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Breakpoint model application to Turkish population growth

school that explains fertility changes as a response to changes in mortality. In addition, some other theories associate
the demographic transition with economic and social development.
Furthermore, as a result of the continued work in this area done by the social scientists and epidemiologists, Lee
(2011) provides well-ground reasons for decline in mortality during the process of demographic transition as well as for
international migration changes. During the demographic transition, the decline in mortality is due to economic progress,
improved waste disposal and water supply, public health interventions, and medical treatment. As fertility and mortality
declined during the demographic transition, as a result of the globalization process, there was increased international
migration as well as growing foreigners born in many countries. Certainly, international migration can affect POPG in
more developed countries where low fertility would otherwise lead to population decline. Actually, immigration is often
encouraged as a means of reducing the aging population.
Willekens (2015) discusses both consequences of the role of diffusion process in the demographic transition. The first
consequence is a divergence followed by a convergence. Because some numbers of people respond before others do,
the divergence in a population increases. When more people respond, convergence puts in. The second consequence is
the increased response rate among settlers. When the population starts the transition late, that is, when other populations
or other countries were already at an advanced stage, then this population has a higher response rate. In the developing
countries and less developed countries, mortality and fertility declined more quickly than in Europe, where the start was
much earlier. Furthermore, Willekens (2015) points out that people respond to opportunity structures in their close and
more far away circumstances (e.g., family, community, country, and at the global level). People also respond to what
others do. Thus, when some groups in society change ideas about family and children, birth control, living a healthy life,
or about the need to emigrate to improve their living conditions, other people are likely to follow it so these conceptual
changes may make diffusion to all groups in a society. These social interactions and the resulting diffusion of ideas show
the mechanism of social change.
1.2. Trend and development of the POPG in Türkiye
When speaking about the POPG in Türkiye, it may be openly said that the growth has remained still and has been shaped
under the effects of diverse factors. Almost until 1990, the annual POPG rate of the Turkish population remained steadily
above 2%, simply slowing down in the 1990s (Kröhnert, 2010). So far, according to the World Bank (2022a) with an
annual growth rate of 1.2% in 2008, and a current rate of 1.08 in 2020, Türkiye is above the European average. Regarding
population dynamics and transition periods in Türkiye, Doğan (2015) mentions about three different periods. The “first”
period takes place between 1927 and 1955. In this “first” period, birth and death rates were at the highest level. There
were seven children during this first period on average, and the population doubled in 28 years. The second period of
the demographic transition in Türkiye covers the period between 1955 and 1985, when the fertility rate was high and
the mortality rate was low (Doğan, 2015). During this period, the yearly POPG rate was 2.8%. The so-called “third
period” started in 1985 and still continues. According to Doğan (2015), the most important feature of this period is the
considerable decline in the birth rates. It has been observed that the fertility rate in Türkiye has been slowly decreasing
since the 1990s (Gönder, 2017). This author emphasizes that the fertility rate has decreased to 2.05 in 2011 compared to
2001 when it was 2.37, and from 1990 as well when it was 3.08. It is well known and accepted that after the 2000s, Türkiye
entered the last phase of demographic transition (Yüksel, 2015). The demographic transition of Türkiye is considered an
exceptional one. Compared with the averages of the less developed, least developed, and the world, the total fertility rate
(TFR) and the life expectancy for Türkiye are the closest to those of more developed countries, especially when observed
for the period 2003 – 2010 (Aykut, 2013). Despite this rapid transformation, the aging population in Türkiye is still at a
very early stage and Türkiye is one of the slowest aging countries in the world (Aykut, 2013; Gönder, 2017). Türkiye’s
current demographic structure is still in the final stages of the demographic transition process (Canpolat-Bese, Ucar, and
Karakaya-Dogu, 2013). According to these authors, the rapid POPG in Türkiye is now a thing of the past and there is no
likelihood of accelerating POPG again, and it can certainly be said that the annual POPG rate will continue to decline
thereafter. Doğan (2015) further noted that the “fourth period” will begin after the end of this “third” period. Accordingly,
in the “fourth” period, birth and death rates will be expected to be low and equal to each other. As a consequence, the
POPG rate would be zero. One of the conditions of the “fourth” period is the reaching of the net reproduction rate to one
and this process was expected to be reached in 2014. The stabilization of the population, as a second important condition
during this “fourth” period, is expected to be achieved in 2050.
According to the TURKSTAT baseline scenario, the TFR by 2013 is 1.99 (below the 2010 replacement level) and with
projections that the rate will drop to 1.85 in 2023 (commonly mentioned in national documents) and to 1.65 in 2050, and
then, it is expected that after 2050, the POPG rate will be approximately “zero” and that the total population will begin to

26 International Journal of Population Studies | 2021, Volume 7, Issue 1