. Therefore, local   a degree of certainty and speed in developing a solution.
               governors are not motivated to take responsibility for   After all, policymakers can see what has already been done
               water pollution control. 17(p1)                 to address the issue. 35



            Volume 2 Issue 3 (2025)                         2                           doi: 10.36922/EER025110018
   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84