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International Journal of
            Population Studies                                                             Fertility by parity in China








































            Figure 3. Schedules of total and parity-specific fertility of Chinese women in selected years
            Sources: 1970: Tabulates from Fertility Data of China, edited by Yao (1995); 1980: Tabulates from Analysis of the National One-Per-Thousand-Population Sample Survey, edited by Population & Economics
            Editorial Board (1983); 1989: Tabulations from censuses conducted in 1990; 2000, 2010, 2016: Tabulates from censuses conducted in 2000, 2010, and national one per thousand annual sample surveys of
            population change in 2016, as well as authors’ own estimation from the 2017 Fertility Survey.

            declined slightly to 0.96 in 1979. That is, almost all Chinese   0.61 from 2005 and 2015. With the implementation of the
            women who had already had one child would progress   selective two-child policy in 2013 and the universal two-
            to a second child during the 1950s to 1970s, indicating a   child policy in 2015, the progression ratio to second births
            widespread birth of two children. Since the introduction of   began to fluctuate upward. In particular, after the universal
            the one-child policy in 1980, the progression ratio to second   two-child policy, the progression ratio to second births
            births of Chinese women declined appreciably to 0.80 in   rose sharply from 0.54 in 2015 to 0.71 in 2016, reaching a
            1984 and rebounded slightly from 1985 to 1987 when the   peak of 0.74 in 2017.
            fertility policy in rural areas was adjusted and continued
            to decline afterward. The decline of the progression ratio   The  progression  ratio  to  first  births  has  remained
                                                                                                     th
            to second births during this period undoubtedly reflects   stable at above 0.95 in the second half of the 20  century,
            the impact of the fertility policy. The low level of social   except for the period of the Great Famine. Even though the
            development and traditional fertility attitudes might have   progression ratio to first births has been slowly declining
                                                                                        st
            the opposite effect on the progression ratio to second   since the beginning of the 21   century, it has remained
            births during this period, that is, inhibiting this decline.   at 0.90 recently. The decline in the progression ratios to
            During the 1990s, there was a monotonous and rapid   the third and fourth births was earlier and faster than
            decline in the progression ratio to second births. The rapid   the decline in the progression ratio to the second births,
            decline during this period was partly influenced by the   which occurred in the mid-1960s. It should be noted that
            quality of the birth data. Given that the fertility policy was   the progression ratios to third and fourth births declined
            stable, it suggests that socioeconomic development factors   rapidly from the 1970s onwards, plummeting from 0.89
            played important roles to the decline of progression ratio   and 0.87 in 1970, to 0.36 and 0.30 in 1990, respectively, as
            to second births. The progression ratio to second births   a result of the “later, longer, fewer” policy that began in the
            remained at around 0.45 in the 2000s, then rose to 0.53   early 1970s and one-child policy in the 1980s. After the
            in 2005 as the first generation of only-child entered their   1990s, the progression ratios to the third and fourth births
            reproductive age, and then fluctuated between 0.53 and   stabilized at around 0.20.



            Volume 8 Issue 1 (2022)                         91                      https://doi.org/10.36922/ijps.v8i1.348
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