Page 152 - IJPS-11-3

International Journal of
Population Studies Family planning and its economic outcomes

because there are less workers available in the labor market pension schemes, to address the challenges associated with
and the structural rigidity associated with aging labor force aging populations.
(Kerr & Beaujot, 2016). The experience of population aging in China, in

For decades, the Chinese government implemented a contrast to that of developed countries, could be described
series of policies designed to slow the growth of the world’s as “getting old before getting rich” as China remains a
most populous nation, including limiting urban couples to developing country, and its aging population is likely
one child. However, the long-term effects of these policies unsustainable due to a lack of economic foundation
have been the fastest population aging and the sharpest (Myers et al., 2020). When China joined the world’s
population decline projected for the coming decades, “aged population club” in 2015, its per capita GDP was
setting the stage for potential demographic and economic only $8,016.4 – significantly below the global average of
crises, as well as threats to social harmony and stability $15,094.4 at the time (World Bank, 2023). Moreover,
(Myers et al., 2020; Zhang, 2017; Nundy, 2016). While social welfare coverage in China remains limited and
population aging is a common demographic phenomenon, basic. For instance, a recent study by the Organization
the process in China is distinct, primarily resulting for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
from family planning policies rather than economic found that 10 – 15% of pension recipients still depend
development (Buckley, 2013; Rajan, 1994; Yardley, 2008; primarily on their children for old-age support, while this
Myers et al., 2020). The pace of population aging in China figure rises to over 50% for those without a pension (Lee,
far exceeds that of other countries. For instance, it only 2013). Furthermore, despite its limited coverage (due to
takes China 30 years for the proportion of individuals aged low economic development), the state’s pension liabilities
65 and older to increase from 5.6% in 1990 to 13.5% in were estimated at $2.7 trillion in 2010 and $2.9 trillion in
2020, while it takes Canada 75 years for the similar increase 2013 (Lee, 2013:59). Without changes to pension policies,
of senior group – from 5.6% in 1931 to 13.3% in 2006 liabilities are projected to reach $10.25 trillion by 2033,
(Kerr & Beaujot, 2016). According to the United Nations, or nearly 40% of China’s GDP if it grows at a rate of 6%
China was classified as an “aging society” in 2015, when annually (Lee, 2013:59). These figures underscore that
the proportion of those aged 65 and older exceeded 10% China is neither economically nor financially prepared to
of the population (United Nations, 2022). This milestone address the challenges of its aging population.
occurred just 35 years after the implementation of the Simultaneously, the social system is transitioning from
“one-child” policy. Projections from the United Nations government-controlled socialism to a quasi-capitalist free-
Population Division’s 2017 medium fertility scenario market system, shifting old-age care responsibilities from
indicate that the proportion of people aged 65 and older the state to individuals and families (Howden & Zhou, 2015).
will reach 26.3% of the total population by 2050, assuming Conventionally, elderly individuals in China rely on family
a moderate and gradual recovery in fertility rates (Cai members for care. However, with fewer children due to the
et al., 2018).
“one-child” policy, parents may receive less support from
Another unique aspect of population aging in China is their families (Peng, 2011). The policy created the so-called
that it remains a developing country. China is becoming “4-2-1” family structure, where a couple must care for four
the first major nation in history to grow old before parents and a child of their own after marriage (Zhan,
achieving moderate wealth (Lee, 2013; Buckley, 2013). The 2013; Basten & Jiang, 2015). This structure has significant
demographic transition in most countries occurs alongside consequences. First, parents of an only child born under
robust economic development, where declining fertility the “one-child” policy will have at most one surviving child
and mortality rates reflect improved living standards. to support them in old age (a certain number of parents
Developed countries in Western Europe and North America lost their only child because of various reasons, resulting
experienced long “wealth durations” followed by extended so-called “families losing their only child”). If that child is
“aging durations” – a process often described as “getting a daughter adhering to traditional cultural norms, she may
old after getting rich” (GOAR) (Johnston et al., 2016; Song prioritize her husband’s parents over her own (Wolf Jr. et al.,
et al., 2016; Zhan, 2013). In these nations, population aging 2011). Second, when the one-child generation becomes
primarily results from economic growth, as highlighted by adult caregivers, they may simultaneously support four
the slogan from the Third World Population Conference elderly parents and one or two children. This burden forces
in 1974: “Development is the best contraceptive.” These the one-child generation to work harder to provide both
countries also possess necessary – if not always sufficient financial support and physical care for their aging parents
– economic foundations, including comprehensive social (Zhan, 2013). While women in these households face fewer
welfare systems, free healthcare, social security, and robust childcare responsibilities due to declining fertility, their

Volume 11 Issue 3 (2025) 146 https://doi.org/10.36922/ijps.6859